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Chapter 
1
“!e human mind must think with the aid of categories. Once formed, categories are 
the basis for normal prejudgment.” - Gordon Allport in On the Nature of Prejudice 
(1954/1979, p. 20)
As re%ected in this famous passage from the most widely cited work on prejudice, 
categorizing people into groups is part of human nature (see also Dovidio, Glick, & Rudman, 
2005). Social categorization is a normal and inevitable psychological process that plays a 
functional role in everyday life (Van Knippenberg & Dijksterhuis, 2000). However, these 
categorizations also form the foundation for problematic types of intergroup bias such as 
stereotyping, prejudice and discrimination (Brown, 1995). !ese biases have been at the core 
of the development of the $eld of social psychology a#er World War II, the horrors of which 
resulted in many questions about the roots of prejudice (Cartwright, 1979). 
In recent years, social psychological research on intergroup bias has further expanded in 
quantity. In the years 2005-2008, approximately 10 percent of the articles published in the four 
most prominent social psychology journals studied prejudice or stereotypes, as compared to 
1-2 percent in 4-year periods from 1965 to 1984 (Dovidio, Hewstone, Glick, & Esses, 2010). 
!is growth in number of studies was accompanied by a broadening of perspectives that were 
applied to intergroup bias. For instance, new insights from cognitive and social psychology 
further emphasized the role of basic psychological and social processes in the development of 
bias. Moreover, current emphases on automatic processes, speci$c emotions and fundamental 
neural and evolutionary processes have contributed signi$cantly to the knowledge about the 
nature of intergroup bias (Dovidio et al., 2010). 
A perspective from cognitive science that has recently provided important contributions 
to the study of various social psychological topics – such as emotions, social perception, 
and attitudes – has been derived from theories of embodied cognition (see e.g., Barsalou, 
Niedenthal, Barbey, & Ruppert, 2003; Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, & 
Ric, 2005; Smith & Semin, 2007). Although the embodied cognition framework has o&ered 
valuable new insights into topics that also play a role in intergroup bias, as of yet only a 
relatively small number of studies on prejudice have been inspired by this perspective. !e 
goal of the present dissertation is to enhance the understanding of the nature and working of 
prejudice by applying and investigating ideas from an embodied cognition perspective. 
In short, theories of embodied cognition suggest that psychological processes, including 
cognition, are inherently shaped by the behavior and experiences of people in their physical 
and social environment. In the present dissertation, this framework is used to gain insight 
into the role that a person’s current environment and bodily states play in his or her feelings 
and behavior toward people from ethnic out-groups. Although the main focus is on theories 
of embodied cognition, it should be noted upfront that I do not claim that all the $ndings 
from this dissertation could be explained solely by an embodiment perspective. !e research 
presented in this dissertation also makes use of and may contribute to other perspectives on 
prejudice. 
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!e empirical chapters of this dissertation each relate to independent research questions, 
which will be outlined in more detail at the end of this Introduction. Importantly, the 
empirical chapters are based on collaborative research. !erefore, these chapters and parts 
of the dissertation that speci$cally refer to these chapters are written from the $rst-person 
plural perspective. 
!e remainder of this introductory chapter provides a broader framework in which the 
independent chapters can be positioned. I start this chapter with a section on prejudice, in 
which I give a more detailed de$nition of this type of intergroup bias and describe relevant 
recent approaches to the study of prejudice. !e second section deals with the embodiment 
perspective, by discussing core aspects of embodied cognition theories and how these have 
contributed to the knowledge about social psychological constructs such as attitudes and 
emotions. In the third section, I combine ideas from the $rst two sections into a framework 
that approaches prejudice from an embodiment perspective. Finally, I provide an outline of 
the content of the present dissertation. 
APProAcHes to PrejuDice
!e term ‘prejudice’ $nds its origin in the Latin word praejudicium, meaning “prior 
judgment”. !is etymology is re%ected in Allport’s de$nition of prejudice as “a feeling, 
favorable or unfavorable, toward a person or thing, prior to, or not based on, actual 
experience” (Allport, 1954/1979, p. 6). Although this de$nition comprises both positive and 
negative types of prejudice, Allport and many others have mainly focused on people’s negative 
feelings toward other groups (see Eagly & Diekman, 2005). Nowadays, prejudice has become 
thought of as a biased attitude that is – like other attitudes – built of a cognitive, an a&ective, 
and a behavioral component (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2010). For example, prejudice toward a 
target group may consist of overgeneralized beliefs about the group, disliking of the group, 
and a behavioral tendency to avoid the group1. Moreover, current de$nitions have started to 
emphasize the idea that prejudices are not in%exible, but o#en depend on the social context 
(see Eagly & Diekman, 2005). 
!e term prejudice refers to many di&erent types of biased attitudes, for example based on 
group boundaries de$ned by culture, ethnicity, gender, or role (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2010). 
Although these di&erent manifestations of prejudice may share important core characteristics, 
the underlying processes and resulting biases may di&er in important ways. In the present 
dissertation, the emphasis is on prejudice toward groups that are distinguished by ethnicity. 
Speci$cally, I focus on the biased attitudes of members of an ethnic majority group (the so-
called in-group) toward members of an ethnic minority group (the so-called out-group). 
1 Note that overgeneralized beliefs are also referred to as stereotypes, and the negative behaviors toward or unfair 
treatment of groups as discrimination (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2010). In the de$nition provided here, stereotypes and 
discrimination are considered parts of prejudice. However, other researchers have emphasized that stereotypes and 
prejudice are distinct components of bias that result in di&erent forms of discrimination (e.g., Amodio & Devine, 
2006; Park & Judd, 2005). When distinguishing the two biases, prejudice refers to the a&ective component of bias 
toward out-group members (e.g., the negative a&ective responses; McConahay & Hough, 1976), and stereotypes to 
the cognitive component (e.g., cognitive representations of culturally held beliefs; Hamilton, 1981). 
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implicit prejudice
One of the most drastic changes in the way of thinking about psychological functioning 
has been the idea that the processes that underlie social behavior o#en occur automatically 
(Bargh, 1997; Moors & De Houwer, 2006), or outside conscious awareness or conscious control 
(Bargh & Williams, 2006). !e notion of automaticity has become popular in many research 
areas of social cognition, among which the study of attitudes (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 
2006). Social psychologists have long assumed that people’s evaluations are the result of 
deliberate processes, and can be measured by means of self-reports. However, such deliberate 
or ‘explicit’ attitudes have become contrasted with ‘implicit’ attitudes that are a result of more 
automatic processes and can be inferred from people’s performance on indirect, associative 
measures (Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). 
Traditionally, prejudice was measured by self-reports of people’s evaluations of di&erent 
groups. !ese direct measures of prejudice were in line with the idea that biased attitudes 
are a result of conscious and deliberative processes (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2010). By now, a 
considerable amount of research has been devoted to the study of more implicit forms of bias. 
A variety of indirect measures of prejudice have been developed that focus on associative 
processes underlying out-group evaluations (for overviews see Fazio & Olson, 2003; Gawronski 
& Payne, 2010; Nosek, Hawkins, & Frazier, 2011). Instead of having people directly report 
their evaluations of an out-group, these evaluations are inferred from people’s behavioral 
performance (e.g., response latencies, errors in categorization) on indirect measures. 
One of the most widely used measures of implicit prejudice is the Implicit Association Test 
(IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). In a typical IAT, respondents have to combine 
the categorization of stimuli belonging to one of two categories (e.g., in-group versus out-
group) with the categorization of positive versus negative stimuli (e.g., ‘love’ versus ‘war’). !e 
relative speed with which they respond to the combination of out-group stimuli and negative 
stimuli on the same response key versus out-group stimuli and positive stimuli on the same 
response key is used as an indication of negative associations with the out-group. 
Other indirect measures of prejudice are based on priming techniques, for example the 
A&ective Priming Task (APT; Fazio et al., 1986). In the APT, people have to rapidly indicate 
whether they $nd target stimuli (e.g., adjectives) positive or negative. Before the target stimulus 
appears, a prime (e.g., a picture of an out-group person) is quickly presented on the screen. 
!e idea is that the prime automatically activates an evaluation, which facilitates responses 
to target stimuli that are congruent in valence, and inhibits responses to target stimuli that 
are incongruent in valence. In the case of negative out-group associations, priming with an 
out-group picture should result in faster responses to subsequent negative target stimuli and 
slower responses to subsequent positive target stimuli (Fazio et al., 1986). 
Although indirect measures are now commonly used in research on prejudice, it is not 
always clear what they measure or what is meant by the term ‘implicit prejudice’. Especially, 
notions concerning automaticity and unconsciousness remain topics of confusion and 
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debate (Payne & Gawronski, 2010). Recent empirical evidence shows that people are not 
necessarily unaware of the biased attitudes they hold, but they may not always have insight 
into the sources and operation of these attitudes. !at is, the physical or symbolic presence of 
a member of an out-group may spontaneously activate evaluative associations, which may or 
may not be in line with people’s more deliberate judgments of the out-group (Greenwald & 
Banaji, 1995; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). !us, the terms explicit and implicit should 
not be used as synonyms for conscious and unconscious (Gawronski, Hofmann & Wilbur, 
2006). Instead, these terms refer to the di&erent kinds of evaluative responses on direct versus 
indirect measurement procedures (see also De Houwer, 2006; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 
2011).  
Interestingly, research has shown that explicit and implicit attitudes may in%uence behavior 
in di&erent ways (see Fazio, 1990; Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2002). Applied to prejudice, 
several studies have shown that self-reported ethnic attitudes in%uence deliberate forms of 
bias toward an ethnic out-group, whereas indirect measures of ethnic attitudes predict more 
subtle manifestations of ethnic bias (e.g., Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995; Dovidio, 
Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson, & Howard, 1997). Accordingly, Dovidio, Kawakami, and 
Gaertner (2002) showed that during an interethnic interaction, white participants’ explicit 
ethnic attitudes predicted verbal (un)friendliness toward a black interaction partner, whereas 
implicit ethnic attitudes predicted bias in nonverbal unfriendliness. Furthermore, white 
participants‘ self-impression of friendliness was related to their explicit prejudice and verbal 
behavior. In contrast, these impressions from the perspective of the black interaction partner 
and independent observers were mostly related to the implicit prejudice and nonverbal 
behaviors of the white participant. !us, people’s implicit negative attitudes toward another 
group may ‘leak through’ their nonverbal behaviors, and are recognized by the interaction 
partners (see also Richeson & Shelton, 2005).  
the role of specific emotions
A second development in research on prejudice in the past years has been that researchers 
started to reconsider the traditional ideas about the a&ective component of prejudice. Instead 
of looking at the a&ective component of prejudice as a general attitude or evaluation, the focus 
shi#ed to the study of distinct and di&erentiated emotions that people experience toward 
di&erent groups. !is new perspective allows for more speci$c predictions about a&ective and 
behavioral reactions that people may have to out-groups (Mackie & Smith, 1998). 
Various models have been proposed that move beyond the traditional view of prejudice 
as a general attitude (for an overview see Mackie & Smith, 2002), for example the stereotype 
content model (SCM, see Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002), intergroup emotions theory (IET, 
see Smith, 1993), integrated threat theory (Stephan & Stephan, 2000), and a sociofunctional 
threat-based approach to prejudice (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). !ese models vary in di&erent 
ways; such as the speci$c groups and emotions they investigate, the way in which they cluster 
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emotions in relation to categorization, their focus on processes of social categorization and 
social identity, and the emphasis on threats underlying emotions. Still, these models share 
the general view that out-groups are not merely evaluated as negative, but evoke speci$c 
emotional experiences. 
!e basic negative emotions of anger, fear and disgust (Ekman, 1992) have o#en been 
related to prejudice toward ethnic out-groups. !ese emotions are presumed to have evolved 
to automatically address recurrent problems related to survival (Ekman, 1999). For instance, 
anger may particularly result from obstacles to desired outcomes or competition over 
resources with others, and may result in aggression used to acquire the desired outcome. In 
contrast, fear and disgust produce avoidance responses, instigated respectively by immediate 
threats to physical safety or by the risk of physical or moral contamination (see Mackie & 
Smith, 2002). 
Although fear and disgust are both negative emotions that automatically produce 
avoidance intentions, there are di&erences in the underlying threats by which they are 
triggered. !us, out-groups that evoke fear may not elicit disgust, and vice versa. According 
to a review by Neuberg, Kenrick, and Schaller (2011), fear and disgust are a&ective responses 
that are associated with two functionally di&erent psychological precautionary systems, 
respectively the self-protection system and the disease-avoidance system. !e self-protection 
system is triggered by cues that signal threat of intentional physical harm, whereas the disease-
avoidance system is triggered by cues that connote possible infection. 
Examples of social cues that could trigger the self-protection system are expressions of 
aggression (especially by males; see Daly & Wilson, 1994) and the encounter of members of 
out-groups that are associated with danger. More speci$cally, in the US it has been shown that 
African Americans and Arabs may activate the self-protection system and elicit a pattern of 
emotional reactions related to fear in European Americans (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). !e 
disease-avoidance system is likely to be responsive to social cues that signal possible infection 
in people, for example dis$gured faces, obesity, and physical disability. Furthermore, feelings 
of disgust are also triggered by the perception of behaviors that deviate from the cultural norms 
of the own group. Groups that are historically associated with carrying exotic diseases, such 
as foreigners, and those who are stereotypically associated with speci$c kinds of infectious 
diseases or norm-deviating behaviors, such as gay men in the US, may elicit feelings of disgust 
(see Curtis, Aunger, & Rabie, 2004; Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). 
!us, prejudice not only refers to the negative evaluation of out-groups, but speci$c discrete 
negative emotions underlie people’s biased attitudes toward di&erent groups. Additionally, it 
has been found that this emotion-speci$city of prejudice also a&ects how incidental emotions 
– that is, emotions elicited by sources unrelated to intergroup relations – spill-over to out-
group judgments (Dasgupta, DeSteno, Williams, & Hunsinger, 2009). In a series of studies, 
it was shown that recalling a speci$c negative emotional feeling enhanced people’s scores 
on indirect measures of out-group bias, but only toward out-groups that are stereotypically 
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associated with that emotion. In these studies, implicit out-group bias was measured toward 
a group associated with disgust (i.e., homosexuals) and a group associated with anger (i.e., 
Arabs). Implicit out-group bias toward homosexuals but not toward Arabs increased a#er 
recalling feeling disgusted, whereas the reverse was true a#er recalling angry feelings. !ese 
$ndings suggest that emotions serve as signals that help people deal with speci$c out-
group threats, in line with the idea that emotions are adaptive mechanisms that produce the 
necessary psychological and physiological responses to challenges in the environment (cf., 
Frijda, 1986; Damasio, 1994).   
evolutionary perspectives of prejudice
Recently, evolutionary approaches to prejudice have proposed that the emotional bases for 
intergroup bias may di&er fundamentally for males and females (see Navarrete, McDonald, 
Molina, & Sidanius, 2010). More generally, intergroup con%ict poses di&erent adaptive 
challenges for men and women, which has resulted in distinct psychologies of intergroup 
bias for the sexes. In short, it is proposed that intergroup bias is primarily directed at male 
members of the out-group, and is based on feelings of fear for females and feelings of anger 
for males. 
For men, intergroup con%ict situations should more likely result in risky and aggressive 
behaviors to eliminate or weaken same-sex competitors. As a result, males are expected to 
be both the primary agents and targets of intergroup aggression (Buss, 1999; Daly & Wilson, 
1988). In comparison with men, women have both much to lose and little to gain from 
intergroup aggression. Besides the risk for survival, women run the risk of becoming victims 
of sexual aggression (!ornhill & Palmer, 2000). It has been assumed that in intergroup 
contexts, unfamiliar men from groups other than the own have historically posed greater risk 
of sexual assault than familiar men from the own group (Vikman, 2005). !us, intergroup bias 
should be primarily directed at males from the out-group, and be associated with approach-
oriented aggression in men and avoidance-oriented fear in women.  
According to this perspective, it is thus crucial for the understanding of ethnic bias to 
consider both the gender of the target and the gender of the agent in psychological studies 
on prejudice. In doing so, several studies have provided empirical support for this gendered 
approach to prejudice. First, it has been shown that negative ethnic bias is indeed primarily 
targeted at male out-group members (Haley, Sidanius, Lowery, & Malamuth, 2004; Navarrete 
et al., 2009; Navarrete et al., 2010). Second, studies have started to provide evidence for the 
idea that ethnic bias is generated by di&erent systems for men and women (Navarrete et al., 
2010). In these studies, it was shown that men expressed more aggression-related behaviors 
toward male out-group members than women. Moreover, men’s negative attitudes toward 
an ethnic out-group resulted from individual di&erences in level of social dominance and 
aggression, such that more socially dominant males expressed more negative attitudes. For 
women, explicit ethnic bias and fear of out-group males was predicted by individual di&erences 
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in sexual vulnerability. Females who felt generally more sexually vulnerable expressed more 
negative attitudes toward out-group males. Finally, anxious arousal in response to out-group 
males as measured by skin conductance was found to increase for male participants as a 
function of aggression and social dominance, whereas it was related to sexual vulnerability 
for female participants (Navarrete et al., 2010). 
Overall, these recent studies provide $rst insights into the role of gender in ethnic prejudice. 
In the literature on ethnic bias, most studies focus on male out-group members, in line with 
the suggestion that they are the primary targets of bias. However, not much emphasis is placed 
on the agents of ethnic bias. !e recent gendered approach to prejudice suggests that gender 
of the participant may play a crucial role in investigations of prejudice, especially when these 
concern attitudes or behaviors resulting from fear versus aggression.   
summary
In this section, I have given a brief overview of the $eld of research on prejudice, and 
have discussed recent insights into this form of intergroup bias. In short, prejudice refers 
to the (negatively) biased attitudes that people may have toward members of other groups. 
Recent developments have emphasized that people are not always aware of the sources or 
consequences of these attitudes, and these more implicit forms of prejudice may transfer 
into behaviors that are di'cult to control. Furthermore, instead of merely holding negative 
feelings about other groups, people may experience distinct negative emotions in response to 
di&erent out-groups. Research on these emotions may help to better understand intergroup 
relations. Finally, it has recently been suggested that there are important gender di&erences in 
the emotional basis and expression of prejudice. Males’ responses to men from other ethnic 
groups may primarily be driven by aggression, whereas females’ responses may primarily be 
motivated by fear.    
!e goal of the present dissertation is to further enhance knowledge about prejudice by 
applying and testing ideas from an embodied cognition perspective. !is perspective may 
provide important insights to the study of prejudice, but has as of yet gained little attention in 
this research $eld. Before discussing this perspective’s relevance for the study of prejudice, I 
will explain the basic principles of embodied cognition theories in the next section.   
tHe emboDiment PersPective
!e notion that the body may play an important role in psychological processes is not 
new. Over a century ago, Charles Darwin and William James already developed ideas about 
the embodiment of attitudes and emotions. According to Darwin (1872/1904), an organism’s 
feelings toward an object are re%ected in bodily positions. In de$ning attitudes, he thus 
focused on motor behaviors and postures. Furthermore, James (1884) proposed that bodily 
states play an important causal role in emotional experiences. In phrasing the question “do 
we run from a bear because we are afraid, or are we afraid because we run?”, James suggested 
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that the obvious answer that we run because we are afraid was wrong. Instead, he suggested 
that bodily manifestations are not the result of emotions, but that they precede emotional 
reactions: we are afraid because we run (James, 1884, p. 190; see also LeDoux, 1996, p. 43). 
!ese basic ideas about the body’s involvement in psychological processes have thus 
been around for a long time, but until recently they did not play a central role in (social) 
psychological research and theory (Schubert & Semin, 2009). In contrast, psychological 
theories have mostly relied on so-called amodal models of knowledge representation, 
imported from cognitive psychology in the 1970s and 1980s. In these models, it is assumed 
that high-level cognition processes – such as inference and categorization – operate largely 
independent of the body. Information that is taken in by the di&erent senses (e.g., vision, smell, 
hearing) is stored in memory in the form of abstract symbols that no longer bear a functional 
relation with the neural systems (of e.g., vision, olfaction and audition) that were involved in 
the original experience (e.g., Fodor, 1975; Newell, 1980; see for a discussion Barsalou, 1999). 
As will become clear from the next section, these amodal approaches stand in stark contrast 
with embodiment perspectives of cognition.  
the notion of an embodied mind
An embodiment perspective posits that “states of the body, such as postures, arm 
movements and facial expressions, arise during social interaction and play central roles in 
social information processes” (Barsalou et al., 2003, p. 43). Many embodiment e&ects have 
been reported in social psychology over the years, but only recently theories have been 
proposed that explain these $ndings in a uni$ed manner (see Barsalou, 1999; Wilson, 2002). 
Barsalou’s model of Perceptual Symbol Systems (PSS; see Barsalou 1999; 2003) provides such 
an integrative theory that serves to explain and make a priori predictions about embodiment 
e&ects in social psychology (Barsalou et al., 2003; Niedenthal et al., 2005). 
!e central idea of PSS is that knowledge is represented in the same systems as the sensory 
and motor states that originally produced it. To illustrate, when you perceive a person, neurons 
in the visual system of the brain become active to what you see, in the auditory system to what 
you hear, and in the motor cortex to how you behave. Parts of these sensory and motor states 
during the original experience are stored, and they are partially reenacted when you later 
think or talk about the event. !us, knowledge is represented as a partial simulation of the 
original experience (Barsalou, 1999). !is way, using knowledge is like reliving an experience 
in (parts of) its original modalities (Niedenthal, 2007). 
In amodal models of knowledge acquisition, the mind is viewed as a computer that 
processes information in an abstract way. !e modality-speci$c states that are active during 
an experience are not stored in the original sensory-motor systems, but are translated into 
a new abstract representation language. When thinking about a person you previously 
encountered, no reactivation takes place in the visual, auditory or motor system, but instead 
the amodal symbol is retrieved from a di&erent neural system (Barsalou, 1999). Although 
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models of amodal representation of knowledge have been widely used and have played an 
important role in identifying the properties that are important to human cognition, little 
empirical evidence exists that the brain contains amodal symbols (Barsalou, 1999; Niedenthal 
et al., 2005).     
embodying attitudes and emotions
!e embodied representation of knowledge is now o#en proposed as an interesting 
alternative for amodal theories, and a large number of empirical studies have been reported 
in social psychological research that are in line with theories of embodied cognition (for 
overviews see Barsalou, 2010; Barsalou et al., 2003; Glenberg, 2010; Niedenthal et al., 
2005; Semin & Smith, 2008; Smith & Semin, 2004). I will now brie%y discuss two types of 
embodiment $ndings in the area of attitudes and emotions.   
 !e $rst type of embodiment $ndings demonstrates that (social) stimuli produce or 
facilitate a&ectively laden bodily responses. For example, people tend to approach things they 
like and avoid things they dislike, and it has been shown that people are faster to make approach 
arm movements in response to positive stimuli and avoidance arm movements in response 
to negative stimuli (Chen & Bargh, 1999; see also Eder & Rothermund, 2008; Krieglmeyer, 
Deutsch, De Houwer, & De Raedt, 2010; Rinck & Becker, 2007). Such compatibility e&ects 
between approach and avoidance movements and evaluation have also been found for 
social stimuli. Speci$cally, studies investigating approach and avoidance reactions to facial 
expressions have shown congruency e&ects in response to the emotional category of the 
expression (Heuer, Rinck, & Becker, 2007; Marsh, Ambady, & Kleck, 2005; Roelofs, Minelli, 
Mars, Van Peer, & Toni, 2009; Rotteveel & Phaf, 2004; Seidel, Habel, Kirschner, Gur, & Derntl, 
2010; Stins et al., 2011). To illustrate, participants were slower to pull a joystick toward the 
self in response to angry faces and push a joystick for happy faces, as compared to pushing 
angry faces and pulling happy faces (Roelofs et al., 2009). Similarly, Stins et al. (2011) showed 
that people were faster to initiate forward steps in response to smiling faces as compared to 
angry faces. 
Furthermore, social stimuli have been found to a&ect people’s facial expressions. Several 
studies have shown that imagining or reading about a person automatically produces facial 
responses that express how people feel about the person (e.g., Andersen, Reznik, & Manzella, 
1996; Vanman, Paul, Ito, & Miller, 1997). 
Besides these demonstrations of bodily expressions of attitudes, the processing of emotions 
has also been found to rely on bodily responses. For example, studies have shown that merely 
thinking about an emotion concept is associated with facial simulation of the corresponding 
emotion (e.g., Niedenthal, Winkielman, Mondillon, & Vermeulen, 2009). Furthermore, when 
interpreting faces with ambiguous emotional expressions, the word “happy” led participants 
to express more happiness in their own face as compared to participants who saw the word 
“angry” (Halberstadt, Winkielman, Niedenthal, & Dalle, 2009).  
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!e second type of embodiment $ndings refers to the opposite causal pattern; from bodily 
responses to a&ective states or judgments. For example, it has been shown that adopting 
emotion-speci$c postures and facial expressions may result in the experience of the emotions 
that are associated with the bodily expressions (Duclos et al., 1989; Stepper & Strack, 1993). 
Moreover, blocking the use of expression-relevant facial muscles has been found to impair 
performance in detecting facial expressions that involve those muscles (Niedenthal, Brauer, 
Halberstadt, & Innes-Ker, 2001; Oberman, Winkielman, & Ramachandran, 2007; Stel & Van 
Knippenberg, 2008). Finally, blocking facial expressions also resulted in impaired performance 
on judgments of whether words were related to emotions (Niedenthal et al., 2009).
Besides e&ects of the body on the experience or processing of emotions, adopting emotion-
speci$c gestures or expressions has been found to guide people’s attitudes. To illustrate, Strack, 
Martin, and Stepper (1988) asked participants to either hold a pencil between their lips or 
to hold it between their teeth while judging how funny they found several cartoons. When 
doing this yourself, you will notice that the $rst way of holding the pencil prevents you from 
forming your lips into a smile, whereas the second way of holding the pencil enforces a smile 
on your lips. As expected, people who held the pencil between their teeth rated the cartoons 
as funnier than those who held the pencil between their lips. 
Finally, it has been shown that people’s attitudes toward novel or neutral objects can 
be guided by bodily responses. For example, making movements that are associated with 
positivity – such as approach arm movements or head nodding movements – during the 
perception of a stimulus has been found to result in more liking of that stimulus as compared 
to making the contrasting avoidance arm movements or head shaking movements (see 
Cacioppo, Priester, & Berntson, 1993; Tom, Pettersen, Lau, Burton, & Cook, 1991). To 
illustrate, Tom and colleagues (1991) told participants that they were testing headphones for a 
local manufacturer who wanted to know whether the headphones were suited to wear during 
sports activities (cf., Wells & Petty, 1980). Participants were asked to listen to music over the 
headphones while either nodding the head up and down or shaking it from le# to right in 
order to simulate movement during sports activity. !roughout the head movement task, 
a pencil was present within eyesight of the participant. At the end of the task, participants 
received a pencil as reward for their participation. !ey could choose between the pen that 
was present during the experiment and a pen they had not seen before. !e results showed 
that people who had nodded their head in the experiment more o#en chose the pen that was 
present during the listening session, whereas people who had shaken their head more o#en 
chose the pen that was not present during the listening session. !us, nodding the head may 
result in favoring an unrelated stimulus that happened to be present while performing these 
approving movements. 
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the role of the social environment
I have now discussed two types of $ndings that underscore the important role that the 
body plays in the processing of social and a&ective information. !at is, (1) the perception 
of stimuli directs people’s behavior, and (2) people’s behaviors guide their perception and 
judgment of stimuli. Although the term embodied cognition by de$nition puts the body in 
a prominent position, the embodied cognition framework also emphasizes the important 
in%uence of the social environment in cognition (see Clark, 1997; Yeh & Barsalou, 2006), 
which is also re%ected in terms such as ‘socially situated cognition’ (Smith & Semin, 2004) or 
‘situated social cognition’ (Smith & Semin, 2007). 
From an amodal perspective, mental representations are context-free; they are stored in 
memory as prototypes or schemas, “divorced from the speci$cs of the situation in which the 
knowledge was acquired and used” (Smith & Semin, 2004; p. 86). In contrast, an embodied 
cognition perspective suggests that knowledge is actually organized in terms of speci$c 
situations (Smith & Semin, 2004; Smith & Semin, 2007). Evidence has been found supporting 
this assumption. For example, it has been shown that people recall lists of words better when 
they perform the recall test in the same environment (e.g., the same room) as in which they 
learned the words (see Smith & Semin, 2004). A classic demonstration of this phenomenon 
was provided by Godden and Baddeley (1975), who had divers learn lists of words in two 
natural environments: on the beach or underwater. Subsequently, the divers were asked to 
recall the words in either the environment in which they had memorized them, or in the 
alternative environment. !e results showed that the lists that were learnt underwater were 
best recalled underwater, and lists that were learnt on the beach were best recalled on the 
beach. 
A natural consequence from the fact that the environment plays an important role in 
cognitive processes is that people actively manage their environment to ease such processes 
(Kirsh, 1995). For example, we place a letter we need to post on a visible spot near the door, 
so we will think about it when we leave. Furthermore, if our behavior is sensitive to situations, 
these situations should not be ignored when studying (social) behavior. !is may have 
methodological implications for the way in which psychological experiments are designed in 
a laboratory context. According to Smith and Semin (2004; p. 88), “the true strength of the 
laboratory is not its supposed insulation of behavior from context e&ects, but its %exibility in 
allowing experimenters to construct very di&erent types of contexts, suited to test di&erent 
types of theoretical hypotheses”. 
In sum, an embodiment perspective situates the body and the environment at the core 
of psychological processes. Amongst others, support for this perspective has been found in 
research on attitudes and emotions. First, it has been shown that people’s feelings about stimuli 
are expressed in their bodily responses toward these stimuli. Second, research has shown that 
bodily responses may shape people’s attitudes toward stimuli in their environment. !ird, the 
environment has been suggested to play an important role in the representation of knowledge. 
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emboDiment of PrejuDice
According to several reviews of embodied cognition theories, the embodiment approach 
is ripe to generate research that can further the understanding of social attitudes and prejudice 
(Niedenthal, 2007; Niedenthal et al., 2005). Several predictions about the important role of 
the environment and the body in prejudice follow from the discussion of the embodiment 
perspective in the previous section. First, the environment in which a person encounters an 
out-group member – or stimuli that represent an out-group, such as names or pictures – should 
a&ect which experiences about that group are being reenacted. As a result of these context-
dependent simulations, people’s feelings and responses toward the out-group should di&er 
across various situations. Second, people’s biased attitudes are bound to a&ect their bodily 
responses toward members of the out-group. !ird, in order to change prejudiced responses 
toward an out-group, it may be e'cient to target the emotional and behavioral bases of the 
biased attitudes. Speci$cally, repeatedly coupling pleasant experiences or positive behavioral 
responses to out-group members could positively a&ect simulations during subsequent 
encounters with members of this group, which could reduce the negative responses to the 
out-group. 
For the relation between biased attitudes and bodily responses, abundant evidence can be 
found in the literature on prejudice. As discussed in the section on prejudice, implicit forms of 
bias have especially been shown to a&ect people’s nonverbal behaviors toward the out-group. 
For example, implicit bias has been found to result in more distance behavior (see Amodio & 
Devine, 2006; Dotsch & Wigboldus, 2008; Dovidio et al., 1997), and anxious responses such 
as eye blinking and the avoidance of eye contact (Dovidio et al., 1997). As I will discuss below, 
the e&ect of the environment and bodily responses on prejudice have thus far received only 
little attention. 
Prejudice is situated in the environmental context
Social psychologists have long thought of attitudes – and especially attitudes assessed by 
indirect measurements (e.g., Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000) – as stable representations 
in memory. Accordingly, indirect measures of prejudice were also considered to re%ect stable 
evaluations of out-groups. However, the malleability of scores on indirect measures of biased 
attitudes (e.g., the IAT) has now been demonstrated extensively (for a review see Blair, 2002). 
For example, when people were $rst primed with admired exemplars of an out-group and 
disliked exemplars of the in-group, a subsequent IAT showed weakened relative negativity to 
the out-group (Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001). Similarly, primes of African American faces 
against the background of a ghetto elicited more negative automatic evaluations in European 
Americans than the same primes in the context of a church (Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 2001; 
see also Barden, Maddox, Petty, & Brewer, 2004). 
Although these previous studies have shown that implicit attitudes may not re%ect stable 
representations in memory, and acknowledge that attitudes are to some extent sensitive to 
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context, explanations for these e&ects stem primarily from amodal cognition perspectives, as 
were discussed in the previous section. For example, people may have di&erent schemas in 
their mind for thinking about an out-group, and the speci$c situation then activates the best-
$tting schema (Tesser, 1978, see Blair, 2002). In other words, priming people with positive 
members of an out-group may enhance the mental accessibility of positive exemplars of that 
group, which may result in more positive associations as re%ected on the indirect attitude 
measure (Dasgupta & Rivera, 2008). !is explanation is in line with the idea of an attitudinal 
cognitorium (Bassili & Brown, 2005), which refers to an associative network in long-term 
memory that houses di&erent beliefs that may become accessible by internal or external cues. 
However, from an embodied cognition approach, the context is not seen as an external cue 
that makes certain schemas or exemplars of an out-group in a cognitive associative store more 
accessible. Instead, the focus should be on the perceiver, whose evaluations of the out-group 
should be a&ected by the environment that he or she is situated in. !at is, the environment 
activates modality-speci$c experiences that may or may not be related to modality-speci$c 
experiences with the out-group. In the case of overlapping activations, the in%uence of the 
environment may transfer to people’s evaluation of the out-group. Speci$cally, bringing people 
in a fearful state by making changes to the environment (e.g., turning o& the lights) might 
a&ect their evaluations of a group that typically evokes feelings of fear. In the $eld of prejudice, 
studies that have focused on the role of such situated environments in the expression of bias 
are scarce (for exceptions, see Schaller, Park, & Mueller, 2003, and recently Inbar, Pizarro, & 
Bloom, 2012). Studying the role of the environment in the expression and development of 
biased attitudes may enhance our understanding of the dynamic and adaptive functions of 
evaluations. 
In the $rst part of the present dissertation, the aim was to elucidate how the environment 
in%uences people’s biased attitudes. Speci$cally, we focused on the role of ambient darkness 
in the expression of people’s negative associations toward an ethnic out-group. Darkness has 
been found to signal danger, which may elicit fear in people (Grillon, Pellowski, Merikangas, 
& Davis, 1997; Mühlberger, Wieser, & Pauli, 2008). In line with the idea that di&erent groups 
evoke di&erent discrete negative emotions, we studied the e&ect of darkness of the room on 
people’s negative associations with an out-group that elicits fear. !us, in Part 1 we combined 
an embodiment approach with recent perspectives on the emotional bases of prejudice.  
Prejudice is interrelated with bodily responses
According to an embodiment approach to prejudice, the body should also play an 
important role in the expression and development of biased attitudes. In line with the two 
types of embodiment $ndings that I described before, a bidirectional link is expected between 
people’s attitudes and their automatic bodily responses toward members of an ethnic out-
group. First, people’s attitudes toward an out-group should automatically guide their bodily 
responses toward people belonging to that group. Second, people’s bodily states should also 
in%uence their biased attitudes. By now, many studies have been reported that show e&ects of 
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people’s biased attitudes on their bodily responses toward an out-group. However, research on 
how bodily movements may shape or alter people’s biased attitudes is still in its early stages. 
!e automatic behavioral consequences of prejudice have received much attention in the 
literature on intergroup bias. To sum up, scores on indirect measures of prejudice have been 
found to predict a variety of nonverbal behaviors, such as eye blinking and visual contact 
(Dovidio et al., 1997), nonverbal friendliness as indicated by factors such as eye contact, 
smiling, spatial distance and body language (Dovidio et al., 2002; Fazio et al., 1995; McConnell 
& Leibold, 2001), and interpersonal distance (Amodio & Devine, 2006; Dotsch & Wigboldus, 
2008). In the present dissertation, it is further studied how biased attitudes may in%uence the 
body, by focusing on approach and avoidance arm movements (cf., Chen & Bargh, 1999). 
Importantly, we used this knowledge about how prejudice a&ects approach and avoidance 
responses to subsequently design a training in which these responses are used as input, in 
order to directly tap into these underlying behavioral processes.  
Although it has been repeatedly demonstrated that implicit forms of prejudice result in 
negative nonverbal behaviors toward members of an out-group, research on ways to reduce 
biased attitudes has mainly focused on changing people’s cognitive or associative schemas 
about an out-group (e.g., Kawakami, Dovidio, Moll, Hermsen, & Russin, 2000; Olson & Fazio, 
2006; Rudman, Ashmore, & Gary, 2001). Speci$cally, by informing people about prejudice 
during a semester-long seminar (Rudman et al., 2001), by training people to literally say no 
to stereotypic associations (Kawakami et al., 2000), or by presenting people repeatedly with 
pairs of positive pictures and out-group stimuli (Olson & Fazio, 2006), these previous studies 
showed a reduction of bias on indirect measures of prejudice or stereotypes. 
Despite the promising e&ects on indirect measures of prejudice, the authors of these 
previous studies have not considered directly the experiential basis of prejudice. !at is, 
because these trainings have not focused directly on the bodily and emotional responses that 
are elicited by members of the out-group, subsequent encounters with an out-group may still 
evoke simulations of arousal and nonverbal avoidance behaviors. According to an embodiment 
perspective, these bodily responses should be addressed in order to a&ect people’s attitudes 
and behaviors toward the out-group. !us, if an out-group typically evokes feelings of fear 
and avoidance responses, prejudice-reducing methods should focus on reducing fear and 
avoidance.  
!e idea that people’s bodily responses may shape their attitudes has as of yet gained 
relatively little attention in the $eld of prejudice. As an exception, Kawakami, Phills, Steele, 
and Dovidio (2007) have demonstrated that repeatedly making approach arm movements in 
response to pictures of out-group males – as compared to avoidance arm movements or no 
movements – resulted in reduced bias on a subsequent IAT and a behavioral measure. !ese 
studies provided a $rst empirical test of the role of bodily movements in the development 
of biased attitudes. As will be explained in the next section, in the present dissertation it is 
investigated how approach arm movements may reduce bias. Moreover, it is also studied how 
head nodding movements may in%uence prejudice.
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tHe Present DissertAtion
!e aim of the present dissertation is to approach prejudice from an embodiment 
perspective to enhance understanding of people’s biased attitudes toward members of other 
ethnic groups. !e present dissertation is divided into three parts, each emphasizing a di&erent 
aspect of our embodiment framework. In Part 1, we focus on the role of the environment in 
the expression of implicit bias. Speci$cally, we studied the e&ects of ambient darkness on 
implicit bias toward a feared ethnic out-group. In the next two parts, we investigate how the 
body is related to people’s biased attitudes. Speci$cally, we studied how the repeated coupling 
of speci$c behavioral responses to out-group members may a&ect people’s bias toward the out-
group. !e focus is on approach and avoidance movements in Part 2, and on head nodding 
and shaking movements in Part 3.
overview of the chapters
Part 1 consists of two chapters, in which we combine insights about the emotion-speci$city 
of prejudice with knowledge from situated cognition, by investigating how a threatening 
environment a&ects people’s bias toward an ethnic out-group that typically elicits fear. We 
$rst set the stage for this part, by testing the discrete emotions that are evoked by di&erent 
out-groups in the Netherlands. Speci$cally, the aim of Chapter 2 was to test whether our 
intended target group – namely people of Moroccan descent in the Netherlands – indeed 
primarily evokes feelings of fear in Dutch participants. Previous research has shown that this 
group is among the most negatively evaluated ethnic groups in the Netherlands (Verkuyten 
& Zaremba, 2005), and is stereotypically associated with criminality and aggression (Gordijn, 
Koomen, & Stapel, 2001; Dotsch, Wigboldus, Langner, & Van Knippenberg, 2008). Across 
three studies, we used direct and indirect measures to test the discrete negative emotions 
that people of Moroccan descent evoke in Dutch participants. We speci$cally distinguished 
between the two basic avoidance emotions of fear and disgust, and compared people’s 
emotional responses toward Moroccans with their emotions toward other minority groups 
as well as the Dutch in-group.
In Chapter 3, we tested how the environment a person is situated in a&ects his or her 
negative associations with an ethnic out-group. In a series of four studies, we investigated the 
e&ect of ambient darkness on the expression of bias, using an indirect measure of prejudice 
(i.e., the IAT). We tested the hypothesis that darkness only a&ects prejudice toward an 
out-group that evokes fear, in line with previous $ndings that speci$c emotions a&ect bias 
toward a group that is stereotypically associated with that emotion (Dasgupta et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, we aimed to study whether e&ects of darkness are moderated by individual 
di&erences in people’s susceptibility to fear (cf., Schaller et al., 2003).
Part 2 consists of one chapter, in which we study the e&ects of repeated approach 
movements in response to an out-group on prejudiced behavior (cf., Kawakami et al., 2007; 
Phills, Kawakami, Tabi, Nadolny, & Inzlicht, 2011). Speci$cally, Chapter 4 contains two 
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studies that tap into the process underlying such e&ects of approach movements. In the $rst 
study, we tested the idea that a feared out-group automatically evokes avoidance responses 
in people that hold negative associations toward this group. In the second study, we aimed to 
show that repeated approach movements in response to the out-group reduce the automatic 
avoidance tendencies of relatively highly prejudiced people. 
Part 3 consists of two chapters, in which we report research on the in%uence of head 
nodding movements on biased attitudes. Previous studies have shown that head nodding 
movements result in positive attitudes toward neutral or novel objects, whereas head shaking 
movements result in more negative attitudes (Tom et al., 1991). Still, these movements have 
never been applied to social categories and we aimed to study whether and how head nodding 
may reduce negative associations with an ethnic out-group. !e e&ect of repeated couplings 
of movements to an out-group could be considered to be an embodied form of evaluative 
conditioning, in which the positive valence of the movement spills over to the out-group. !e 
aim of Chapter 5 was to study whether the positive valence of head nodding movements spills 
over to out-group names that are presented in close temporal proximity to the movement (i.e., 
shortly before or a#er the movement), or whether e&ects of head nodding are only applied to 
the out-group when the movement is made as a behavioral response to the out-group (and 
thus follows the out-group name). In Chapter 6, we aimed to replicate $ndings of Chapter 5 
and to further study the process by which head nodding movements may a&ect out-group 
bias.   
Preliminary remarks concerning the empirical chapters
!e research reported in the present dissertation was conducted in the laboratory of the 
Behavioural Science Institute at Radboud University Nijmegen in the Netherlands. !e people 
that participated in the studies of this laboratory were mostly students of Radboud University 
Nijmegen. Outside the large group of Dutch students, Nijmegen also has a signi$cant number 
of German students. Because of our interest in bias of Dutch people toward people of other 
ethnic groups, we aimed to include only native Dutch participants in our studies. In case such 
a preselection was practically impossible, we excluded the data of non-Dutch participants 
from our analyses.   
!roughout our studies, we also used a consistent procedure to identify and delete data of 
potential outliers from the analyses of our response latency measures (see Ratcli&, 1993). For 
all response latency measures, responses on incorrect trials were deleted from the analyses. 
For the IAT, response times faster than 300 ms and slower than 3000 ms were also deleted 
from the analyses, for the APT the range of valid response times was set to 300-1500 ms. 
For all measures, the remaining responses were log-transformed and analyzed, but means of 
untransformed latencies are reported for sake of clarity. Before executing our $nal analyses, 
we excluded the data of participants with mean scores on these measures of more than 3 SD 
from the sample mean.  
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Finally, it should be noted that the article by Navarrete and colleagues about prejudice 
as a gendered phenomenon came to our attention over the course of the research presented 
in this dissertation. In the $rst and second part of the present dissertation, we focus on 
fear-related prejudice and avoidance behaviors toward male out-group members. From the 
perspective of prejudice as a gendered phenomenon, it could be hypothesized that e&ects of 
fear and avoidance primarily apply to female participants. Due to the low number of male 
participants in our studies and in our laboratory in general, we were not always able to test for 
gender di&erences in these chapters. However, where possible, we report e&ects of gender of 
the participant. Moreover, because fear and avoidance motivations should apply primarily to 
female agents (Navarrete et al., 2010), we also report $ndings for females only, or invited only 
females to participate in our studies. In the closing chapter of this dissertation, I will discuss 
this gender issue in more detail and make recommendations for future research. 
Before turning to the empirical chapters, it should be emphasized that not all studies 
reported in this dissertation have been designed directly from an embodiment perspective. 
However, this perspective has become increasingly important over the course of the project. 
!erefore, the embodiment framework has a central function in the General Introduction and 
General Discussion of the dissertation, but is not fully implemented in each of the empirical 
chapters.

1Part IDarkness and fear

Chapter 2
Do they frighten or disgust you?
Associations of Moroccan Dutch with 
discrete negative emotions
Abstract
!e goal of the present chapter was to study in the context of the 
Netherlands the theoretical notion that di&erent out-groups evoke 
discrete negative emotions. Speci$cally, we focus on Moroccan Dutch, 
a group that is among the most stigmatized ethnic out-groups in the 
Netherlands. Studies have demonstrated that Moroccans are negatively 
evaluated and associated with criminality and aggression on both explicit 
and implicit levels. Furthermore, it has been shown that Moroccans 
induce avoidance-related behaviors in people who are relatively highly 
prejudiced toward this group. In three studies, we measured Dutch 
participants’ explicit and implicit associations between Moroccans 
and fear and disgust, which are avoidance emotions that have been 
linked to prejudice. !e results clearly show that Moroccans primarily 
evoke feelings of fear. !e present chapter sets the stage for subsequent 
chapters, in which we further investigate psychological reactions of 
Dutch participants to Moroccan targets in various conditions. 
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According to recent perspectives on prejudice, speci$c out-groups elicit discrete negative 
emotions, instead of merely being evaluated as negative (e.g., Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Fiske, 
Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; Mackie & Smith, 1998; Smith, 1993). !e speci$c emotions that 
members of a particular group experience toward another group are a result of di&erent 
conditions, among which the functional relationships between groups as de$ned by socio-
historical factors (e.g., Fiske et al., 2002). !e majority of studies on intergroup emotions 
have been conducted in the US, and these may not generalize to intergroup relations in other 
countries. 
In the present dissertation, people of Moroccan descent in the Netherlands1 are the 
primary target group for which we study Dutch participants’ psychological reactions across 
diverse conditions. It is therefore of importance to examine whether and how the emotion-
speci$city account applies to this group in the Dutch context. Moreover, previous research 
on intergroup emotions has mainly focused on self-report measures of emotions. Since we 
are primarily interested in more automatic processes that play a role in intergroup bias, we 
measure the discrete emotions that Moroccans evoke in Dutch participants using both direct 
and indirect measures. 
Moroccans are among the most negatively evaluated ethnic out-groups in the Netherlands 
(Gordijn, Koomen, & Stapel, 2001). !ese evaluations have become even more negative in 
the last decades, likely as a result of terrorist attacks by Muslim extremists in the western 
world and the upcoming prevalence of anti-Muslim ideologies in Dutch politics (Coenders, 
Lubbers, Scheepers, & Verkuyten, 2008; Verkuyten, & Zaremba, 2005). Moroccans in the 
Netherlands are stereotypically associated with criminality and aggression, both on an 
explicit level (Gordijn et al., 2001) and a more implicit level (Dotsch, Wigboldus, Langner, 
& Van Knippenberg, 2008). On automatic behavioral responses, it has been shown that 
Moroccans evoke avoidance behavior in Dutch participants who hold relatively strong 
negative associations with Moroccans (Dotsch & Wigboldus, 2008). 
!e goal of the present chapter is to study the discrete negative emotions that are associated 
with Moroccans in the Netherlands, and we speci$cally focus on fear and disgust in our 
studies. Fear is an emotion that is triggered by threats to the own physical safety and produces 
behaviors aimed at avoiding this threat (see Mackie & Smith, 2002). Based on the stereotypical 
associations of Moroccans with criminality and aggression, it is hypothesized that Moroccans 
primarily evoke fear in Dutch participants. Another suggestion for the associations between 
Moroccans and fear comes from the study by Dotsch and Wigboldus (2008), in which Dutch 
participants held more distance toward a Moroccan avatar in a virtual reality environment as 
a function of their level of implicit prejudice. 
However, such avoidance behavior could result also from disgust, which is another basic 
emotion that activates withdrawal responses (Ekman, 1999). !e type of threat triggering the 
1 In the remaining of the dissertation, we use the term ‘Moroccans’ when referring to ‘Moroccan Dutch’, and the term 
‘Dutch’ when we refer to ‘White Dutch’.
Chapter 232
emotion disgust di&ers from the type of threat that triggers fear. Whereas fear is evoked by 
cues that signal physical danger, disgust is evoked by cues that connote possible infection. 
!us, fear serves self-protection and disgust serves disease-avoidance (see for a review 
Neuberg, Kenrick, & Schaller, 2011). Both fear and disgust have been linked to prejudice 
toward ethnic out-groups, and we aim to directly compare the activation in perceivers of 
these emotions by Moroccans. We $rst measured the activation of these emotions by means 
of self-report. However, in the present dissertation we are primarily interested in studying 
spontaneous processes of bias, of which the basis may not be addressed by self-report measures 
(cf., Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002). !erefore, we also administered a reaction time 
measure to study the more automatic elicitation of fear and disgust by Moroccans.
In Study 1, we asked participants about their feelings of fear and disgust toward di&erent 
groups. In this questionnaire, we included both ethnic out-groups and non-ethnic minority 
groups. In Study 2, we asked participants about their feelings of fear and disgust toward 
Moroccans and toward Dutch. !e aim of this study was to replicate $ndings of Study 1 for 
Moroccans, and to compare the emotions elicited by this ethnic out-group with emotions 
elicited by the in-group. In Study 3, we investigated the implicit associations between 
Moroccans and fear and disgust using an adapted version of the A&ective Priming Task 
(APT; see Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986). !is study also included a self-
report measure of associations between Moroccans and fear and disgust, to allow for a direct 
comparison of the explicit and implicit associations.     
stuDy 1
method
Participants. Twenty-seven Dutch students (19 females, 8 males; age range 18-51, M = 
22.37, SD = 6.14) of Radboud University Nijmegen took part in this study. 
Procedure. We asked students who had just participated in an unrelated study or were 
waiting to participate in another experiment to $ll out our questionnaire. !e questionnaire 
started with a written instruction, in which participants were asked to indicate for several 
groups of people how frightening and how disgusting they found them. We emphasized that 
they should not think too long and give the answer that $rst came to mind. We also stressed 
that there were no right or wrong answers.
!e questionnaire contained 36 questions concerning 18 minority groups for which we 
had one question about fear and one about disgust. !e groups were presented in a list, 
with for each group $rst the question about fear, then about disgust (i.e., “How frightening/
disgusting would you evaluate this group in general?”). Participants could indicate their 
answer by circling a number between 1 (“not at all”) and 7 (“very much”). !e ethnic groups 
were: Turks, Antilleans, Moroccans, Surinamers, Arabs, Poles, Muslims, and Romanians. 
!e non-ethnic groups were: people with obesity, AIDS-patients, smokers, criminals with a 
Do they frighten or disgust you? Associations of Moroccan Dutch with discrete negative emotions 33
Chapter 
2
psychological disorder2, psychiatric patients, alcohol addicts, mentally challenged, homeless, 
drug addicts, and homosexuals.  
results and Discussion
!e mean scores for fear and disgust were analyzed separately for the ethnic (see Table 2.1) 
and the non-ethnic out-groups (see Table 2.2). A repeated measures analysis on the fear and 
disgust associations with the eight ethnic groups showed a main e&ect of emotion, F(1, 26) = 
41.40, p < .001, ηp2 = .61, and ethnicity, F(7, 20) = 3.93, p = .008, ηp2  = .58. !ese main e&ects 
were quali$ed by a signi$cant interaction e&ect, F(7, 20) = 4.13, p = .006, ηp2 = .593. Simple 
contrast analyses showed that most ethnic groups scored signi$cantly higher on fear than on 
disgust, except for Surinamers and Poles. Further comparisons showed that Moroccans scored 
highest on fear, together with Turks and Antilleans. Poles had the highest disgust score, but 
this di&ered only signi$cantly from the lowest disgust score for Surinamers (p = .005).  
table 2.1. Mean scores and standard deviations for fear and disgust evaluations of ethnic groups
Fear
M (SD)
Disgust
M (SD)
Comparison of the means
Turks 3.41 (1.55) 2.11 (1.31) p < .001 
Antilleans 3.11 (1.65) 1.81 (0.92) p < .001 
Moroccans 3.56 (1.55) 2.07 (1.04) p < .001 
Surinamers 2.00 (1.14) 1.63 (0.69) p = .067
Arabs 2.93 (1.62) 1.78 (1.16) p < .001 
Poles 2.48 (1.42) 2.22 (1.19) p = .364
Muslims 2.89 (1.67) 1.96 (1.29) p < .001 
Romanians 2.63 (1.47) 2.00 (1.00) p = .004
!e focus of this dissertation is on ethnic prejudice, but we also shortly report the results 
for the non-ethnic minorities because these are relevant for the next chapter. For these groups, 
a repeated measures analysis revealed a main e&ect of group, F(9, 18) = 34.49, p < .001, ηp2 
= .95, but not of emotion F(1, 26) = 2.14, p = .155, n.s. !e interaction e&ect was signi$cant, 
F(9, 18) = 15.56, p < .001, ηp2 = .89. Simple contrast tests showed that three groups (i.e., 
AIDS-patients, criminals with a psychological disorder, psychiatric patients) evoked more 
fear than disgust, whereas four groups (i.e., obese, smokers, homeless, homosexuals) evoked 
more disgust than fear. For the remaining groups, there was no signi$cant di&erence between 
the two emotions. 
2 !e Dutch term is TBS-ers.
3 Note that gender does not moderate these e&ects, F < 1, n.s.. !ese data do not give any indication that men and 
women di&er in their feelings of fear and disgust toward these ethnic out-groups.  
Chapter 234
table 2.2.  Mean scores and standard deviations for fear and disgust evaluations of other 
minorities
Fear
M (SD)
Disgust
M (SD)
Comparison of the means
Obese 2.15 (1.26) 3.56 (1.37) p < .001
AIDS-patients 3.26 (1.48) 1.96 (0.76) p < .001
Smokers 1.59 (1.01) 3.26 (1.63) p < .001
Criminals (TBS) 5.30 (0.99) 3.30 (1.61) p < .001
Psychiatric patients 3.96 (1.53) 1.96 (1.19) p < .001
Alcohol addicts 3.63 (1.55) 3.30 (1.38) p = .344
Homeless 3.04 (1.43) 3.67 (1.47) p = .047
Drug addicts 4.11 (1.58) 3.44 (1.53) p = .068
Homosexuals 1.15 (0.46) 1.48 (0.75) p = .026
!e results of this $rst study indicate that our target group of interest, that is Moroccans, 
seems to be associated with the discrete negative emotion of fear. Not only do people associate 
this group more with fear than with disgust, Moroccans also score higher on fear than most 
other out-groups. Interestingly, similar fear-associations were found for Turks, and to a lesser 
extent also for Antilleans. Still, because of our focus on Moroccans, we continue the next 
studies with only this ethnic out-group.    
stuDy 2
!e results of Study 1 are in line with the idea that Moroccans in the Netherlands are 
associated with a discrete negative emotion, namely fear as opposed to disgust. !e aim of 
Study 2 was to replicate these $ndings for Moroccans, and to compare them with people’s 
associations with the Dutch in-group.  
method
Participants. Fi#y-$ve Dutch students (12 males, 43 females; age range 17-34, M = 21.35, 
SD = 3.10) of Radboud University Nijmegen participated in this study, in return for a gi# 
voucher or course credit points. 
Procedure. Participants took part in a series of studies from di&erent researchers, 
conducted on a computer in an individual cubicle. In our task, they indicated how frightening 
and disgusting they found Moroccans and Dutch, by positioning a slider on a scale from “not 
at all” (scored 0) to “very much” (scored 100). Note that participants did not see the numbers 
associated with the scale anchors. !e questions appeared on the screen one-by-one. !e 
order of the questions concerning emotion (fear versus disgust) and target group (Moroccans 
versus Dutch) was counterbalanced between-subjects. One half of the participants started 
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with the fear questions, the other half of the participants started with the disgust questions. 
Within these orders, half of the participants $rst indicated their feeling toward Moroccans; 
the other half $rst indicated their feeling toward Dutch. 
results and Discussion
A 2 (ethnicity group: Dutch vs. Moroccans) X 2 (emotion: fear vs. disgust) repeated 
measures analysis revealed a signi$cant main e&ect of ethnicity, F(1, 54) = 42.50, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .44, and of emotion, F(1, 54) = 22.55, p < .001, ηp2 = .30, which were quali$ed by a 
signi$cant interaction e&ect, F(1, 54) = 21.73, p < .001, ηp2 = .294. Simple contrast analyses 
showed that Moroccans were on average rated as more frightening (M = 48.16, SD = 16.23) 
than disgusting (M = 31.38, SD = 13.51), F(1, 54) = 33.69, p < .001, ηp2 = .38. In contrast, 
Dutch were rated equally frightening (M = 22.82, SD = 12.72) as disgusting (M = 20.18, SD = 
13.44), F(1, 54) = 1.51, p = .225, n.s. Comparisons between the groups per emotion showed 
that Moroccans scored higher than Dutch on both fear, F(1, 54) = 56.90, p < .001, ηp2 = .51, 
and disgust, F(1, 54) = 13.89, p < .001, ηp2 = .21. See Figure 2.1 for an illustration of the results. 
Note that throughout this chapter, standard deviations and con$dence intervals in the graphs 
of within-subjects analyses were calculated as recommended by Lo#us and Masson (1994), 
and Wright (2007).  
figure 2.1. Means and 95% Confidence Intervals for the responses on the 0-100 slider scale 
about self-reported feelings of fear and disgust toward Moroccans and Dutch.
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4As in Study 1, these e&ects were not moderated by gender, F < 1, n.s.
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Although Moroccans evoke both more fear and disgust as compared to the in-group, 
participants clearly reported stronger feelings of fear than disgust toward Moroccans. In line 
with the results of Study 1, we again found that Moroccans were most strongly associated 
with fear on an explicit level. In the next study, we investigate the more automatic associations 
between Moroccans and fear and disgust. 
stuDy 3
!e results of Study 1 and Study 2 show that Moroccans clearly evoke fear as compared 
to disgust on an explicit level. !e goal of Study 3 was to measure the activation of these 
negative emotions by Moroccans on a more implicit level. For this purpose, we created an 
adapted version of the A&ective Priming Task (Fazio et al., 1986), which we will refer to as 
Emotion Priming Task (EPT). In an APT, evaluations are estimated by the extent to which 
stimuli that represent a category facilitate responding to positive or negative targets. Instead 
of measuring response facilitation to generally positive and negative targets, we measured 
response facilitation by discrete emotion targets related to fear and disgust. We compared 
facilitation by Moroccan as compared to Dutch primes. Furthermore, we also measured the 
self-reported feelings of fear and disgust toward Moroccans and Dutch. 
method
Participants. Fi#y-seven Dutch female students of Radboud University Nijmegen5 
participated, in return for course credit points or a gi# voucher. 
Procedure. Participants were seated behind a computer in a laboratory room, and 
participated in a series of studies by di&erent researchers6. !ey started with the EPT, a#er 
which they were brought to another room for a di&erent task. !ey returned to $ll out the 
explicit measure of fear and disgust toward groups. 
Participants’ task in the EPT was to categorize as quickly and accurately as possible whether 
a picture was related to fear or disgust. Before each picture, a prime of a face appeared. In 
order to make sure that participants would attend to these primes, we used a detailed cover 
story as described by Fazio et al. (1986). We told participants that we were interested in the 
automaticity of emotion judgments. !at is, how good are people at making fast emotion 
judgments from pictures, while having to remember pictures of faces at the same time? 
Participants $rst practiced with classifying emotion pictures from the International A&ective 
Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthberth, 1999) as being related to fear or disgust, 
by pressing a designated key on the keyboard. !ey $rst judged a practice picture for each 
emotion, a#er which they categorized the 3 fear and 3 disgust pictures that would also be used 
5 Information about age of the participants is missing, because this question was not included in the study. We used 
the regular participant pool for this study, thus they are comparable in age to the participants in the other studies. 
6 !is study was part of a larger experiment, reported in Chapter 3 (Study 2).
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in the experimental phase of the EPT. Participants also received a practice face recognition 
task, in which they $rst carefully looked at a series of faces of Dutch and Moroccan males for 
which we tested their recognition a#erwards. !e faces were selected from the Radboud Faces 
Database (RaFD; Langner et al., 2010). 
A#er having practiced the emotion judgments and face recognition tasks, the two tasks 
were combined in the experimental phase of the EPT. Participants classi$ed the pictures of 
fear and disgust as quickly and accurately as possible, while trying to remember the faces 
that were presented as primes. !e same three fear pictures and disgust pictures were used 
as in the practice test. To be able to do a new face recognition task, we selected three new 
Moroccan male faces and three new Dutch male faces from the RaFD, which were matched 
on attractiveness and picture valence. To make ethnicity less salient, we added three more 
Dutch male faces as $llers (see also Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995). 
Participants started the EPT with four practice trials, followed by the experimental block 
of 54 trials. !ese trials were divided into three parts of 18 trials each that were performed 
without a break in-between, in counterbalanced order. Across these 18 trials, all face primes 
were shown twice, once before a fear picture and once before a disgust picture. Across the 54 
trials each face was thus presented once with each of the three fear pictures and three disgust 
pictures. A trial started with a $xation cross in the center of the screen for a second. !e 
prime was then presented for 160 ms, followed by a blank screen for 80 ms, a#er which the 
target picture appeared and remained on the screen until the participant gave a response. In-
between trials there was a blank screen for a second. Immediately a#er the EPT, participants 
received the face recognition task, conform our cover story. 
At the end of the study, participants indicated their self-reported feelings of fear and 
disgust toward groups, on a slider scale similar to Study 2. On the $rst screen, participants 
indicated the extent to which they found several groups frightening, on the second screen the 
extent to which they found the groups disgusting. !e groups were presented in the following 
list: Dutch, Moroccans, Homeless, Students, Addicts7.  
results and Discussion
Emotion Priming Task. Latencies on incorrect trials were recorded as missing, as well as 
trials with responses faster than 300 or slower than 1500 ms (e.g., Wentura & Degner, 2010), 
resulting in deletion of 3.5% of the data. !e remaining responses were log-transformed, but 
untransformed means are reported for clarity. !e data of one participant were deleted from 
the analyses, because this person had a mean reaction time of more than 3SD from the mean 
on two of the four prime X target combinations. 
7 !e other groups served a purpose outside the scope of the present research, and we will thus not report the results 
for these groups. Note that Dutch and Moroccans were the $rst groups on the list. 
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Latencies were subjected to a 2 (ethnicity prime: Moroccan vs. Dutch) X 2 (emotion target: 
fear vs. disgust) repeated measures analysis, which revealed no main e&ect of emotion, F 
< 1, n.s., but showed a marginally signi$cant main e&ect of ethnicity, F(1, 55) = 3.02, p = 
.088, ηp2 = .05. Responses were somewhat faster a#er Moroccan primes (M = 607, SD = 105) 
versus Dutch primes (M = 618, SD = 103). Moreover, the ethnicity X emotion interaction was 
marginally signi$cant, F(1, 55) = 3.38, p = .071, ηp2 = .06. 
Since our primary hypothesis involved a facilitation of fear toward Moroccans, we analyzed 
the speci$c contrast of whether people were faster in responding to fear a#er a Moroccan 
prime as compared to fear a#er a Dutch prime, or disgust a#er Moroccan and Dutch primes. 
In this contrast, a weight of 3 was given to the cell of fear responses a#er Moroccans, and a 
weight of -1 to the other three cells of the design. !is analysis showed a signi$cant e&ect, F(1, 
55) = 4.84, p = .032, ηp2 = .08. !e simple main e&ects were in the expected direction, with a 
facilitation of fear responses a#er a Moroccan (M = 602, SD = 105) versus a Dutch prime (M 
= 622, SD = 110), F(1, 55) = 8.44, p = .005, ηp2 = .13, and no di&erence between Moroccan 
(M = 611, SD = 115) and Dutch primes (M = 613, SD = 104) on disgust responses, F < 1, n.s. 
Comparing the two emotions within each ethnicity did not reveal any di&erences, with F(1, 
55) = 1.26, p = .267, n.s. for Moroccan, and F < 1 for Dutch primes. See Figure 2.2 for an 
illustration.
In sum, these results provide preliminary evidence that Moroccans are also speci$cally 
associated with fear on a more indirect association measure. 
figure 2.2. Means and standard errors for the responses in milliseconds to the fear and disgust 
pictures as a function of ethnicity of the prime. Note that untransformed latencies are depicted 
in the graph, whereas analyses were performed on log-transformed latencies.
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Explicit emotion associations. We performed a 2 (ethnicity: Moroccan vs. Dutch) X 2 
(emotion: fear vs. disgust) repeated measures analysis on the self-reported emotions, revealing 
two main e&ects; for ethnicity, F(1, 56) = 36.21, p < .001, ηp2 = .39, and emotion, F(1, 56) = 
21.32, p < .001, ηp2 = .28. !ese e&ects were quali$ed by a signi$cant interaction, F(1, 56) = 
51.39, p < .001, ηp2 = .48. For both emotions, the associations with Moroccans were stronger 
than with Dutch. However, the di&erence was stronger for fear, F(1, 56) = 60.53, p < .001, ηp2 
= .52 (M = 41.81, SD = 15.48 versus  M = 18.28, SD = 15.10) than for disgust, F(1, 56) = 9.21, p 
= .004, ηp2 = .14 (M = 21.60 , SD = 15.29 versus M = 13.61, SD = 13.05). Moreover, Moroccans 
were signi$cantly more associated with fear than disgust, F(1, 56) = 41.88, p < .001, ηp2 = .43, 
whereas this di&erence was marginally signi$cant for Dutch, F(1, 56) = 3.06, p = .086, ηp2 = 
.05. See Figure 2.3 for an illustration of the results.
In sum, we replicated the $ndings of Study 1 and 2 that Moroccans are explicitly primarily 
associated with fear.
figure 2.3. Means and 95% Confidence Intervals for the responses on the 0-100 slider scale 
about self-reported feelings of fear and disgust toward Moroccans and Dutch.
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Correlations between implicit and explicit fear and disgust. To investigate the potential 
relation between the explicit and implicit fear associations with Moroccans, we correlated the 
implicit and explicit associations between Moroccans and fear. First, we corrected people’s 
responses to fear a#er Moroccans by controlling for their general speed of responding in the 
EPT. We did this by predicting these fear responses by people’s average response time to the 
other types of trials (i.e., disgust a#er Moroccan, and fear and disgust a#er Dutch) and saving 
the standardized residuals. We then correlated these residuals to people’s explicit fear score 
of Moroccans, which did not reveal a signi$cant correlation, r(54) = -.14, p = .317, n.s. !us, 
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people’s responses to fear of Moroccans on the direct measure seem to be unrelated to their 
responses on the indirect measure. 
GenerAl Discussion
!e goal of this chapter was to investigate the discrete negative emotions that Moroccans 
in the Netherlands evoke in Dutch participants, on an explicit and implicit level. In three 
studies, we compared associations with fear and disgust, two negative basic emotions that 
have been linked to prejudice and avoidance. Furthermore, we compared these associations 
with Moroccans to the associations with other out-groups as well as the in-group. We used 
self-report measures by explicitly asking people about their feelings of fear and disgust toward 
groups, as well as a reaction time measure that provided an indication of the extent to which 
primes from the in-group versus the out-group facilitate responding to pictures related to fear 
versus disgust. 
!e self-report measures in all three studies showed that Moroccans evoked more fear 
than disgust. Importantly, participants evaluated Moroccans as the most frightening ethnic 
group, as compared to other ethnic out-groups and compared to the in-group. In Study 1, 
Turks were the only ethnic out-group that scored as high on fear as Moroccans. Interestingly, 
they constitute another Muslim out-group that has become more negatively evaluated with 
the changing Dutch political context (see Coenders et al., 2008; Verkuyten, & Zaremba, 
2005). Still, we focus on Moroccans in the present dissertation, because this group has been 
studied most extensively in social psychological research on stereotypes and prejudice in the 
Netherlands. Moreover, in terms of negative media attention, Moroccans form a prominent 
group. To quote a Dutch respondent in a European media report: “when they are Moroccans, 
it is street terror, and when they are Dutch it is nuisance” (Bennett, Ter Wal, Lipinski, Fabiszak, 
Krzyzanowski, 2011; p. 24).  
Besides these self-reported feelings of fear toward Moroccans, the present studies also 
provide preliminary evidence for a more spontaneous activation of fear in response to 
Moroccans. In Study 3, we tested whether Moroccan male pictures as compared to Dutch 
male pictures would facilitate responses to fearful versus disgusting pictures using a priming 
paradigm. If Moroccans evoke the spontaneous activation of fear, we should $nd a facilitation 
of responding to fear a#er seeing a Moroccan prime. Although the interaction between 
ethnicity and emotion was only marginally signi$cant, simple contrast analyses clearly show 
that fear responses were facilitated by Moroccan primes as compared to Dutch primes. For 
disgust, no di&erences in response times were found a#er Moroccan as compared to Dutch 
primes. 
A recent study by Neumann and Lozo (2012) serves as proof of principle for the idea 
that a priming procedure can indeed elicit emotions and serve as a measure of the extent 
to which these emotions are activated. In their research, the elicitation of fear by subliminal 
presentation of frightening scenes facilitated responses to subsequent fear target pictures, 
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whereas the elicitation of disgust by subliminal presentation of disgusting scenes facilitated 
responses to subsequent disgust target pictures (Neumann, & Lozo, 2012). Our adaptation 
of this priming technique in Study 3 yielded a paradigm for the study of discrete negative 
emotions as evoked by di&erent groups. We look forward to further investigations and 
optimizations of this measure. 
Most investigations of intergroup evaluations in the Netherlands have focused on 
evaluations of general positivity and negativity. In line with recent perspectives that di&erent 
out-groups evoke discrete emotions, we show that Moroccans are both explicitly and implicitly 
primarily associated with fear. In the next chapter, we investigate how an environment that 
induces fear may in%uence implicit bias toward Moroccans.

Chapter 3
Prejudice in the dark:
How darkness facilitates negative 
associations with a feared out-group
Abstract
Darkness is a cue that signals danger, and, hence, arouses fear in people. 
In the present chapter, we investigated e&ects of darkness on fear-based 
out-group biases. According to recent perspectives on prejudice, speci$c 
out-groups evoke discrete negative emotions. Moreover, recalling an 
emotion outside an intergroup context has been found to a&ect negative 
associations with an out-group that is related to that emotion. We 
predicted that a dark environment would enhance negative associations 
with an out-group that evokes fear. !e results of two studies indeed 
supported this hypothesis. !e data of two additional studies suggest 
that darkness alone may not su'ce to a&ect implicit bias. Our e&ects 
seem contingent upon on a procedure in which the implicit association 
measure contains stimuli that people $rst repeatedly have categorized as 
being fear-related. We discuss potentially underlying processes for the 
e&ects obtained in this line of research. 
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Most people will be able to recall times during their childhood in which they were afraid of 
being in the dark. Alone in the dark, objects in the room may have turned into shapes closely 
resembling monsters or other evil creatures. Such fears may be strongest during childhood, but 
many people remain a bit scared of being in the dark throughout life. In popular language this 
fear is shortly referred to as ‘fear of the dark’. However, this type of fear is more appropriately 
de$ned by philosopher William Lyons (Lyons, 1985; p.75): “Fear of the dark is not fear of 
the absence of light, but fear of possible or imagined dangers concealed by the darkness”. 
!us, darkness potentially signals danger, and consequently may distort people’s perception 
and interpretation of their environment. In this fashion, darkness may also in%uence our 
judgments of other people. In the present research, we focus on e&ects of darkness on implicit 
negative associations toward people from other groups. 
Negative emotions, such as fear, play an important role in intergroup relations (Smith, 
1993). Recent perspectives on prejudice emphasize that people may not only experience 
general negative a&ect toward people from other groups, but also that speci$c negative 
emotions – such as fear, disgust, or anger – are associated with di&erent out-groups (e.g., 
Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; Mackie & Smith, 2002). !is view 
is consistent with functional theories, according to which emotions are adaptive mechanisms 
producing relevant cognitive, physiological and behavioral responses to challenges in the 
environment (Damasio, 1994; Frijda, 1986; LeDoux, 1996). More speci$cally, out-groups can 
be a source of threat – for instance for the own group’s moral values, resources or physical 
safety (see Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005) – and may evoke emotions that are in line with this type 
of threat, which subsequently activate the necessary responses to deal with the threat. 
 Interestingly, experiencing concrete negative emotions outside a group context also a&ects 
implicit forms of prejudice toward a group that is associated with the activated emotion. In 
studies by Dasgupta, DeSteno, Williams and Hunsinger (2009), participants were asked to 
write about an autobiographical event in which they had experienced a speci$c negative 
emotion. A#er recalling this experience, they performed an Implicit Association Test 
measuring positive and negative associations with an out-group as compared to the in-
group (IAT; see Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). !e results were in line with an 
emotion-speci$city account of prejudice, i.e., people who recalled feeling disgusted showed 
stronger negative associations toward homosexuals (a group associated with disgust), but not 
toward Arabs (a group associated with anger). Vice versa, people who recalled feeling angry 
showed enhanced negative associations toward Arabs, but not toward homosexuals. !us, 
emotions increased implicit bias only if the induced emotion was applicable to the out-group 
stereotype. !e authors explain these $ndings in terms of a functional view of emotions. !at 
is, the negative emotions signal speci$c types of threat, and if the emotion-speci$c threat is 
applicable to prior expectations of a group, the emotion increases implicit bias toward that 
group (see Dasgupta et al., 2009).
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Following this line of reasoning, a more subtle and ecologically valid signal of threat 
should result in similar emotion-speci$c e&ects on implicit prejudice. In the present research, 
we focus on an environmental cue that is strongly associated with danger, i.e., darkness. To 
back-up our anecdotal evidence in the beginning of this chapter, several empirical studies 
also suggest that darkness is associated with fear (Grillon, Pellowski, Merikangas, & Davis, 
1997; Mühlberger, Wieser, & Pauli, 2008). Previous research looking at contextual e&ects 
of darkness showed that a dark environment could temporarily strengthen the stereotypic 
associations between African-Americans and danger, but only for people with a chronic belief 
that our world is a dangerous place (Schaller, Park, & Mueller, 2003). In two studies, these 
authors aimed to investigate the circumstances under which individuals who are generally 
susceptible to danger would be more prejudiced against ethnic out-groups. Speci$cally, they 
focused on the extent to which beliefs about a dangerous world are related to the activation 
of stereotypic associations, and tested whether ambient darkness moderates this relation. 
In both studies, a marginally signi$cant trend was found that beliefs in a dangerous world 
strengthened the stereotypic association between African-Americans and danger in a dark 
environment but not in a light environment. No main e&ects of the darkness manipulation on 
danger stereotypes were obtained. !ese results provide interesting $rst insights into the e&ect 
of darkness and chronic beliefs about danger on the activation of danger-related stereotypes 
about an out-group.
Although these studies provide interesting $rst $ndings about the triggering role of 
darkness in implicit out-group bias, two important issues are still unclear. First, the question 
remains open whether e&ects of darkness on out-group bias are driven by the fact that 
darkness is a general negative cue, or by the speci$c threat it may re%ect. As has recently been 
shown, discrete negative emotions are associated with di&erent out-groups, and the activation 
of these emotions a&ects implicit bias toward groups that are stereotypically associated with 
that speci$c emotion (Dasgupta et al., 2009). In line with an emotion-speci$city account, we 
predicted that a dark environment could temporarily enhance implicit negative associations 
toward an out-group, but only when the threat that is induced by the dark is applicable to 
that out-group. Darkness is associated with fear, so we predicted that a dark environment 
enhances implicit bias toward an out-group that is perceived as frightening. As has been 
shown in Chapter 2 of this dissertation, Moroccans in the Netherlands are a group that is 
particularly associated with fear. !erefore, we hypothesized that a dark environment would 
result in enhanced implicit bias of Dutch participants toward Moroccans. 
A second issue that needs more investigation is the question of whether darkness in itself 
a&ects out-group bias, or whether there are important individual di&erences in susceptibility 
that may moderate the e&ect. On the one hand, in the studies of Dasgupta et al. (2009), the 
experience of the emotion had an in%uence on implicit bias irrespective of other factors. On 
the other hand, Schaller et al. (2003) found that darkness biases stereotypical judgments only 
for people that generally view the world as a dangerous place. Besides our manipulation of 
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darkness, we therefore measured several possible moderating variables in the present line 
of research. First, we measured people’s fear-associations with Moroccans. In line with the 
emotion-speci$city hypothesis, it could be hypothesized that darkness enhances implicit bias 
toward Moroccans especially for people who indeed $nd this group frightening. Second, we 
measured individual di&erences in susceptibility to fear or danger. In line with the $ndings by 
Schaller et al. (2003), it could be that darkness a&ects only the judgments of people that are 
generally susceptible to danger cues. Finally, gender of the participant may play an important 
role in the e&ect of darkness on bias. According to recent evolutionary perspectives, it is 
important to consider the gender of the out-group target as well as the gender of the agent 
in psychological studies on prejudice (see Navarrete, McDonald, Molina, & Sidanius, 2010). 
!at is, out-group males are the primary targets of ethnic prejudice (Navarrete et al., 2009), 
and this prejudice is based on di&erent emotions for male and female perceivers. Most 
importantly, fear primarily drives females’ bias against out-group targets, whereas anger and 
aggression are the primary motivators for males’ out-group bias (Navarrete et al., 2010). In 
line with these gender di&erences, it is expected that darkness primarily a&ects implicit bias 
in female participants, and not in male participants1.  
the present research
We conducted four studies to further investigate the in%uence of darkness on implicit bias. 
!e $rst aim was to test whether e&ects of darkness on implicit bias are fear-speci$c or whether 
they are driven by general negativity. !e second aim was to investigate whether darkness has 
a general e&ect on bias toward a feared out-group, or whether there are important individual 
di&erences that moderate the e&ect. 
To study the $rst question, in Study 1 we manipulated darkness versus a negative cue that 
is not associated with fear but with disgust, namely a bad smell. According to the speci$city-
account, darkness should increase negative associations with Moroccans, whereas a bad smell 
should not a&ect bias toward this group. Oppositely, we also measured implicit associations 
toward a group that is generally found to be disgusting, and expected to $nd increased bias 
toward this group in the bad smell but not in the dark environment. Based on the $ndings 
of the $rst study of the previous chapter, we selected people with obesity as group that is 
associated with disgust but not with fear (see Chapter 2 for the ratings). 
To study the second question, we focused on several individual di&erences variables across 
the four studies, namely fear of Moroccans, general fear of the dark, and gender. 
1 Ideally, this claim should be tested with a design including an equal number of male and female participants. 
However, this is practically hard to accomplish with a participant pool that primarily consists of females. In Study 1, 
we had a small number of male participants and we report an exploratory analysis of gender. In the following three 
studies, we exclusively selected female participants, because of our main focus on the e&ect of darkness on fear-based 
prejudice. 
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stuDy 1
In the $rst study, we aimed to investigate the fear-speci$city hypothesis for e&ects of darkness 
on implicit bias. We manipulated the environment of the individual research cubicle in di&erent 
ways. For our manipulation of darkness, we turned o& the lights in the cubicle. As control 
condition we used another negative cue, that is a bad smell. We also included a baseline control 
condition in which the light was turned on and no odor was di&used. In the same cubicle, 
we measured negative associations with a feared out-group (i.e., Moroccans) using a Single-
Target Implicit Association Test (ST-IAT; Wigboldus, Holland, & Van Knippenberg, 2005). 
We hypothesized that darkness would result in more negative associations with Moroccans as 
compared to the lightness and bad smell condition. 
As an extra control, we also measured implicit associations toward a group that is negatively 
evaluated, but not associated with fear. Based on the results of Study 1 of the previous chapter, 
we selected people with obesity as control group, because this group was signi$cantly stronger 
associated with disgust than with fear, whereas the opposite was true for Moroccans (see the 
results section of Study 1 of Chapter 2). Furthermore, a repeated measures analysis comparing 
Moroccans with people with obesity revealed a signi$cant emotion X group interaction e&ect, 
F(1, 39) = 58.81, p < .001, ηp2 = .58. Simple contrast analyses showed that fear scores were 
signi$cantly higher for Moroccans than for obese people, F(1, 39) = 8.34, p = .006, ηp2 = .18, 
whereas disgust scores were signi$cantly higher for obese people than for Moroccans, F(1, 39) = 
58.83, p < .001, ηp2 = .60. !us, when comparing emotion-associations with Moroccans and obese 
people, Moroccans clearly score high on fear and low on disgust, whereas obese people clearly 
score low on fear and high on disgust. Accordingly, we expected enhanced negative associations 
in the dark for Moroccans, but not for obese people. Conversely, a bad smell could increase 
negative associations with obese people, but is not expected to a&ect negative associations with 
Moroccans.   
Finally, we aimed to test whether individual di&erences in susceptibility to fear of the dark 
and fear of Moroccans could have a moderating in%uence. We included an implicit and explicit 
measure of fear associations with Moroccans (see Chapter 2 of the present dissertation), as well 
as questionnaires about individual di&erences in anxiety.  
method
Participants and design. Seventy-six students (10 males, 66 females; Mage = 20.91, SDage 
= 2.36, with a range between 17 and 29 years) of Radboud University Nijmegen participated 
in exchange for course credit points or money. !e design included a between-subjects 
manipulation of environmental cue (darkness, bad smell, control), and a within-subjects factor2 
of type of ST-IAT (toward Moroccans or obese people). 
2 We measured the two ST-IATs within-subjects, but we anticipated potential order e&ects of these two measures. 
We counterbalanced the order in which the measures were conducted, to be able to analyze this variable between-
subjects by only including the $rst ST-IAT for each participant in the analysis. Indeed, analyses show that the within-
subjects results were a&ected by the order in which the ST-IATs were administered, and we therefore report results 
using the $rst ST-IAT measure (either concerning Moroccans or obese people) as a between-subjects variable.  
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Stimulus materials. !e stimuli for the Emotion Priming Task (EPT) consisted of 3 
pictures for each of 2 emotion target categories (fear versus disgust), and 3 pictures for each 
of 4 prime categories (Moroccan males, obese people, homeless people, and students). !e 
fear and disgust pictures were selected from the International A&ective Picture System (IAPS; 
Lang, Bradley, & Cuthberth, 1999). !e pictures of Moroccan male faces were selected from 
the Amsterdam Dynamic Facial Expressions Set (ADFES; Van der Schalk, Hawk, Fischer, & 
Doosje, 2011), the pictures of obese males were collected from the Internet, and the pictures 
of students and homeless people came from a set by Degner and Wentura (2011). 
!e fear and disgust pictures from the EPT were used as negative pictures in the Single-
Target Implicit Association Tests (ST-IAT). !e positive pictures in the ST-IAT were 6 IAPS 
pictures of butter%ies and %owers. In the ST-IAT toward Moroccans, we used the pictures 
of Moroccan males from the EPT, as well as 3 new pictures of Moroccan males from the 
Radboud Faces Database (RAFD; Langner et al., 2010). In the ST-IAT toward obese people, 
we used the pictures of obese males from the EPT, as well as 3 new pictures from the Internet.
We also included questionnaires to measure a variety of individual di&erences. First, we 
measured participants’ general sensitivity to disgust by using an adapted version of 26 items 
of the Disgust Scale (Haidt, McCauley, & Rozin, 1994; α = .85), containing disgust-related 
statements and events for which participants had to indicate their opinion using a scale 
from 0 (“strongly disagree” or “not at all disgusting”) to 4 (“strongly agree” or “extremely 
disgusting”). Second, participants $lled out a 14-item Social Dominance Orientation scale 
(Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994; α = .82), including statements about equality 
between groups to which participants indicated their level of agreement on a scale from 
1 (“completely disagree”) to 5 (“completely agree”). !ird, participants $lled out the Body 
Consciousness Scale (Miller, Murphy, & Buss, 1981; α = .513) by indicating their agreement 
to 15 statements on a scale from 1 (“not at all”) to 5 (“very much”). !e $rst 5 items of this 
scale measure individual di&erences in sensitivity to signals of the own body, which has 
been shown to moderate e&ects of disgust on moral judgments (Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & 
Jordan, 2008). Fourth, we included 10 statements from the Beliefs in a Dangerous World 
questionnaire (Altemeyer, 1988; α = .68 for a 9-item scale) for which participants indicated 
their agreement on a scale from 1 (“completely disagree”) to 7 (“completely agree”). Finally, we 
measured feelings of fear and disgust toward 7 groups, among which Dutch, Moroccans, and 
people with obesity. Participants indicated how frightening and disgusting they found these 
groups from 1 (“not at all”) to 7 (“very much”).    
Procedure. Participants were welcomed by the experimenter and led to a research room. 
!ey started with an Emotion Priming Task, in which they had to categorize pictures as being 
related to fear or disgust. Before the picture appeared, a prime picture was presented to which 
participants did not have to respond. !e EPT started with two practice blocks of 12 trials 
each, in which all emotion pictures were depicted twice. A grey square served as prime during 
3 Note that this is the reliability a#er deletion of one item. Excluding this item resulted in a higher reliability score.
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practice. Two experimental blocks followed, each consisting of 48 trials. Of these 48 trials, 
each social category (i.e., Moroccan males, obese males, students, homeless people) served as 
prime 12 times; 6 times followed by a fear picture and 6 times followed by a disgust picture. 
A trial started with a $xation cross for 1000 ms. !en, the prime picture was presented for 
200 ms. A#er an interval of 100 ms the target picture appeared (Stimulus Onset Asynchrony 
= 300 ms, Intertrial Interval = 1000 ms), which remained on screen until the participant gave 
a response. 
A#er the EPT, participants were led to one of two identical cubicles containing a desk and 
a computer. Here, the environmental cue was manipulated. In one of the cubicles, we di&used 
a bad-smelling odor in the cubicle, by hiding a cotton pad underneath the desk on which 
we put two drops of liquid walrus-poop odor (provided by SmartNose B.V., Amersfoort, the 
Netherlands). In the other cubicle, the glass window above the door was covered with dark 
carton paper. By turning o& the light, the cubicle became completely dark, aside from the light 
from the computer screen. By turning on the light, this cubicle was normally lit. Participants 
were randomly divided over the environmental cue conditions, and performed two single-
target Implicit Association Tests (ST-IAT; Wigboldus et al., 2005) in the cubicle. Half of the 
participants in each condition $rst received an ST-IAT toward people of Moroccan descent, 
followed by an ST-IAT toward obese people. !e other half of the participants received the 
reversed order of the two ST-IATs. Besides the di&erence in category, the tasks were identical. 
In the ST-IAT, participants $rst had to categorize pictures as being positive or negative. In 
the second and third block, the positive and negative pictures had to be categorized, as well 
as pictures of obese people in one ST-IAT or pictures of Moroccan males in the other ST-IAT. 
Both blocks consisted of 40 trials, and the order of the blocks was counterbalanced. In the 
compatible block, the pictures of Moroccans or obese people (10 trials) had to be categorized 
using the same key as the negative pictures (10 trials), whereas the positive pictures (20 trials) 
had to be categorized using a di&erent key. In the incompatible block, the negative pictures 
(20 trials) had to be categorized using the one key, and the other key for positive pictures (10 
trials) and the pictures of Moroccans or obese people (10 trials). Note that the ST-IAT had a 
black background screen in all conditions to prevent too much light coming from the screen. 
A#er having $nished the ST-IAT, participants were brought back to the $rst research room 
to provide demographical information and answer a few questions about the study. Importantly, 
we asked participants to indicate if they had a diminished smelling ability at that moment (for 
instance due to a cold). We included this question to be able to remove participants from the 
analyses who indicated to have a diminished smelling ability, because this may have likely 
a&ected the strength of our smell manipulation. Finally, participants received an email with a 
link to the digital versions of the Disgust Scale (DS), Social Dominance Orientation (SDO), 
Private Body Consciousness (PBC), Beliefs in a Dangerous World (BDW), and the explicit 
measure of fear/disgust toward groups. 
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results 
Main analyses. Incorrect trials on the ST-IATs were coded as missing values, as well 
as latencies faster than 300 and slower than 3000 ms. !e remaining latencies were log-
transformed for the analyses, but means of the untransformed latencies will be reported for 
sake of clarity. For each participant, the mean latency in the compatible block was subtracted 
from the mean latency in the incompatible block. A higher di&erence score thus re%ects more 
negative associations toward the speci$c group. !e data of two participants (1 male and 1 
female) in the bad smell condition were removed from the analyses, because they reported to 
have a diminished smelling ability. In total, the data of 74 participants were included in the 
analyses.  
!e ST-IAT scores were subjected to a 3 (environmental cue: dark, light, bad smell) X 2 
(type of ST-IAT: toward obese people versus Moroccans) between-subjects ANOVA, which 
did not reveal any signi$cant e&ects, all Fs < 1.68, p > .19, n.s. However, founded on the 
idea that fear may primarily be the basis of implicit prejudice toward ethnic out-groups 
for females, and not for males, we included gender as a factor in the analysis. Due to the 
lack of data of male participants in some cells, we cannot test for the three-way interaction 
with gender. However, including gender in the design resulted in a signi$cant e&ect of the 
predicted environmental cue X type of ST-IAT interaction, F(2, 64) = 3.44, p = .038, ηp2 = .10. 
Furthermore, within an analysis of the e&ect of a dark versus light environment on prejudice 
toward Moroccans, the simple e&ect of gender within the dark is statistically signi$cant, F(1, 
20) = 10.59, p = .004, ηp2 = .35. Due to the low number of participants in this comparison, we 
have to be careful in drawing conclusions, but this analysis suggests that negative associations 
toward Moroccans in the dark are much higher for female participants (M = 108.45, SD = 
72.94) than for male participants (M = -11.31, SD = 22.81). In the light, males and females did 
not di&er in their negative associations toward Moroccans, F < 1, n.s.  
We also performed the analysis on the data of females only, revealing a signi$cant 
interaction e&ect between environmental manipulation and type of ST-IAT, F(2,59) = 3.38, 
p = .041, ηp2= .10. Simple contrast analyses show a signi$cant e&ect of environmental cue for 
the Moroccan ST-IAT, F(2, 59) = 3.75, p = .029, ηp2 = .11, but not for the obese people ST-IAT, 
F < 1, n.s. As expected, ST-IAT scores toward Moroccan males were signi$cantly higher in 
the dark condition (M = 108.45; SD = 72.94) as compared to the light condition (M = 37.94; 
SD = 36.31) or the bad smell condition (M = 23.46; SD = 48.13), respectively p = .043 and p = 
.010. However, the ST-IAT scores toward obese people did not di&er signi$cantly for the dark 
(M = 44.76; SD = 58.07), light (M = 50.55; SD = 69.36) or bad smell (M = 77.59; SD = 69.42) 
condition, all ps > .319. See Figure 3.1 for an illustration. 
Importantly, the ST-IAT scores toward Moroccans as compared to the ST-IAT scores 
toward obese people did not di&er in the control condition (p = .729). In the bad smell 
condition, there was a marginally signi$cant trend in the expected direction for the ST-
IAT scores to be higher toward obese people than toward Moroccan people (p = .080). !e 
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di&erence between the ST-IAT scores in the dark condition was marginally signi$cant and 
in the expected direction, with higher scores on the ST-IAT toward Moroccans than toward 
obese people (p = .067). 
figure 3.1. Mean ST-IAT scores (and standard errors) for the environmental cue manipulation 
and type of ST-IAT, for female participants. Note that untransformed scores are depicted in the 
graph, whereas analyses were performed on log-transformed scores.
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Supplementary analyses. Although the low number of participants makes it di'cult to 
test for moderation, we did some exploratory analyses. In doing so, we focused exclusively on 
the data of female participants, because we only obtained an e&ect of darkness for females. We 
describe the analyses for implicit and explicit fear of Moroccans, and the four questionnaires 
that we administered to test for di&erences in fear or dominance. For each measure, we $rst 
describe the basic results on the measures themselves, a#er which we describe how we tested 
for potential moderation of these variables in the e&ect of darkness on the ST-IAT toward 
Moroccans.  
Implicit fear of Moroccans. From the EPT data, we $rst deleted latencies of incorrect 
trials, and latencies that fell outside the range of 300-1500 ms. !en we log-transformed 
the remaining latencies. !e data of $ve participants were not recorded due to an error in 
the programming, leaving the data of 61 participants. A 2 (primed group: Moroccan versus 
obese) X 2 (target emotion: fear versus disgust) repeated measures analysis revealed only a 
signi$cant main e&ect of emotion, F(1, 60) = 77.94, p < .001, ηp2 = .53, with faster responses on 
disgust (M = 561) than on fear trials (M = 599). No main e&ect was found for primed group, 
F(1, 60) = 2.23, p = .144, n.s., nor a group X emotion interaction, F < 1, n.s.  
For each participant, we calculated a score to indicate implicit fear toward Moroccans, 
by subtracting the speed of responses to fear pictures a#er Moroccan primes from speed of 
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responding a#er practice primes (e.g., a grey square). To test for possible moderation, we 
performed an analysis of environmental cue manipulation (dark versus light) on the ST-
IAT scores of females toward Moroccans, including the standardized implicit fear score as 
between-subjects factor. !is analysis did not reveal a higher-order interaction or a main 
e&ect of implicit fear, Fs < 1.66, n.s. !us, no indication was found for moderation of implicit 
fear toward Moroccans. 
Explicit fear of Moroccans. Since the measure of explicit associations was administered 
a#er the environmental cue manipulation, we $rst tested whether the manipulation had 
a&ected people’s self-reported emotions toward Moroccans or obese people. We performed 
a repeated measures analysis of group (Moroccans versus obese) X emotion (fear versus 
disgust), including our environmental cue manipulation as between-subjects factor. Our 
manipulation had no main e&ect, F < 1, n.s, nor did it interact with group and/or emotion, all 
Fs < 2.08, ps > .134. Importantly, the results showed a replication of the $ndings of Chapter 2, 
with an emotion X group interaction, F(1, 62) = 157.87, p < .001, ηp2 = .72. Simple main e&ects 
showed that Moroccans scored signi$cantly higher on fear (M = 3.25, SD = 1.68) than on 
disgust (M = 2.11, SD = 1.23), F(1, 62) = 41.12, p < .001, ηp2 = .40, whereas obese people scored 
signi$cantly higher on disgust (M = 3.77, SD = 1.53) than on fear (M = 1.74, SD = 0.91), F(1, 
68) = 130.09, p < .001, ηp2 = .68. Furthermore, Moroccans scored higher than obese on fear, 
F(1, 62) = 52.17, p < .001, ηp2 = .46, whereas obese scored higher than Moroccans on disgust, 
F(1, 62) = 61.52, p < .001, ηp2 = .50. 
To test for possible moderation, we included the explicit fear of Moroccans as between-
subjects factor in the test of environmental cue manipulation (dark versus light) on females’ 
ST-IAT-scores toward Moroccans. !is analysis did not provide evidence for moderation of 
explicit fear of Moroccans, with the interaction of F < 1, n.s. !e main e&ect of explicit fear of 
Moroccans also did not reach signi$cance, F(1, 16) = 2.44, p = .138, n.s.
Questionnaires. For the questionnaires, we reverse scored some items so that the most 
positive values always mean that participants have a high score on that individual measure. 
Before testing for possible moderating e&ects, we checked whether the scores on these four 
individual di&erence variables were a&ected by the environmental cue manipulation. For 
Disgust Sensitivity, Social Dominance Orientation, and Private Body Consciousness this was 
not the case, Fs < 1. Although $lled out hours a#er the experiment, the Beliefs in a Dangerous 
World scores di&ered across conditions, F(2, 62) = 4.51, p = .015, ηp2 = .13. !ese scores 
were signi$cantly higher in the light condition (M = 4.02, SD = 0.74) than in the bad smell 
condition (M = 3.38, SD = 0.69), p = .004. !e scores in the dark condition (M = 3.70, SD = 
0.69) did not di&er from the light, p = 147, or from the bad smell, p = .139. 
When testing for possible moderation of these questionnaires in the e&ect of our 
manipulation (dark versus light) on ST-IAT scores of females toward Moroccans, we did not 
$nd signi$cant higher-order interactions or main e&ects with the PBC and the SDO, Fs < 1, 
n.s., or with the DS and BDW, Fs < 1.86, ps > .166.  
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Discussion
!e results of Study 1 provide insight into how darkness can bolster implicit bias. As 
hypothesized, darkness a&ected ST-IAT scores toward Moroccans, but not toward obese 
people. Importantly, another negative cue (i.e., a bad smell) did not enhance implicit 
prejudice scores toward Moroccans. !e present results thus support the idea that a negative 
environmental cue can temporarily activate more negative associations toward an out-
group, but only when the cue is relevant to the speci$c out-group. A negative cue (bad smell) 
that is not related to the targeted out-group (Moroccans) does not lead to a facilitation of 
negative associations. !ese $ndings are in line with an emotion-speci$city account of 
prejudice (Dasgupta et al., 2009), and extend these previous studies by showing that a subtle 
environmental cue – such as darkness – can directly a&ect prejudice toward a feared out-
group.  Moreover, we must distinguish between emotions believed to be experienced by the 
target category and emotions experienced by the perceiver when confronted with the target 
category. To illustrate, Dasgupta and colleagues (2009) focused on the emotion anger, which 
was typically thought to be displayed by the investigated out-group (Arabs). In contrast, we 
have focused on fear, which is typically elicited in the Dutch perceiver by the out-group under 
investigation (Moroccans).  
According to the emotion-speci$city account, a bad smell could also have been predicted 
to facilitate ST-IAT scores toward obese people. In this study, those e&ects were in the expected 
direction, but did not reach signi$cance. !e question may rise why we did not $nd e&ects 
of the bad smell on the ST-IAT toward obese people. In a recent paper by Inbar, Pizarro, and 
Bloom (2012), it was shown that an obnoxious smell decreases reported warmth toward gay 
men and lesbians, but not implicit associations as measured by an IAT. !ey suggest that 
smells in general may be too subtle to a&ect automatically activated associations. However, 
other studies have shown that scents can be strong non-conscious cues to a&ect cognition and 
behavior when the scent is clearly associated with the behavior (e.g., Holland, Hendriks, & 
Aarts, 2005). A more plausible explanation may thus be that the odor we used was not clearly 
related to obese people. Indeed, the walrus-poop odor that we used smelled bad, but the smell 
was not related to humans in general or obese people speci$cally. !erefore, the disgust that 
was evoked by the smell may not (or insu'ciently) have been applicable to the target group. 
More research is needed to investigate whether and under what conditions smells a&ect 
implicit out-group bias.
In Study 2, we focused exclusively on the associations with Moroccans. First, we aimed to 
replicate the result of darkness on the ST-IAT toward this out-group, especially considering 
the relatively low number of participants in Study 1. We again included measures of possible 
moderating variables in the next study. Furthermore, we focused on females exclusively, 
because the results of Study 1 suggest that they are most susceptible to e&ects of darkness on 
implicit bias.
Prejudice in the dark: How darkness facilitates negative associations with a feared out-group 55
Chapter 
3
Moreover, we made some adjustments to the procedure of Study 2, to shed more light on 
the processes by which darkness temporarily enhances implicit bias. Again, we started with an 
EPT to measure implicit fear-associations with Moroccans. In Study 1, we used the fear and 
disgust pictures from the EPT to serve as negative pictures in the IAT. Although the labels for 
categorization in the ST-IAT in Study 1 were ‘positive’ and ‘negative’, it is possible that these 
pictures changed the meaning of the ST-IAT from general valence to more speci$c emotional 
characteristics. Because we hypothesized that darkness would temporarily activate general 
negative associations with a feared out-group, we now selected pictures for the ST-IAT that 
participants had not seen before and which did not have a strong emotional connotation. 
Finally, we included questions about participants’ feelings in the dark versus light cubicle, to 
test whether the darkness a&ected people’s feeling of anxiety. We were primarily interested 
whether participants’ would report feeling more fearful in the dark cubicle as compared to 
the light cubicle. 
stuDy 2
method
Participants and design. Fi#y-seven female students of Radboud University Nijmegen 
completed this study in exchange for course credit points or money. !e design included a 
between-subjects manipulation of environmental cue (darkness versus control) and an ST-
IAT toward Moroccan males as dependent variable. 
Stimulus materials. !e stimuli for the EPT again included 3 IAPS pictures related to fear, 
and 3 IAPS pictures related to disgust4. For both emotions, we replaced one of the pictures 
of Study 1 by another IAPS picture. !e EPT now followed a detailed cover story, for which 
participants were asked to remember the faces that were shown before the target pictures (cf., 
Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995). In total, we selected 7 Moroccan male faces and 
17 Dutch male faces from the RaFD to serve as practice trials for remembering the faces, and 
3 Moroccan males and 3 Dutch males that served as primes in the experimental block of the 
EPT. 
For the ST-IAT we used 6 positive pictures (e.g., birthday cake, air balloons, gold$sh) 
and 6 negative pictures (e.g., an ashtray, pollution, shark) that depicted a variety of valenced 
stimuli (see Vasey, Harbaugh, Bu'ngton, Jones, & Fazio, 2012). For the Moroccan male faces, 
we used 3 pictures from the RaFD that were not used in the EPT, as well as 3 pictures from 
the ADFES. 
Procedure. !e procedure closely followed the procedure of Study 1. Participants started 
with an EPT, and were then brought to a cubicle that was either dark or light. Here, they 
performed an ST-IAT toward Moroccans. A#er the ST-IAT, they indicated how they felt at 
that moment. !en, they returned to the $rst research room for some $nal questions. 
4 It should be noted that the EPT of this study is already reported in Chapter 2, Study 3. 
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A few adjustments were made to the tasks as compared to Study 1. First, the EPT was now 
followed by a recognition task of the primes, in line with the cover story that was included 
to make sure that participants paid close attention to the primes (see Fazio et al., 1995). !e 
critical block of the EPT now consisted of 54 trials, of which 36 were experimental trials and 
18 $ller trials. Of the experimental trials, 9 trials were Moroccan primes preceding a fear 
picture, 9 trials Moroccan primes preceding a disgust picture, 9 trials Dutch primes preceding 
a fear picture, and 9 trials Dutch primes preceding a disgust picture.  
!e ST-IAT was the same as in Study 1, except for the pictures used (see ‘Stimulus 
Materials’). In addition, right a#er the IAT and while still being in the cubicle with the 
environmental cue manipulation, we asked participants to indicate on a slider from 0 (not 
at all) to 100 (very much) to what extent they experienced certain feelings at that moment. 
We included 1 speci$c fear-item: ‘afraid’ (angstig), and several items that are more generally 
related to feelings of discomfort: ‘nervous’ (nerveus) and ‘uncomfortable’ (ongemakkelijk), 
and the reverse-coded items ‘relaxed’ (ontspannen), ‘calm (rustig), and ‘strong’ (sterk). Note 
that the order of these questions was the same for all participants, with ‘afraid’ always as $rst 
question, because we were primarily interested in testing whether darkness increased feelings 
of fear. 
A#er the ST-IAT and the question about feelings, participants were brought back to the 
$rst research room, where they $lled out some demographics and questionnaires, most 
importantly including questions about the extent to which they associated the feelings of 
fear and disgust with several groups (including Moroccans and Dutch). Participants could 
indicate their associations using a slider from 0 (not at all) to 100 (very much).  
results 
Manipulation check. In contrast to Study 1, we were now able to test the e&ect of 
our environmental cue manipulation on participants’ feelings. Our environmental cue 
manipulation signi$cantly a&ected self-reported fear, F(1, 54) = 5.24, p = .026, ηp2= .09, with 
participants in the dark cubicle reporting to be more afraid (M = 17.34, SD = 18.95) than 
participants in the light cubicle (M = 7.86, SD = 10.92). Furthermore, a 5-item scale composed 
of the items ‘afraid’, ‘nervous’, ‘uncomfortable’, ‘relaxed’ (reverse-coded), and ‘calm’ (reverse 
coded) formed the most reliable scale (α = .86)5, of which the score was signi$cantly a&ected 
by our manipulation, F(1, 55) = 5.59, p = .022, ηp2 = .09. As expected, participants’ scores of 
discomfort were higher in the dark (M = 30.55, SD = 18.54) than in the light cubicle (M = 
20.09, SD = 14.73). 
Main analyses. !e ST-IAT scores were calculated in the same way as in Study 1. As in 
Study 1, we report means of the untransformed latencies, but analyses were performed on 
5 !e reliability of the scale increased from α = .85 to α = .86 by deleting the item ‘strong’ (reverse-coded). Still, a 
scale including all 6 items revealed the same pattern of results, with the highest scores in the dark environment (M = 
32.40, SD = 16.97) as compared to the light environment (M = 24.07, SD = 14.46), F(1, 55) = 3.99, p = .051, ηp2 = .07. 
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log-transformed reaction times. !e data of one participant were removed from the analyses, 
because this person had an ST-IAT score of more than 3 SD from the sample mean6. !e ST-
IAT scores were subjected to an ANOVA with environmental cue manipulation as between-
subjects factor. !is analysis revealed no e&ect of our manipulation, F < 1, n.s. !e ST-IAT 
score toward Moroccans did not di&er in the dark (M = 25.99, SD = 56.92) as compared to the 
control condition (M = 25.55, SD = 55.42). 
Supplementary analyses. In order to test for possible moderation of fear of Moroccans, 
we included the implicit and explicit measure of fear-associations with Moroccans to the 
analyses of our darkness manipulation on the ST-IAT. Note that the results for these scores 
are reported in Study 3 of the previous chapter. !erefore, we do not report the basic analyses 
for these measures, but only focus on testing for potential moderation. 
Implicit fear of Moroccans. !e results of the EPT from the present study are reported 
in Study 3 of the previous chapter. For the present purpose, we created an implicit fear score 
by subtracting the speed of responding to fear pictures a#er seeing a Moroccan prime from 
speed of responding to fear pictures a#er seeing a Dutch prime7 (M = 11.10, SD = 36.24). 
Participants in the dark and light condition did not di&er a priori on this measure, F < 1, 
n.s. To test for possible moderation, we standardized the implicit fear score and added it as 
a continuous between-subjects factor to the ANOVA of environmental cue manipulation on 
the ST-IAT. Both the main e&ect of environmental cue manipulation and the implicit fear 
score did not reach signi$cance, F < 1, n.s. Furthermore, we did not $nd an interaction e&ect 
between these two variables, F(1, 52) = 1.49, p = .228, ηp2 = .03.
Explicit fear of Moroccans. For explicit fear-associations, we also calculated a di&erence 
score by subtracting self-reported fear of Dutch from fear of Moroccans. !ese associations 
were measured at the end of the experiment, a#er the environmental cue manipulation had 
taken place, but our manipulation did not a&ect this score, F < 1, n.s. To test for possible 
moderation, we performed an ANOVA of our environmental cue manipulation including 
standardized explicit fear scores as a continuous between-subjects factor. !is analysis 
revealed a marginally signi$cant main e&ect of the explicit fear score on the ST-IAT, F(1, 52) 
= 3.44, p = .069, ηp2 = .06. To test for the direction of this relation, we regressed the explicit 
fear score on the ST-IAT, revealing a marginally signi$cant relation, β = .247, t(55) = 1.87, p = 
.067. !e interaction between environmental cue manipulation and explicit fear score did not 
reach signi$cance, F < 1, n.s. !us, the higher the explicit fear of Moroccans versus Dutch, the 
higher the ST-IAT score, irrespective of environmental cue manipulation.
6 Note that we checked for outliers on the ST-IAT in all studies reported in this chapter, as well as the rest of the 
dissertation. We deleted the data of participants that had an ST-IAT score of more than 3 SD from the mean. Using 
this criterion, no outliers were detected in Study 1, one outlier in Study 2, one outlier in Study 3, and no outliers in 
Study 4. 
7 Note that reaction times were $rst capped to a range of 300 ms and 1500 ms, a#er which they were log-transformed.
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Discussion
In sum, we did not replicate our $ndings of darkness on the ST-IAT toward Moroccans 
using an adapted procedure. !e main di&erence between Study 1 and Study 2 was in the 
pictures that we used as positive and negative representations in the ST-IAT. In Study 1, we used 
clearly negative pictures from the IAPS, depicting disgusting and fearful scenes. In contrast, 
the pictures in Study 2 did not have such a strong and speci$c emotional connotation. Some 
of them (burned bread, tra'c jam, polluting industry) may even have required some thought 
before being able to categorize them as being negative. More importantly, the pictures were 
not directly fear evoking like in Study 1. Possibly, the e&ects of darkness are only captivated 
when the implicit association measure is fear-relevant by containing pictures depicting fearful 
scenes.
To further study the role of fear-relevance of the ST-IAT, we manipulated the type of 
negative pictures in the ST-IAT of Study 3. Moreover, we distinguished between types of fear 
depicted by the pictures. !at is, we manipulated whether the pictures were related to human 
threat or non-human threat (i.e., threatening animals), in order to study how speci$cally 
applicable the pictures have to be for the out-group under investigation. !us, we created 
three versions of the ST-IAT, one with the pictures of Study 2, one with fear-related pictures 
containing a human threat, and one with fear-related pictures depicting a non-human threat. 
Based on the $ndings of the previous two studies, we expected darkness to in%uence only 
the ST-IATs that contained fear-related pictures. For the type of fear pictures, two outcomes 
were possible. If the ST-IAT has to be generally applicable to the emotion associated with the 
speci$c out-group, both fear-related ST-IATs should show enhanced negative associations. 
However, if the ST-IAT has to be speci$cally applicable to the emotion associated with the 
speci$c out-group, only the ST-IAT with pictures of human threat should reveal enhanced 
implicit bias toward a feared out-group. 
stuDy 3
method
Participants and design. Seventy-nine females participated in this study in exchange 
for course credit points or money. !e design consisted of a between-subjects manipulation 
of fear-relatedness of the negative pictures in the ST-IAT toward Moroccans (not fear-
related, human fear-related, animal fear-related), and a between subjects manipulation of 
environmental cue (darkness vs. light). 
Stimulus materials. All three versions of the ST-IAT consisted of 10 pictures of Moroccan 
males, selected from the RaFD. !e positive pictures were also the same for the three versions, 
containing 3 pictures from the set of Study 2 (of a balloon, sand castle, and a colorful lollipop) 
and 2 pictures from the IAPS (%owers and a butter%y). !e negative pictures di&ered across 
the three versions. !e not fear-related version contained 5 pictures from the set of Study 
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2 (e.g., ashtray, pollution, tra'c jam). !e human fear-related pictures consisted of 5 IAPS 
pictures depicting scenes related to human threat (e.g., attack, gun, knife). !e animal fear-
related version consisted of 5 IAPS pictures depicting scenes related to animal threat (e.g., 
spider, snake, shark). 
Procedure. Participants started with a traditional A&ective Priming Task in a research 
room. !e APT was not related to fear and disgust, but was a standard positive-negative APT 
using words instead of pictures. Moroccan male names and Dutch male names served as 
primes, and positive and negative adjectives as targets.
A#er the APT, participants were brought to a cubicle in which they performed one of the 
three versions of the ST-IAT toward Moroccans in either a light or dark cubicle. Except for 
the di&erence in pictures, the procedure was the same as in Study 1 and 2. A#er the ST-IAT, 
participants were again asked to indicate to what extent they experienced certain feelings. We 
now selected questions from a Dutch translation (Van der Ploeg, Defares, & Spielberger, 1980) 
of the state scale of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory by Spielberger, Gorsuch, and Lushene 
(1970), asking for 10 feelings. Again, we $rst asked for feelings of fear using a 100-point scale 
slider, but now asked how ‘scared’ (bang) people felt at that moment.
Finally, participants went back to the $rst research room in which they $lled out the same 
questionnaires as in the previous studies. 
results 
Manipulation check. Participants’ feeling of fear was not a&ected by our environmental 
cue manipulation; people reported to be equally scared in the dark cubicle using the 1 fear-
item (M = 13.36, SD = 16.86) as in the light cubicle (M =15.97, SD = 19.49), F < 1, n.s. !e ST-
IAT version also did not a&ect reported fear; neither did the interaction between manipulation 
and version, both Fs < 1.30, n.s. Furthermore, the 10 feeling items formed a reliable anxiety 
scale (α = .94), which was also not a&ected by our environmental cue manipulation, ST-IAT 
version manipulation, or an interaction between the two, all Fs < 1, n.s. 
Main analyses. We used the same procedure as in Study 1 and 2 for transforming the 
latencies of the ST-IAT and calculating the ST-IAT score. !e data of one participant were 
removed from further analyses, because this person had an ST-IAT score of more than 3 
SD from the sample mean. !e ST-IAT scores were subjected to a 2 (environmental cue: 
darkness vs. light) X 3 (version ST-IAT: non-fear, human fear, animal fear) between-subjects 
ANOVA. Importantly, there was no main e&ect of our environmental cue manipulation or 
an interaction between our environmental cue manipulation and ST-IAT version, both Fs < 
1, n.s. However, this analysis revealed a main e&ect of the version of the ST-IAT, F(2, 72) = 
5.87, p = .004, ηp2 = .14. Testing the ST-IAT scores in the di&erent version against zero showed 
that only participants in the human threat version of the ST-IAT had marginally signi$cant 
negative associations toward Moroccans (M = 23.91, SD = 78.74), t(29) = 1.81, p = .081. 
Participants in the non-fear version did not show a di&erence between the two IAT blocks 
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(M = 1.17, SD = 64.85), t < 1, n.s. In contrast, participants in the animal fear-related version 
actually showed signi$cant positive associations toward the out-group (M = -35.70, SD = 
52.48), t(23) = -3.62, p = .001. 
Supplementary analyses. In this study, we measured only explicit fear associations with 
Moroccans. However, due to time constraints, only 57 of the participants $lled out these 
questions. 
Explicit fear of Moroccans. As in Study 2, we calculated a di&erence score between self-
reported fear of Moroccans and self-reported fear of Dutch, with higher scores indicating 
higher fear of Moroccans. In general, this score di&ered signi$cantly from zero (M = 24.51, SD 
= 21.11), t(56) = 8.77, p < .001. !e score was not a&ected by our manipulations, Fs < 1.97, ps 
> .150. To test for possible moderation, we included the standardized explicit fear score in our 
analysis of the ST-IAT score. !is analysis did not reveal an indication of moderation, with 
the interaction e&ect F < 1.04, p > .360. As in Study 2, we did $nd a marginally signi$cant 
main e&ect of explicit fear associations on the ST-IAT score, F(1, 45) = 2.88, p = .097, ηp2 = .06. 
A subsequent simple regression analyses including only the explicit fear score showed that 
this relation was again positive, β = .251, t(55)= 1.92, p = .060, indicating that the higher the 
self-reported fear of Moroccans, the higher the implicit prejudice toward Moroccans. 
Discussion 
To conclude, in Study 3 we did not $nd that darkness increased negativity toward 
Moroccans, not even when the pictures in the ST-IAT were related to threat. !us, again the 
$ndings obtained in Study 1 were not replicated. However, we did $nd a main e&ect of the 
version of the ST-IAT, showing the highest prejudice scores on the ST-IAT including human 
threat pictures. Interestingly, we did not $nd an ST-IAT e&ect for the version that did not 
include fear-related pictures, and an opposite ST-IAT e&ect in the version using animal-
related fear. Although these e&ects are not central to the research question of the present 
paper, they may be of interest to researchers studying implicit prejudice using IATs. Previous 
methodological investigations of the IAT have mainly focused on e&ects of aspects of the 
target category on the IAT e&ect. For example, Foroni and Bel-Bahar (2010) suggest that using 
pictures instead of names for the target categories of the IAT results in lower IAT e&ects, 
because the level of representation of stimuli exemplars in relation to the speci$c intended 
category is higher for names than for pictures. In the present version manipulation, we did 
not manipulate aspects of the stimuli representing the target category, but of the stimuli used 
to represent the negative valence category. It may be that level of representation also plays a 
role in our e&ect of version on the IAT scores, but now in the sense that it matters whether the 
content of the negative pictures is relevant to the target category. In other words, threatening 
pictures containing humans are associated with the stereotype of Moroccans, which may 
result in higher general IAT e&ects. In contrast, pictures of tra'c jams and pollution are 
related to humans, but not applicable to the stereotype of Moroccans. Moreover, pictures of 
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threatening animals are neither related to humans in general nor to Moroccans speci$cally, 
which may make it hard to categorize these on the same key as Moroccans, resulting in an 
opposite IAT e&ect. Future research should more systematically study this potentially relevant 
methodological aspect of the ST-IAT. 
In sum, in Study 3 we did not conceptually replicate the $nding that darkness enhances 
negative associations with Moroccans. A reason for this could be that the results of Study 1 
re%ect a Type I error. !e $ndings were in line with our expectations, but the relatively low 
number of participants for this design asks for cautious conclusions, and a replication of the 
$ndings. Alternatively, it could also be that we made some crucial changes to the procedure 
in Study 2 and 3 as compared to Study 1. One important remaining di&erence between Study 
1 and the subsequent two studies is the fact that participants in Study 1 performed a fear 
versus disgust APT before they performed the ST-IAT in the dark or light cubicle, and that the 
pictures from this APT served as negative pictures in the ST-IAT. It could have been the case 
that the APT primed fear-associations toward Moroccans, or the concept of fear in general, 
which was then re-activated during the ST-IAT in the dark where those same fear pictures 
reappeared. In Study 4, we investigated this idea by again including a fear-disgust APT at the 
beginning of the study and using the pictures from the APT as negative pictures in the ST-IAT. 
stuDy 4
method
Participants and design. Forty-seven Dutch female students (Mage = 20.70; SDage = 2.14, 
age range 18-26) of Radboud University Nijmegen participated in this study in return for 
course credit points or money. !e design included a between-subjects manipulation of 
environmental cue (darkness versus light). An ST-IAT toward Moroccans served as dependent 
variable.  
Stimulus materials. !e primes in the EPT consisted of 3 pictures of Moroccan males (the 
same ADFES pictures as in Study 1), and 3 pictures of Dutch males (also from the ADFES). 
As targets, we used 3 disgust pictures (the same as in Study 1), and 3 fear pictures (1 similar to 
Study 1; 2 new ones). We used the fear and disgust pictures from the EPT as negative pictures 
in the ST-IAT, and used the same positive IAPS pictures as in Study 1. !e Moroccan male faces 
from the EPT were used in the ST-IAT, combined with 3 Moroccan male faces from the RaFD.
Procedure. Participants again started in a research room with a pc, where they performed 
the EPT. A#er the EPT, they were brought to a cubicle by the experimenter, in which the lights 
were either turned on or switched o&. In the cubicle, they performed the ST-IAT, a#er which 
they $lled out how they felt at that time. A#er this, they returned to the $rst research room, in 
which they $lled out some digital questionnaires. 
!e EPT followed the same procedure as in Study 1, but instead of having four categories 
as primes, we now only included Moroccan male faces and Dutch male faces as primes. !e 
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procedure of the ST-IAT was also the same as in Study 1. !en, we asked participants to 
indicate the extent to which they experienced certain feelings at that moment, using again the 
same items as in Study 2. Finally, participants were brought back to the $rst research room 
by the experimenter, where they $lled out some digital questionnaires (e.g., same explicit 
associations between groups and emotions as in the previous studies) and demographic 
questions. 
results 
Manipulation check. Analyses of participants’ feelings in the cubicle revealed a marginally 
signi$cant e&ect for ‘afraid’, F(1, 45) = 3.13, p = .084, ηp2 = .07, showing that people reported 
to be more afraid in the dark cubicle (M = 20.41, SD = 21.80) as compared to the light cubicle 
(M = 11.00, SD = 14.30). A scale containing all 5 items (α = .79) was not a&ected by our 
environmental cue manipulation, neither was a slightly more reliable scale of 4 items (α = .80, 
excluding the item ‘afraid’), both Fs < 1, n.s.
Main analyses. !e ST-IAT scores were prepared in the same way as in the previous 
studies. !ese ST-IAT scores were subjected to a 2 (environmental cue: dark versus light) 
between-subjects ANOVA, which revealed a signi$cant main e&ect of environmental cue, 
F(1, 45) = 4.16, p = .047, ηp2 = .09. As predicted, we replicated the $ndings of Study 1, showing 
that the ST-IAT scores toward people of Moroccan descent were signi$cantly higher in the 
dark condition (M = 70.53; SD = 63.45) as compared to the light condition (M = 29.98; SD = 
49.78). 
Supplementary analyses. As in Study 1 and Study 2, we measured both implicit and 
explicit fear of Moroccans. 
Implicit fear of Moroccans. For implicit fear-associations toward Moroccans, we again 
calculated a di&erence score for speed of responding to fear pictures in the EPT a#er a 
Moroccan versus a Dutch prime. In general, we did not $nd enhanced fear associations toward 
Moroccans, as is shown by the non-signi$cant comparison of this score (M = -3.36, SD = 26.90) 
against zero, t < 1, n.s. Furthermore, participants in our two environmental cue conditions 
did not di&er a priori in terms of their implicit fear associations toward Moroccans, F(1, 45) = 
1.19, p = .281, n.s. In order to test for possible moderation, we added the standardized implicit 
fear score to our analysis of environmental cue condition on the ST-IAT scores. !e main 
e&ect of environmental cue condition remained signi$cant, F(1, 43) = 4.43, p = .041, ηp2 = 
.09. We did not $nd a main e&ect of implicit fear on the ST-IAT, F < 1, n.s., nor an interaction 
between our manipulation and the implicit fear scores, F(1, 43) = 2.35, p = .133, n.s.
Explicit fear of Moroccans. We also calculated a di&erence score for explicit fear toward 
Moroccans versus Dutch, of which the mean (M = 27.81, SD = 24.02) was signi$cantly higher 
than zero, t(46) = 7.94, p < .001, but did not di&er as a function of our environmental cue 
manipulation, F < 1, n.s. We included the standardized explicit fear score as a continuous 
variable in our analysis of environmental cue manipulation on the ST-IAT, resulting in the 
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main e&ect of environmental cue manipulation, F(1, 43) = 4.26, p = .045, ηp2 = .09, and a 
main e&ect of explicit fear, F(1, 43) = 4.83, p = .033, ηp2 = .10. !e interaction between the two 
variables did not reach signi$cance, F(1, 43) = 1.43, p = .238, n.s. A simple regression analysis 
revealed a marginally signi$cant positive relation between the explicit fear associations with 
Moroccans and the ST-IAT score, β = .275, t(45) = 1.92, p = .0618. !us, the higher the explicit 
fear toward Moroccans as compared to Dutch, the higher the implicit prejudice.  
Discussion
In this $nal study, darkness again led to more negative implicit associations toward 
Moroccans as compared to a normally lit control condition. Here, we conceptually stayed as 
close as possible to Study 1, by starting with a fear-disgust EPT and then using the pictures 
from the EPT as negative pictures in the ST-IAT. We will discuss the potential processes 
underlying the e&ect of darkness on implicit bias with regard to this speci$c procedure. 
Interestingly, like in Study 2 we found that people in the dark environment felt more 
afraid than people in the light environment. In contrast to our theoretical expectations, these 
feelings of fear did not mediate the e&ect of darkness on implicit negative associations toward 
Moroccans. However, it could be that our measure of feelings of fear is not suitable to reveal 
the hypothesized mediation. First, we use a self-report measure of fear, whereas we expect 
more automatic processes to underlie e&ects of darkness on implicit bias. Second, we measure 
feelings of fear a#er people have performed the ST-IAT and have been in the dark for a while. 
It is possible that feelings of fear have started to fade by the time we measure them.  
Finally, we replicated the results of the previous two studies that the explicit score of 
fear toward Moroccans was positively correlated with the ST-IAT score, irrespective of our 
environmental cue manipulation and the type of pictures used in the ST-IAT. !us, we found 
a general tendency that the higher the explicit fear of Moroccans, the higher the implicit 
prejudice. !ese $ndings provide interesting insights concerning the relation between implicit 
and explicit measures of negative associations, as well as for the emotional bases of implicit 
measures of prejudice. It should be noted that we always measured explicit fear a#er the ST-
IAT, so we have to be careful in our conclusion about the direction of the relation. Future 
studies are needed to further study the relation between implicit negative associations and 
self-reported fear of the out-group.  
8 Using the explicit fear associations with Moroccans (without correcting for the fear associations with Dutch) results 
in the same pattern of results. !e main e&ect of environmental cue manipulation is then F(1, 43) = .97, p = .031, ηp2 
= .10, the main e&ect of explicit fear F(1, 43) = 6.39, p = .015, ηp2 = .13, and no interaction between the two, F < 1, n.s. 
!e simple regression analysis now shows a signi$cant positive relation between fear of Moroccans and the ST-IAT, 
β = .335, t(45) = 2.39, p = .021. 
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GenerAl Discussion
In four studies, we investigated the e&ect of darkness on females’ negative associations 
with an out-group that is associated with fear. In two studies (Study 1 and 4), it was found 
that a dark environment enhanced implicit prejudice scores toward Moroccans. In the other 
two studies (Study 2 and 3) – using an adapted version of the paradigm – this main e&ect of 
darkness on implicit prejudice scores was not obtained. In this section, we will $rst discuss 
the $ndings of Study 1 and Study 4, a#er which we will discuss possible explanations for the 
null e&ects in the other two studies. In conclusion, we will explore potentially fruitful avenues 
for future investigations of processes underlying the e&ect of darkness on negative out-group 
associations. 
As expected, the results of the $rst study showed that a dark environment enhances negative 
associations with Moroccans as compared to a normally lit environment. Furthermore, in this 
study it was shown that this e&ect is not driven by mere negativity of the environmental cue, 
because negative associations toward a non-feared negative out-group (obese people) were 
not a&ected by darkness, and a non-fear related negative cue (a bad smell) did not enhance 
negative associations with Moroccans. In Study 4, we replicated the e&ects of darkness on 
negative associations toward Moroccans. Additionally, in this study we found indications that 
the dark cubicle enhances feelings of fear as compared to the normally lit environment. !ese 
scores did not mediate the e&ect of darkness on implicit negative associations toward the 
out-group. 
!ese studies extend previous research on the link between emotions and out-group bias. 
In fact, di&erent routes have been suggested for how emotions can impact out-group bias. 
According to the information-processing route, some emotions result in enhanced stereotypic 
out-group judgment because they induce heuristic processing (e.g., anger and happiness, 
see Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer, 1994; Tiedens & Linton, 2001), whereas emotions 
that induce controlled processing styles (e.g., sadness) have been shown to result in reduced 
stereotyping of out-groups (Bodenhausen et al., 1994; Lambert, Khan, Lickel, & Fricke, 1997). 
On more implicit measures of prejudice, e&ects of mood and information processing styles 
have also been found. For example, Huntsinger, Sinclair and Clore (2009) showed that a 
positive mood increased implicit bias and a negative mood decreased implicit bias. Studies 
investigating more emotion-speci$c e&ects found that anger enhanced implicit bias and 
sadness decreased implicit bias (DeSteno, Dasgupta, Bartlett, & Cajdric, 2004). !ese authors 
interpreted their $ndings in terms of the adaptive value of emotions, suggesting that anger 
is functionally more relevant for intergroup cognition than sadness. Recently, this functional 
view has been extended with $ndings showing that certain negative emotions enhance 
prejudice only toward out-groups that are associated with the speci$c emotion (Dasgupta et 
al., 2009). In these studies, anger increased prejudice scores, but only toward a group that is 
associated with anger. 
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For darkness, di&erent routes of in%uence could also be theorized. From an information-
processing perspective, darkness could be expected to induce vigilance and result in more 
controlled processing (also in line with $ndings that an avoidance motivation enhances 
cognitive control; e.g., Koch, Holland, & Van Knippenberg, 2008), which could have resulted 
in lower implicit prejudice scores. However, the results of Study 1 and Study 4 are clearly 
in line with the emotion-speci$city account (cf., Dasgupta et al., 2009), showing enhanced 
implicit prejudice scores in the dark, but only toward a feared out-group. !e present studies 
add to these previous studies by focusing on a di&erent emotion (i.e., fear), and using a 
di&erent manipulation. First, the emotion we focus on is not the emotion that is stereotypically 
experienced by the out-group (like anger in the case of Arabs in the paper by Dasgupta et 
al., 2009), but the emotion that is evoked by the out-group. Furthermore, our manipulation 
di&ers in terms of source of the emotion. In the studies by Dasgupta and colleagues (2009), 
participants have to recall an emotional experience. In that case, the source of the emotion is 
internal; it comes from a participant’s own memory and it thus di&ers per participant what 
kind of situation was recalled. In our studies, the cue that a&ects the experienced emotions 
is an external one. !e environment was manipulated to a&ect participants’ emotional 
experience. Future research could compare more directly how internal and external sources 
of fear a&ect implicit prejudice. 
In the discussion of the results thus far we have not made the distinction between male 
and female participants. However, in the present line of research we have mainly focused on 
female participants. In Study 1, we did have a few male participants and the results provide 
a very preliminary indication that the e&ect of darkness on prejudice toward a feared out-
group applies only to females. !is suggestion is in line with recent $ndings showing that 
prejudice toward males of ethnic out-groups is based on fear for females and on aggression 
for males (Navarrete et al., 2010). Future studies should further investigate how darkness may 
di&erentially a&ect female and male agents in their implicit biases.  
Note that we sometimes use the term implicit prejudice when referring to the scores on 
the ST-IAT, which may evoke the suggestion that the darkness manipulation changed an 
individual di&erences variable. It should be emphasized that we consider the e&ects of our 
environmental cue manipulation on negative associations to be temporary and context-
related. !is is in line with previous research showing that measures of automatically 
activated attitudes are sensitive to temporary shi#s in associative strength, resulting from 
context cue manipulations (see Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 2001). For example, watching a 
movie clip about a family barbecue versus a gang-related incident resulted in more positive 
associations with African Americans. Similarly, pictures of Black males resulted in more 
positive associations in a church context as compared to a shady street corner. 
We have now discussed the main e&ect of our darkness manipulation on implicit prejudice 
toward Moroccans and how it $ts with and extends previous research $ndings. However, the 
present line of research seems to suggest that e&ects of darkness on implicit prejudice scores 
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may be contingent upon the procedure in which we $rst prime fear and disgust pictures in 
the EPT that then reappear in the ST-IAT. Although we did not directly manipulate these 
conditions within one study, we do report two studies in the present chapter in which we 
adjusted the paradigm – by omitting the preceding fear and disgust EPT and by using 
di&erent ST-IAT stimuli – and did not obtain the main e&ect of darkness on implicit prejudice. 
Importantly, in the $nal study we again found the expected main e&ect using roughly the 
same procedure as in the $rst study. What could be the process captured with this procedure? 
Based on the results of our four studies, we will now systematically discuss the processes that 
potentially underlie the e&ect of darkness on implicit bias.
First, it is possible that darkness is a negative cue, which activates negative associations 
people may have with an out-group. !is mere negativity account is dismissed by the results of 
our $rst study, showing that e&ects of darkness apply only to a feared out-group. !erefore, a 
second possible explanation is that darkness could be a speci$c fear cue that activates negative 
associations with a group that typically evokes fear. However, the results of the subsequent 
studies suggest that darkness in itself may not be enough to trigger bias toward a feared 
out-group. !us, it may be that people’s fear-associations toward Moroccans $rst have to be 
activated (using a task like the EPT), which are then reactivated by the dark, and re%ected 
in enhanced negative associations on the ST-IAT. However, Study 2 followed this procedure, 
but did not reveal e&ects of darkness on the ST-IAT. !en, we envisioned a third possibility 
that the IAT needs to be fear-related, by containing pictures of fear-evoking scenes. !at is, 
darkness may activate fear associations, which spill over to the ST-IAT toward Moroccans 
when the IAT is fear-relevant. We tested this hypothesis in Study 3 by manipulating the 
fear-relatedness of the negative pictures in the ST-IAT, but the results did not yield e&ects of 
darkness in any of picture-versions of the IAT, not even when using an ST-IAT that included 
fear-related negative pictures. 
It is conceivable that the e&ect of the darkness manipulation on the measure of implicit 
bias toward Moroccans crucially depended on a combination of above-mentioned processes. 
For example, it could be that fear toward Moroccans should be made accessible by a task 
like the fear and disgust EPT. Darkness then reactivates these associations, and they become 
misattributed to Moroccans, which is revealed by an ST-IAT that is fear-relevant. !e question 
that then remains is whether the ST-IAT should contain the exact same pictures as the EPT, 
like they did in the present Study 1 and Study 4. In that case, the EPT may link certain pictures 
to fear appraisal, making sure the ST-IAT is fear-relevant to all participants because of the 
context-driven reactivation of this fear-appraisal. Possibly, this ST-IAT functions more like 
a stereotype-IAT than a valence-IAT. Because the negative pictures have repeatedly been 
coupled to the appraisal of fear, the evaluations toward Moroccans in the ST-IAT may also 
be more on the fear dimension than a general negative evaluation. !is would be in line with 
results of Schaller and colleagues (2003), who found that the beliefs in a dangerous world 
scale only predicted scores in the dark on a stereotype-IAT, but not on a valence-IAT. Future 
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studies should scrutinize di&erent aspects of the procedure, in order to shed more light on the 
processes underlying the e&ect of darkness on implicit prejudice toward a feared out-group.
Although obtaining e&ects of darkness in our present studies required a procedure 
involving accessibility of fear associations and fear-relevance of the prejudice measure, it 
seems still plausible that a strong induction of fear would result in a clear main e&ect on 
an implicit association measure. Possibly, darkness in itself is not a strong enough signal of 
threat, especially not in a controlled laboratory environment. Interestingly, on two of our three 
manipulation checks, darkness showed enhanced feelings of fear as compared to the light. 
However, the absolute values of feelings of fear were very low, within the lowest quarter of 
the scale. In comparison, previous studies on fear and person perception used fear inductions 
that included watching a scary $lm in a dimly lit room for almost 7 minutes (Maner et al., 
2005; Miller, Maner, & Vaughn Becker, 2010). !is manipulation resulted in feelings of fear 
that were above the midpoint of the scale (see Maner et al., 2005). 
Furthermore, the meaning of darkness itself and its e&ects may be highly context-
dependent. Interestingly, in the paper by Maner et al. (2005) a mate-searching motive was 
also activated, by having people watch a $lm clip of a romantic $rst date in a dimly lit room. 
!us, the room was dimly lit for both types of $lm clip, which was thought to create “an 
atmosphere that depending on context could be consistent with either a sexual/romantic or 
fear-inducing state” (Maner et al, 2005; p. 67). In other studies, darkness has been found to 
be associated with again another psychological e&ect – that is, subjective anonymity – and 
resulted in enhanced moral transgressions (Zhong, Bohns, & Gino, 2010). Future research 
should further study the psychological e&ects of darkness in di&erent contexts. 
Darkness may thus be a relatively mild manipulation of fear, at least in a controlled 
experimental environment. However, in combination with other strong threat cues, it may 
actually result in enhanced fear and consequently a&ect out-group bias. An interesting 
question may be whether strong feelings of fear would only a&ect negative associations with 
out-groups, or whether there are circumstances in which e&ects of fear are so strong that it 
may negatively a&ect associations with people that are simply unfamiliar, even if they may 
belong to the own (ethnic) group (cf., Correll, Wittenbrink, Park, Judd, & Goyle, 2011) 
To conclude, the present studies provide interesting insights into the e&ect of darkness on 
implicit negative out-group associations. Our $ndings suggest that ambient darkness only 
a&ects negative associations with a feared out-group when these fear associations are $rst 
primed and then measured using pertinent fear constructs. People are not afraid of the dark; 
rather darkness may trigger the fear they already have on their minds. 

2Part IIApproach and avoidance

Chapter 4
How to approach avoidance:
Reducing prejudiced behavior 
using approach training
Abstract
!e present research aims to enhance understanding of the behavioral 
processes related to implicit prejudice and prejudice reduction. We 
investigated both how implicit prejudice predicts approach/avoidance 
tendencies, and how repeated approach of out-group targets reduces 
prejudiced behavior. As hypothesized from the link between prejudice 
and fear, Study 1 showed that implicit prejudice predicted faster 
avoidance responses toward out-group as compared to in-group targets, 
but was unrelated to the speed of approach movements. Study 2 showed 
that repeated approach reduced avoidance behavior of highly prejudiced 
people toward an out-group male, while it did not a&ect avoidance 
behavior of less prejudiced people. !ese e&ects were particularly 
strong for female participants, potentially because the fear component is 
especially important in their intergroup bias. In conclusion, the current 
$ndings suggest that repeated approach decreases avoidance behavior 
of relatively highly prejudiced individuals. We discuss these results in 
light of recent work on embodiment and prejudice. 
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Imagine getting on a subway and seeing a group of men from a stigmatized ethnic out-
group sitting near the entrance doors of the rail car. Where do you sit down? Chances are that 
you will inconspicuously walk a little further away from this group before you take a seat. 
Could this avoidance behavior ensue from unjusti$ed fear, like in phobias? If so, exposure 
treatment could be a viable solution for changing discriminatory behavior toward members 
of stigmatized out-groups. In the present chapter, we describe two studies in which we show 
that implicit prejudice predicts avoidance tendencies and that repeated approach can reduce 
such avoidance behavior of relatively highly prejudiced people. 
Physically distancing yourself from an out-group is an example of negative nonverbal 
behavior that can result from implicit negative associations people may have toward ethnic 
out-group members, whereas more explicit negative attitudes o#en come to expression in 
verbal behavior (Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002). A vast body of research in social 
psychology has investigated methods to reduce such prejudice and discrimination (e.g., 
Dovidio & Gaertner, 1999; Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001; Monteith, Ashburn-Nardo, Voils, & 
Czopp, 2002; Rudman, Ashmore, & Gary, 2001; Olson & Fazio, 2004, 2006; Czopp, Monteith, 
& Mark, 2006). Recently, insights from an embodied cognition perspective have been applied 
to the reduction of implicit prejudice1 (Kawakami, Phills, Steele, & Dovidio, 2007; Phills, 
Kawakami, Tabi, Nadolny, & Inzlicht, 2011). 
According to embodied cognition theories, our thoughts and feelings are inextricably 
linked to our behaviors (Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2005). 
More concretely, we may not only approach something or someone that we like (e.g., Chen 
& Bargh, 1999), we may also like something or someone better a#er having made approach 
movements (e.g., Cacioppo, Priester, & Berntson, 1993). Applying these principles to implicit 
prejudice, Kawakami et al. (2007) showed that an extensive approach training toward 
pictures of Black males reduces White participants’ implicit prejudice. In the approach 
training condition, people were trained in 480 trials to pull a joystick when presented with 
photos of Black males and to push a joystick when presented with photos of males of other 
groups. Approach training led to less prejudiced scores on an implicit association task (IAT; 
Greenwald & Banaji, 1995) and to more behavioral openness during an interaction with a 
Black confederate, as compared to an avoidance training condition or sideways movement 
control condition. In a recent follow-up paper, it was shown that approach training reduces 
implicit prejudice, because it strengthens the implicit associations between the self and the 
out-group (Phills et al., 2011). 
Although these data clearly speak for the idea that approach training can reduce prejudice, 
on a behavioral level it remains unclear what process drives the e&ect of repeated approach 
behavior on prejudice reduction. Approach and avoidance behaviors are regulated by two 
1 Implicit prejudice can be de$ned as the negative evaluations a person may have of members of other groups (e.g., 
Amodio & Devine, 2006). !ese negative evaluative responses are automatically activated when encountering an 
out-group member, and can be assessed by implicit measures of attitudes (for an overview on implicit versus explicit 
measures, see Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Fazio & Olson, 2003; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006).
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separate systems that guide actions toward desired end states or away from aversive or 
threatening stimuli, respectively (see e.g., Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson, 1997; Carver, 
Sutton, & Scheier, 2000; Gable, Reis, & Elliot, 2003). !e question thus rises whether approach 
training is e&ective in reducing prejudice because it results in increased approach tendencies 
and positivity toward out-groups, or because it leads to decreased avoidance and negativity 
toward out-groups, or both. In the existing studies on prejudice reduction by means of 
approach training, these two processes cannot be distinguished. First, in the Kawakami et 
al. (2007) studies, the lower IAT score in the approach training condition can be a result 
of strengthened associations between Blacks and positive, weakened associations between 
Blacks and negative, or a combination of the two. Similarly, in the Phills et al. (2011) studies, 
the increased overlap between the self and Blacks can be a result of an enhanced approach 
motivation toward Blacks, or a reduced avoidance motivation, or both. 
In the present chapter we aim to shed more light on the behavioral processes underlying 
e&ects of an embodied form of reducing prejudice through repeated approach. We start from 
the idea that implicit prejudice is largely based on (irrational) feelings of fear or anxiety toward 
an ethnic out-group. Fear o#en results in avoidance, and we thus propose that relatively highly 
prejudiced people will have the automatic tendency to avoid out-group members (Study 1). 
In line with clinical psychological research on exposure treatment of phobias, we test the 
hypothesis that repeated approach reduces such avoidance tendencies of highly prejudiced 
people (Study 2). 
An abundant amount of research has suggested that ethnic out-group members may be 
perceived as threatening, and especially so for people high in implicit prejudice. First, skin 
conductance response research has found that humans show similar prepared fear responses 
toward out-group faces as they do toward natural fear-categories (e.g., snakes and spiders). !at 
is, when out-group and in-group exemplars are aversively conditioned, the resulting anxious 
arousal is more resistant to extinction for racial out-group as compared to in-group members. 
!us, racial out-group members are more readily associated with an aversive stimulus than 
racial in-group individuals (Olsson, Ebert, Banaji, & Phelps, 2005), and this is speci$cally 
true for males of the racial out-group (Navarrete et al., 2009). Moreover, neuroscienti$c 
studies have shown a strong link between implicit ethnic prejudice and amygdala activation 
during the viewing of faces of racial groups that are culturally associated with threat (Phelps 
et al., 2000; Cunningham et al., 2004; Lieberman, Hariri, Jarcho, Eisenberger, & Bookheimer, 
2005). Amygdala activation is involved in emotional learning and evaluation and is strongly 
associated with fear, anxiety and threat (Adolphs, Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 1994; LeDoux, 
1996, 2000; Davis & Whalen, 2001; Phelps et al., 2001; Zald, 2003)2. Moreover, Dotsch and 
2 !ese $ndings strongly indicate a link between amygdala activation and processing of fear-related stimuli. However, 
recent views suggest that the amygdala has a broader function, responding to relevant stimuli in general (see for 
a review Sander, Grafman, & Zalla, 2003). Clearly, fear-related stimuli are highly relevant across a wide range of 
situations. Accordingly, this new view does not reject the role of the amygdala in the appraisal of fearful events, but 
expands it to include other relevant events as well.
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Wigboldus (2008) found that skin conductance levels in the presence of ethnic out-group 
members correlated with implicit prejudice. !is $nding serves as additional support for 
the relation between ethnic prejudice and fear, because skin conductance level is related to 
amygdala activation during fear expressions (Cheng, Knight, Smith, & Helmstetter, 2006).
Based on this link between implicit prejudice and fear or anxiety, we propose that implicit 
prejudice should be speci$cally related to increased avoidance tendencies. Although previous 
e&ects of prejudice on biased behaviors can be interpreted in terms of basic approach/avoidance 
tendencies (e.g., Dovidio et al., 2002; Amodio & Devine, 2006; Dotsch & Wigboldus, 2008), 
the behavior actually measured in these studies (i.e., nonverbal unfriendliness, interpersonal 
distance) cannot clearly separate e&ects of approach and avoidance tendencies. In a similar 
vein, Neumann, Hülsenbeck and Seibt (2004) related implicit prejudice toward people with 
AIDS to both approach and avoidance tendencies, but they conceptualized ‘avoidance’ as the 
di&erence between speed of approach and speed of avoidance toward an out-group. Finally, 
studies that separate avoidance from approach responses toward an ethnic out-group versus 
in-group have not investigated the predicting role of implicit prejudice (Paladino & Castelli, 
2008). !erefore, on the basis of existing studies, unambiguous conclusions concerning 
e&ects of prejudice on approach and avoidance cannot be drawn. In the $rst study of the 
present chapter, we measure implicit prejudice and approach and avoidance tendencies 
toward in-group and out-group names. We calculate ‘avoidance’ as the di&erence in speed 
between avoiding an out-group versus in-group names, and ‘approach’ as the di&erence in 
speed between approaching out-group versus in-group names. Our hypothesis is that implicit 
prejudice results in faster avoidance of out-group targets as compared to in-group targets, but 
is unrelated to speed of approach. 
As a result of the proposed link between implicit prejudice and fear-based avoidance, 
interesting parallels can be drawn between prejudice and phobia symptoms (cf., Guglielmi, 
1999). With regard to reducing avoidance of the feared stimulus in people with a phobia, 
research in clinical psychology has shown that exposure therapy can be an e&ective method. 
Exposure treatment consists of repeated approach of the feared stimulus in the absence of 
aversive consequences, which can reduce fear associations and subsequent avoidance behavior 
(for exposure treatment in spider phobia, see Öst, 1996; Vansteenwegen, Vervliet, Hermans, 
!ewissen, & Eelen, 2007; Teachman & Woody, 2003). 
!is principle of exposure treatment could be applied to changing ethnic prejudice. 
Repeated approach of out-group members in the absence of negative events should then be 
e&ective in reducing avoidance behavior of people that have the automatic tendency to avoid 
out-group members, i.e., relatively highly prejudiced people. We test this hypothesis in our 
second study, in which we measure the e&ects of approach training on avoidance behavior 
toward an out-group as a function of individual di&erences in pre-existing levels of implicit 
prejudice. 
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the present research
To summarize, we conducted two studies to investigate the behavioral process by which 
approach training can reduce prejudiced behavior. In Study 1, we tested the hypothesis that 
implicit prejudice is speci$cally related to avoidance responses and not approach responses 
toward out-group names as compared to in-group names. In Study 2, we measured e&ects 
of approach training on an interpersonal distance measure, and studied these e&ects as a 
function of preexisting di&erences in implicit prejudice. We hypothesized that approach 
training reduces avoidance behavior of people who were relatively high in implicit prejudice. 
In both studies we investigated implicit prejudice of Dutch students toward males 
of Moroccan descent (Dotsch & Wigboldus, 2008), who are currently among the most 
stigmatized ethnic groups in the Netherlands (see Verkuyten & Zaremba, 2005) and seen 
as criminal and untrustworthy by highly prejudiced people (Dotsch, Wigboldus, Langner, 
& Van Knippenberg, 2008). Recent views on prejudice suggest that particularly females 
depict a fearful and avoidant intergroup bias, whereas the bias for males may be predisposed 
toward aggression and approach (Navarrete, McDonald, Molina, & Sidanius, 2010). Our 
data were collected before these new insights were published. A vast majority (over 85%) of 
our participants were females. In line with our theoretical focus on fear and avoidance, we 
will focus on the female participants in the analyses of our data, although we also report the 
results including male participants. 
stuDy 1
!e aim of the $rst study was to test the proposed relation between implicit prejudice 
and avoidance of ethnic out-group members. Implicit prejudice toward people of Moroccan 
descent was measured, as well as speed of approach and avoidance movements in response to 
Moroccan and Dutch names. We hypothesized that the higher the level of implicit prejudice, 
the faster people would be to avoid Moroccan names as compared to Dutch names. Di&erences 
in speed of approach as a function of implicit prejudice were not expected.  
method
Participants and design. Eighty-eight Dutch students (10 males, mean age 20.7 years) 
of Radboud University Nijmegen participated in this study. !ey received money or credit 
points in return for their participation.
Procedure. First, participants completed a Single Target Implicit Association Task (ST-
IAT; e.g., Bluemke & Friese, 2008; Dotsch & Wigboldus, 2008; Wigboldus, Holland & Van 
Knippenberg, 2005) to measure their implicit associations with people of Moroccan descent. 
A#er a series of unrelated tasks, participants completed an Approach Avoidance Task using 
a joystick (AAT; cf., Rinck & Becker, 2007) to measure the speed with which they executed 
approach and avoidance arm movements in response to Dutch and Moroccan names. 
!e ST-IAT consisted of two experimental blocks of 40 trials each in which participants 
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had to classify Moroccan names as Moroccan and words as being of positive or of negative 
valence, by pressing a designated key on the le# or right side of the keyboard. In total, there we 
10 Moroccan names (e.g., Ibrahim, Abdul, Youssef), 20 positive words (e.g., happy, beautiful, 
party), and 20 negative words (e.g., angry, awful, accident). In the congruent block, the same 
key was used for the classi$cation of Moroccan names (10 trials) and the classi$cation of 
negative words (10 trials, for which 10 negative targets were randomly selected from the 
20 options), while the other key was used to classify positive words (20 trials, for which all 
20 positive targets were shown). In the incongruent block, Moroccan names (10 trials) and 
positive words (10 trials, for which 10 positive targets were randomly selected from the 20 
options) had to be classi$ed using the same key, while the other key was used to classify 
negative words (20 trials, for which all 20 negative targets were shown). !e order of the blocks 
was counterbalanced over participants. Participants always started with a practice block of 10 
positive words, 10 negative words, and no names. Within blocks, stimuli were presented in 
random order. Faster reaction times in the congruent block than in the incongruent block 
indicate implicit prejudice toward people of Moroccan descent. 
In the AAT, participants had to respond to Moroccan and Dutch names by pushing 
or pulling a joystick. We selected 10 names for each category, using the same Moroccan 
names as in the ST-IAT, and 10 typical Dutch names (e.g., Johan, Maarten, Pieter). Half of 
the participants started with a block in which they had to push the joystick in response to 
Moroccan names (avoidance) and pull the joystick in response to Dutch names (approach), 
and vice versa in the second block. !e other half of the participants started with the block 
in which they had to push Dutch names and pull Moroccan names. !e two blocks each 
consisted of 30 trials, and each block was preceded by 10 practice trials. Participants who 
responded correctly in less than 80 percent of the trials in the practice block received another 
practice block of 10 trials. !e names appeared in random order in the center of the screen 
in font size 26. Upon pulling the joystick, the font size of the name changed to a bigger font 
(size 41) and upon pushing the joystick, it changed to a smaller font (size 11) to reinforce 
the illusion of approach and avoidance, respectively (cf., Rinck & Becker, 2007). To further 
strengthen the illusion of movement, the stimuli were presented in a corridor (cf., Markman 
& Brendl, 2005). Response times were calculated from the moment of onset of the stimulus 
to the point when the joystick was moved 3 degrees. !e interval between trials was 1500 
milliseconds. 
results and Discussion
For both the ST-IAT and the AAT, reaction times were analyzed for correct trials only. 
Furthermore, reaction times faster than 300 ms and slower than 3000 ms were recorded as 
missing, and the remaining reaction times were log transformed. Per participant, an ST-IAT 
score was calculated by subtracting the mean reaction time in the congruent block from the 
mean reaction time in the incongruent block. !us, higher ST-IAT scores re%ect higher levels 
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of implicit prejudice. As noted above, a#er becoming aware of new empirical $ndings and 
insights on the important role that fear plays in out-group bias of women (Navarrete et al., 
2010) we included only the data of the female participants in the analyses. For transparency, 
we will also report the analyses with males, and an explorative interaction e&ect with gender. 
!e data of one female participants and one male participant were removed from the analyses, 
because these participants had an ST-IAT score and/or AAT score of more than 3 SD from 
the mean. 
Because of the speci$city of our hypothesis, we calculated separate di&erence scores for 
the approach component (mean reaction time for approaching Moroccan names minus 
mean reaction time for approaching Dutch names) and for the avoidance component (mean 
reaction time for avoiding Dutch names minus mean reaction time for avoiding Moroccan 
names). To test the multivariate regression e&ect, we used a GLM procedure with the 
approach and avoidance components as dependent variables, and with the ST-IAT score 
as continuous independent variable. !e ST-IAT score had a multivariate e&ect on the two 
components, F(2, 74) = 5.40, p = .006, ηp2 = .13. Univariate tests showed that the ST-IAT 
score predicted the avoidance component, F(1, 75) = 10.39, p = .002, ηp2 = .12, but not the 
approach component, F < 1, n.s. Subsequently, we performed a simple regression analysis to 
test the direction of the e&ect of implicit prejudice on the avoidance score. In accordance with 
our hypothesis, this analysis revealed a positive relation between implicit prejudice and the 
avoidance component, β = .35, t(75) = 3.22, p = .002. !us, the higher implicit prejudice, the 
faster the avoidance of Moroccan names as compared to Dutch names. !ese analyses are 
all based on di&erence scores, and are therefore corrected for individual di&erences in speed 
of responding. However, to give a complete picture of the results, we also performed simple 
analyses regressing the ST-IAT score on mean reaction times for all four AAT combinations 
of movement (approach/avoidance) X ethnicity (Moroccan/Dutch). Speed of approaching 
Moroccan names and speed of approaching Dutch names were not predicted by the ST-IAT 
score, ts < 1, n.s. As hypothesized, the relation between the ST-IAT and speed of avoiding 
Moroccan names was negative, but did not reach signi$cance, β = -.143, t(75) = -1.25, p = 
.215. Finally, the ST-IAT had a non-signi$cant positive relation with the speed of avoiding 
Dutch names, β = -.133, t(75) = 1.16, p = .249. 
We also performed the analyses of the results including the data of the male participants. 
!e direction of signi$cant and non-signi$cant results for the whole sample is the same as 
reported above for the female participants. !e multivariate e&ect is F(2, 83) = 4.19, p = .018, 
ηp2 = .09. Univariate tests again reveal that the ST-IAT predicts the avoidance component, F(1, 
84) = 7.75, p = .007, ηp2 = .08, but not the approach component, F < 1, n.s. When designing 
the present studies, participant gender was not part of the hypothesis, so we do not have an 
equal amount of males and females in the design. Still, for explorative reasons we also ran 
an analysis including participant gender, revealing a signi$cant gender X ST-IAT interaction 
e&ect for the avoidance component, F(1, 82) = 4.31, p = .041, ηp2 = .05, but not for the approach 
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component, F < 1.1, n.s. !e multivariate interaction e&ect did not reach signi$cance, F(2, 81) 
= 2.13, p = .126, ηp2 = .05.
In line with our hypothesis, the results of the $rst study show that implicit prejudice toward 
people of Moroccan descent predicts speed of avoidance of Moroccan names as compared to 
Dutch names, whereas speed of approach of Moroccan versus Dutch names was not a&ected 
by implicit prejudice. Additional analyses show that these e&ects are especially strong for 
female participants, which is in line with recent insights showing that intergroup bias may 
have a fearful and avoidant origin speci$cally for females. In the second study, we built on 
these insights by investigating whether approach training can curb these e&ects of implicit 
prejudice on avoidance behavior of females. !e dynamics for males remain unclear from 
the present study. We will come back to this issue in the General Discussion of this chapter.  
stuDy 2
!e goal of the second study was to gain more insight into the mechanism by which 
approach training can reduce prejudiced behavior. We hypothesized that approach training 
is e&ective because it reduces avoidance behavior of relatively highly prejudiced people. 
Individual di&erences in implicit prejudice were measured. Subsequently, people were trained 
to repeatedly approach or avoid pictures of Moroccans, a#er which an ecologically valid 
measure of seating distance was used as an indicator of avoidance behavior (cf., Amodio & 
Devine, 2006). In line with $ndings by Amodio and Devine (2006) that implicit prejudice 
predicts seating distance, we expected highly prejudiced people in the avoidance training 
condition to sit further away from an out-group male than lowly prejudiced people. However, 
in the approach training condition implicit prejudice was expected not to predict seating 
distance.
method
Participants and design. Fi#y-$ve students of Radboud University Nijmegen (8 males, 
mean age 21 years) took part in this study in return for money or credit points. !ey were 
randomly allocated to one of two conditions (approach versus avoid pictures of Moroccan 
males). Implicit prejudice was measured and served as continuous independent variable in 
the design. 
Procedure. Participants started with an ST-IAT to measure implicit prejudice. A#er some 
unrelated tasks, participants received either an approach or avoidance training toward photos 
of males of Moroccan descent. Immediately a#er this manipulation we measured interpersonal 
distance toward a Moroccan person using a waiting room paradigm (cf., Amodio & Devine, 
2006). 
!e ST-IAT followed the exact same procedure as in Study 1. For the approach and 
avoidance training, an adapted version of the joystick training of Kawakami et al. (2007) was 
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used. Firstly, instead of 480 trials, our training only included two blocks of 100 trials each, 
and was preceded by a practice block of 20 trials. Secondly, in the Kawakami et al. (2007) 
studies, photos of Whites or Asian Americans were used as comparison category for the Black 
target photos in the AAT. We wanted to exclude the possibility that e&ects of approach of the 
out-group could also be in%uenced by the simultaneous repeated avoidance of another group. 
!erefore, we used objects (i.e., closets) as a reference category. Participants were asked to 
respond to pictures of Moroccan males and closets using a joystick. In the approach training 
condition, participants had to pull the joystick in response to pictures of Moroccan males, 
and push the joystick in response to pictures of closets. In the avoidance training condition, 
participants had to pull pictures of closets, and push pictures of Moroccan males. A picture 
of a joystick-movement was presented to show participants which movement they had to 
make in response to which categories. Four pictures of neutral-looking Moroccan males were 
selected from the Radboud Faces Database (Langner et al., 2010), and four pictures of closets 
were selected from a website of IKEA. All pictures were presented in gray-scale. Again, a 
zoom-e&ect was included, using the same screen background and procedure as in the AAT 
of Study 1. 
A#er the training manipulation, participants were instructed to go to the experimenter 
who would bring them to a waiting room. In this room six chairs were lined up against 
the wall to the le#. A jacket and backpack on the $rst chair (closest to the door) indicated 
someone else’s presence (cf., Amodio & Devine, 2006). Importantly, participants were led to 
believe these possessions belonged to a Moroccan person. Seating distance was recorded by 
the experimenter, who wrote down the number of chairs the participant sat away from the 
chair of the Moroccan male. Because the $rst chair supposedly belonged to a Moroccan male, 
participants $rst passed this chair and we could measure how far they removed themselves 
from the chair with the backpack and jacket, i.e., an indication of avoidance behavior. 
To evoke the impression that the jacket and bag in the waiting room belonged to a 
Moroccan person, a cover story was created. At their arrival in the laboratory, we asked 
participants whether we could take a picture of them for a test on people’s ability to infer 
personality characteristics from faces. !ey were told that only one other participant would 
evaluate their picture, and that they themselves would evaluate the picture of the person who 
had just started participating in the experiment. In fact, this was always the same picture of a 
Moroccan male that was altered using Photoshop to create the illusion the picture was taken 
in the same hallway. Participants also had to sign-up on a sheet next to the name of this other 
participant (i.e., Mounir El Marabat). While walking to the waiting room, the experimenter 
explained that the other participant was also waiting there. Upon entering, only his jacket and 
bag were present. Participants were asked to take a seat and $ll out a questionnaire about their 
personality. A#er returning to the computer, participants performed a few unrelated tasks 
and we checked whether they believed the cover story about the other participant. 
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results and Discussion
!e reaction times of the ST-IAT were transformed in the same way as in Study 1. !e 
data of the male participants were removed from the analyses. An ANOVA was performed 
with seating distance (i.e., number of chairs removed from the chair of the Moroccan person, 
scores 1 to 5) as dependent variable, training condition as between-subjects factor, and ST-
IAT scores as continuous between-subjects variable. A marginally signi$cant main e&ect of 
the ST-IAT was obtained, F(1, 43) = 2.85, p = .099, ηp2 = .06. !is e&ect was quali$ed by the 
expected interaction e&ect between implicit prejudice and training condition, F(1, 43) = 4.97, 
p = .031, ηp2 = .10. !e direction of the interaction is illustrated in Figure 4.1. 
Simple slopes regression analyses (Aiken, & West, 1991) showed that for female participants 
who were trained to avoid Moroccans, implicit prejudice was a signi$cant predictor of seating 
distance, β = .64, t(43) = 2.30, p = .026. !e higher participants’ implicit prejudice, the further 
away they sat from the Moroccan person, which corroborates the $nding of Study 1 that 
highly prejudiced people are more avoiding of the out-group. However, for participants who 
were trained to approach Moroccans, implicit prejudice no longer served as a predictor of 
seating distance, β = -.09, t < 1, n.s. Relatively highly prejudiced people (1 SD above the mean) 
sat closer to the Moroccan person in the approach training condition than in the avoidance 
training condition, β = .51, t(43) = 2.17, p = .036. For lowly prejudiced people (1 SD below the 
mean), no signi$cant di&erence in seating distance was found between training conditions, β 
= -.22, t(43) = -1.08, p = .284. 
figure 4.1. The effect of implicit prejudice (ST-IAT) on seating distance toward an out-group 
male measured in number of chairs, for the group of females that was trained to approach 
Moroccans and the group of females that was trained to avoid Moroccans.
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We also did an analysis including the male participants in the design. !e interaction 
between training and implicit prejudice on distance was not signi$cant, F(1, 51) = 1.98, p = 
.165, ηp2 = .04. Including gender in the model resulted in a signi$cant three-way interaction 
between gender, condition and ST-IAT, F(1, 47) = 4.93, p = .031, ηp2 = .10. Because of the low 
number of male participants, this interaction has to be interpreted with caution. Still, the 
present $ndings are generally in line with the results of Study 1 in suggesting that the process 
under investigation seems to be primarily applicable to females. 
At the end of the experiment we checked whether participants believed our cover story 
about the belongings of the other person in the waiting room. Six female participants indicated 
to have suspicions about the existence of this other participant, and two female participants 
reported high awareness of the distance measure. We measured this a#erwards, so it is not 
clear whether these participants already distrusted the cover story during the seating distance 
measure, and if they did, whether this a&ected the measure. However, excluding these 
participants does not a&ect our $ndings for females. We still $nd a marginally signi$cant 
main e&ect of the ST-IAT on seating distance, F(1, 35) = 3.97, p = .054, ηp2 = .10, which was 
quali$ed by the strong interaction e&ect between implicit prejudice and training condition, 
F(1, 35) = 7.09, p = .012, ηp2 = .17.
In sum, for females who were trained to avoid Moroccans, implicit prejudice predicted 
avoidance behavior. However, a#er an approach training, the relation between implicit 
prejudice and avoidance behavior was no longer present, because relatively highly prejudiced 
people showed less avoidance of an out-group member, and sat as close to this person as 
individuals low in prejudice. 
GenerAl Discussion
!e goal of the present research was to gain more insight into an embodied form of 
prejudice reduction by repeated approach of out-group targets. More speci$cally, the aim 
was to investigate the behavioral tendencies underlying these e&ects. Does approach training 
result in changes in approach tendencies, or does it a&ect people’s avoidance tendencies? 
To study the process by which repeated approach a&ects implicit prejudice, we $rst needed 
to establish how implicit prejudice is related to approach/avoidance tendencies. Based on 
$ndings that implicit prejudice is related to fear, we expected implicit prejudice to primarily 
be a predictor of avoidance behavior. In Study 1, we found that higher scores on a measure of 
implicit prejudice predicted faster avoidance arm movements in response to out-group names 
as compared to in-group names. Speed of approach of out-group versus in-group names did 
not di&er across di&erent levels of implicit prejudice. !ese $ndings contribute to earlier 
studies on the general link between implicit prejudice and interpersonal distance (Amodio 
& Devine, 2006; Dotsch & Wigboldus, 2008). !ese previous $ndings could be explained by 
enhanced avoidance or reduced approach, without being able to distinguish between the two. 
Our Study 1 comprises of the $rst empirical investigation that was aimed at making such a 
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distinction between approach and avoidance tendencies as a result of implicit prejudice. 
If prejudice is primarily related to fear-induced avoidance, then repeated approach could 
potentially be e&ective in reducing prejudice and prejudiced behaviors because it reduces 
fear of the out-group. !at way, approach training should be mostly e&ective in reducing 
avoidance behavior of relatively highly prejudiced people, who experience the highest levels 
of fear of the out-group and are most likely to automatically avoid this group. Previous studies 
on e&ects of approach training in reducing bias did not include pretest measures of prejudice, 
and could therefore not make this distinction. In our Study 2, we did include such a measure, 
and the results are in line with this hypothesis. In a waiting room paradigm, we measured 
people’s avoidance behavior toward an out-group male. Preceding the avoidance measure, 
people were trained to either repeatedly approach or avoid out-group targets. For people 
who were trained to avoid out-group targets, the results showed parallels to the relation we 
found in Study 1 between implicit prejudice and avoidance. !at is, the higher the implicit 
prejudice, the further away they sat from the chair with the belongings of the out-group 
male. In contrast, for people trained to approach out-group targets, the relation between 
implicit prejudice and seating distance was no longer present. !is $nding was driven by the 
reduction of such avoidance behavior for relatively highly prejudiced people. With the results 
of Study 2 we extend earlier $ndings of Kawakami et al. (2007) and Phills et al. (2011), who 
have provided the $rst demonstrations of approach training as an e&ective tool for reducing 
implicit prejudice, but did not distinguish between the roles of approach versus avoidance in 
these e&ects.
In conclusion, the present research contributes to the recent embodied cognition 
approach to prejudice and prejudice reduction. Most importantly, we take a detailed look 
at the bidirectional link between implicit prejudice and approach/avoidance tendencies. 
First, whereas earlier studies did not distinguish between e&ects of implicit ethnic prejudice 
in terms of decreased approach or increased avoidance, our $rst correlational study clearly 
demonstrates that high implicit prejudice is speci$cally related to faster avoidance of out-
group names. Second, we report an experiment in which we investigate the e&ects of approach 
training on such avoidance tendencies. !is study shows that repeated approach can be a 
powerful tool in reducing avoidance behavior of people holding negative feelings toward out-
group males. 
In our second study, we compared e&ects of an approach versus avoidance training on 
seating distance. We interpreted the avoidance training as the baseline, in line with earlier 
$ndings of Kawakami et al. (2007) and Amodio and Devine (2006). Kawakami et al. (2007) 
repeatedly demonstrated that e&ects of avoidance training did not di&er from a control 
condition (i.e., sideways joystick movements). Furthermore, the e&ects of implicit prejudice 
on avoidance behavior in the avoidance training condition are in line with earlier $ndings 
showing a basic link between implicit prejudice and avoidance (Amodio & Devine, 2006; 
Dotsch & Wigboldus, 2008). Speci$cally, Amodio and Devine (2006) already demonstrated 
that implicit prejudice predicts seating distance in a similar paradigm. In addition, in our $rst 
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study we showed a link between implicit prejudice and avoidance responses. Although we 
cannot fully exclude the possibility that the avoidance training increased highly prejudiced 
people’s avoidance behavior, on the basis of these earlier $ndings it seems likely that the e&ects 
in our second study could be explained by decreased avoidance behavior in the approach 
training condition.
Interestingly, our $ndings pertain to the importance of taking gender di&erences into 
account when looking at the relation between prejudice and approach/avoidance tendencies. 
Our studies reveal some preliminary evidence that both the link between prejudice and 
avoidance and the prejudice-reducing e&ects of approach training speci$cally play a role for 
female participants. We seem to $nd our e&ects only for female participants toward male 
targets3. !is is in line with recent perspectives on prejudice as a gendered phenomenon, both 
on the side of the target and the actor. !at is, male out-group exemplars and not female out-
group exemplars are threatening (Plant, Goplen, & Kunstman, 2011) and anxiety-evoking 
(Navarrete et al., 2009). However, the reason out-group males evoke anxiety may be di&erent 
for male and female actors. Recent $ndings suggest that for male actors, a male out-group 
target may be anxiously arousing in order to prepare the body for aggressive con%ict, whereas 
they may be anxiously arousing for female actors to prepare them to %ee (Navarrete et al., 
2010). In the present studies, we focus on fear and avoidance, and it is thus in line with 
these earlier $ndings that our e&ects occur for females speci$cally. Note however that we 
have very few males in our sample, which prevents us from drawing strong conclusions on 
whether or how the processes may di&er for males and females. Besides testing for gender 
e&ects more directly, factors underlying potential gender di&erences (e.g., measures of fear 
and vulnerability in females and aggression and dominance in males) should be taken into 
account in future studies (see also Navarrete et al., 2010). 
Our research ideas were inspired by insights from clinical psychological research on 
reducing fear and avoidance behaviors of phobic patients. Guglielmi (1999) noted these 
potential parallels between implicit prejudice and phobias, and described exposure as “the 
clinical counterpart of the contact hypothesis for reducing prejudice” (p. 151). Our $ndings 
that repeated approach of out-group targets can be e&ective in reducing automatic avoidance 
behavior of relatively highly prejudiced people underline the applicability of this view. !us, 
we have shown that linking clinical psychological research on phobia treatments with social 
psychological insights can provide an interesting and valuable perspective in the study of 
implicit prejudice. Note that an important aspect of the current approach training was the 
absence of aversive consequences for the participants. Based on exposure treatment principles, 
this could be a crucial aspect in the success of the training, which should be a focus of future 
studies. 
3 Note that also Kawakami et al. (2007) found a hint for stronger e&ects in females. In their fourth study, they 
measured immediacy behavior, and found higher immediacy scores toward an out-group a#er approach training as 
compared to avoidance or control training. Although there was no signi$cant interaction with gender, this $nding 
seemed to be especially strong for female participants.
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In the present study, we have only demonstrated e&ects of approach training on behavior, 
the question still remains whether an approach training reduces negative associations with 
out-group members, or increases positive associations. !e IAT that was used in earlier 
research by Kawakami et al. (2007) cannot provide insight into this question, because it 
measures relative association strength. Studying e&ects of approach training on a test that 
can distinguish between positive and negative associations (e.g., the A&ective Priming Task, 
see Strick, Holland, & Van Knippenberg, 2008) could be an interesting direction for future 
research. 
Other interesting lines for future research can be derived from the present studies. First, 
our conclusion that approach training is especially e&ective for highly prejudiced people must 
be interpreted with some caution, and in a relative fashion. Although people of Moroccan 
descent are among the most highly stigmatized groups in the Netherlands, Dutch university 
students are generally not extremely highly prejudiced. It remains to be seen whether 
approach training is also e&ective in reducing prejudice of even more highly prejudiced 
people. Furthermore, it could be investigated whether approach training indeed changes 
speci$c fear-related emotional responses or whether these e&ects can be explained by changes 
in more general negative a&ect. Measures should be used that can distinguish between general 
a&ective associations and discrete emotional responses. Finally, we studied ethnic prejudice 
toward people of Moroccan descent in the Netherlands only, but it would be interesting to 
investigate whether these results generalize to prejudice toward other (ethnic) groups that are 
also associated with fear and anxiety. 
Going back to our opening example, the present studies predict that you would indeed 
walk further away from the out-group males on the subway, but only when you have negative 
associations with this group. However, repeatedly approaching out-group members and 
noticing that nothing bad happens may make you less likely to avoid them. 

3Part IIIHead nodding and shaking

Chapter 5
First see, then nod:
!e role of temporal contiguity in the embodied 
evaluative conditioning of social attitudes
!is chapter was published as:
Wennekers, A. M., Holland, R. W., Wigboldus, D. H. J., Van Knippenberg, A. (2012). First 
see then nod, the role of temporal contiguity in the embodied evaluative conditioning of 
social attitudes. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 3, 455-461.
Abstract
Head nodding and shaking are bodily signals of approval and disapproval 
respectively. Previous research has shown that these movements can 
be used to shape attitudes by means of evaluative conditioning. In the 
present experiment, we studied the conditions under which evaluative 
conditioning with head movements can alter social attitudes. Speci$cally, 
we investigated whether the evaluative conditioning e&ect depends on 
the order in which the target stimulus and the head movement are 
presented. !e results showed that repeated coupling of head nodding 
with out-group names reduced negative implicit associations with this 
out-group only when the head nodding movement followed the target 
name. No e&ects were found when the movement preceded the name 
in the conditioning procedure. We conclude that embodied evaluative 
conditioning e&ects are constrained to a sequence of the target stimulus 
and head movement that corresponds to the natural temporal script in 
which the stimulus precedes the evaluative embodied reaction.
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Head nodding and shaking are strong communicative signals that people use to convey 
their thoughts and feelings. Not only do we nod or shake our heads in response to a question 
that requires a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’. A#er hearing something to our approval or agreement, 
we may also – inadvertently – nod our head, or we may shake in disagreement when we 
disapprove of a person or message1. !ese examples show that head nodding and shaking 
are o#en used as responses signaling how we feel or think about something. Interestingly, 
growing empirical evidence suggests that it may also work the other way around. !at is, 
our bodily movements in%uence what we think and feel (see for an overview Niedenthal, 
Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2005). To illustrate: we may like a person or 
message better, because we nod our heads. 
Indeed, in earlier studies it was found that when people made a head nodding movement 
while listening to a persuasive message, they agreed more with the message as compared to 
when they had shaken their heads (Wells & Petty, 1980). More generally, it has been shown 
that head nodding can enhance preferences for neutral objects that are presented while 
nodding the head (Tom, Pettersen, Lau, Burton, & Cook, 1991). In sum, the co-occurrence of 
head nodding with a neutral or novel stimulus can result in a spillover of the positivity of head 
nodding to the stimulus, whereas the co-occurrence of stimuli with head shaking can result 
in more negative evaluations. !ese $ndings are in line with evaluative conditioning e&ects, 
in which the valence of a stimulus can change as a result of repeated pairing with another 
positive or negative stimulus (De Houwer, !omas, & Baeyens, 2001). 
!us, it seems that head nodding or shaking movements can color our evaluations 
through an embodied form of evaluative conditioning. However, how does the embodied 
evaluative conditioning of attitudes work? One possibility is that the valence of the bodily 
movement spills over to stimuli that are presented in close temporal and spatial proximity to 
the movement. As demonstrated in a recent review, the order of the pairing does not play a 
signi$cant role in evaluative conditioning e&ects (Hofmann, De Houwer, Perugini, Baeyens, 
& Crombez, 2010). From this perspective, the association of head nodding with positivity and 
head shaking with negativity could change the valence of stimuli shown simultaneously with 
or directly before or a#er the movement. 
However, people have learned to use head nodding and shaking movements in a script-
like fashion2. !e natural sequence of head movements is to follow rather than to precede 
a stimulus encounter. For example, when listening to a presentation, we nod our heads 
a#er hearing something to our liking, and not before. !erefore, order information seems 
particularly relevant for the embodied experience underlying the evaluative meaning of 
head movements. !e natural sequence of these movements following a target should be 
encoded during the original experience (online), and may then be re-enacted (o+ine) when 
1 Note that these movements have di&erent meanings in di&erent cultures. As a result, e&ects of nodding and shaking 
on evaluations may vary across di&erent cultures.
2 It should be noted here that our use of the term ‘script’ is a simpler and more basic version of the elaborated cognitive 
structure people use to comprehend event-based situations, as referred to in the work of Abelson (1981).
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encountering a similar situation (see Barsalou, 2008). Reasoning from this perspective, it may 
be argued that evaluative conditioning as a function of head movements is bounded to the 
temporal script we have for these movements. !erefore, the order in which the target stimulus 
(i.e., the conditioned stimulus) and the head movement (i.e., the unconditioned stimulus) 
appear in the evaluative conditioning paradigm should matter a great deal. Speci$cally, head 
nodding and shaking should a&ect evaluations only when the movements follow rather than 
precede a target. A#er all, only in this case, the stimulus can be perceived as causing the 
movement. As noted in early attribution studies (e.g., Michotte, 1946/1963), ordinal relations 
are of importance for the perception of causality, in that “e&ects ordinarily are assumed to 
occur closely a#er their causes” (Kelley, 1973; p. 109). 
To recap, if embodied evaluative conditioning by head nodding and shaking works 
through mere proximity principles, the order in which the unconditioned and conditioned 
stimulus are presented should not matter. However, in case temporal scripts play a role, 
embodied evaluative conditioning e&ects should be obtained only when the movement is 
presented a#er the appearance of the stimulus. Which of these processes applies to embodied 
evaluative conditioning cannot be derived from existing research. In previous studies, the 
head movement and the attitude object were always presented simultaneously (Wells & Petty, 
1980; Tom et al., 1991), a#er which an evaluation of the stimulus object was measured. !is 
simultaneous presentation of stimulus object and movement allows for the movement to 
be attributed as a response to the stimulus that is presented at the same time. !e lack of a 
manipulation of presentation order of the object and the movement prevents us from drawing 
conclusions on the role of order in embodied evaluative conditioning.
Interestingly, research on evaluative conditioning e&ects of approach and avoidance 
movements consists of studies in which the movement either is also presented simultaneously 
with the stimulus (e.g., Cacioppo, Priester, & Berntson, 1993), or always follows the stimulus 
(e.g., Kawakami, Phills, Steele, & Dovidio, 2007; Wiers, Rinck, Kordts, Houben, & Strack, 
2010). As an example of the latter, it has been shown that repeatedly performing approach 
movements a#er seeing a picture of a Black person reduces implicit prejudice of white 
participants (Kawakami, et al., 2007). All in all, as yet, it is unknown how bodily movements 
a&ect stimulus evaluations when the movement precedes the presentation of the stimulus 
object. 
the Present research
!e goal of the present experiment was to investigate the role of the order of the conditioned 
and unconditioned stimulus in evaluative conditioning of social attitudes by means of head 
movements. In previous studies on embodied evaluative conditioning, the movement and 
attitude object were either presented in a simultaneous fashion, or the movement always 
followed the attitude object. In order to investigate e&ects of temporal contiguity, we 
manipulated the order in which the movement and the target stimulus were presented. In 
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line with previous research on embodied evaluative conditioning, we focused on out-group 
attitudes (cf., Kawakami et al., 2007). We studied Dutch participants’ implicit evaluations of 
people of Moroccan descent (a highly stigmatized ethnic out-group in the Netherlands; see 
Verkuyten & Zaremba, 2005).  
To this end, we employed a Single-Target Implicit Association Test (ST-IAT; e.g., 
Bluemke & Friese, 2008; Dotsch, Wigboldus, Langner, & van Knippenberg, 2008) twice; once 
before and once a#er an evaluative conditioning procedure using head movements. In the 
conditioning procedure, the unconditioned stimulus (i.e., head nodding or shaking) was 
repeatedly coupled with the conditioned stimulus, (i.e., Moroccan names), either by following 
or preceding these names. Control participants did not receive the conditioning procedure. 
We hypothesized that head nodding would result in reduced negativity toward the out-group, 
whereas head shaking and no movements were not expected to alter out-group attitudes (cf., 
Kawakami et al., 2007). Importantly, if this embodied evaluative conditioning works through 
mere proximity, we should $nd these e&ects of head nodding for both conditioning orders. In 
case temporal order is crucial, we should $nd these e&ects only for the conditioning order in 
which the movement followed the presentation of the out-group name and not in the reversed 
order. 
metHoD
Participants and design
One-hundred and thirty-eight students (31 males, 107 females, Mage = 21.61, SDage = 3.47, 
age range: 17 - 40 years) of Radboud University Nijmegen participated in this study with a 
2 (movement condition: nod to Moroccan vs. shake to Moroccan) X 2 (conditioning order: 
forward vs. backward) between-subjects design, including a pre- and post measure of implicit 
prejudice, and a no training control condition. Forward conditioning refers to the order in 
which the movement (unconditioned stimulus) follows the out-group name (conditioned 
stimulus), whereas backward conditioning refers to the procedure in which the movement 
precedes the out-group name. 
Procedure
Participants were seated behind a computer with a webcam attached to the screen, which 
was explained to record only during the head movement task. In fact, the webcam did not 
record anything, but was used to ensure participants would believe the purpose of the task 
and participate seriously. 
Participants started with an ST-IAT to measure implicit attitudes toward people of 
Moroccan descent. !e ST-IAT started with a block in which 20 words had to be categorized 
as positive or negative, in order to get used to the task. A congruent block followed, in which 
20 positive words had to be categorized using one key, and 10 negative words and 10 Moroccan 
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names using the other key3. !e next block was an incongruent block in which participants 
had to categorize 20 negative words using one key, and 10 positive words and 10 Moroccan 
names using the other key.
A#er an unrelated $ller task, participants performed the head movement conditioning 
procedure. Participants in the control condition completed several unrelated tasks, keeping 
the time between the two ST-IATs constant across conditions. !e head movement task was 
introduced as a study on the in%uence of head movements on the pronunciation of words. 
Participants’ task was to pronounce words presented on the screen. At the same time, they had 
to look at a circle that appeared on the screen and were explicitly asked to follow the circle 
with their entire head, in order to prevent them from merely moving their eyes. Participants 
were instructed to place their chair close to the table, and sit straight. 
For half of the participants, a forward conditioning procedure was used, in which the 
target name always preceded the movement. A trial started with a $xation cross in the center 
of the screen, for a random time between 1500 and 2500 ms. !en, a name appeared in 
the center of the screen, and a#er 500 ms a circle appeared in the center of the screen that 
immediately started to move. In nodding trials, the circle moved up, down, up again, and 
stopped in the middle. In shaking trials, the circle moved le#, right, le# again, and stopped in 
the middle. !e word remained in the center of the screen, until it disappeared 575 ms a#er 
movement onset, when the circle ended the $rst movement. !e movement of the circle lasted 
2300 ms in total. For the other half of the participants, a backward conditioning procedure 
was used, in which the target name always followed the movement. !e procedure was the 
same as for the forward conditioning group, but now the $xation cross was followed by the 
moving circle. !e name appeared 575 ms before the ending of the movement (i.e., when the 
circle started the last movement). !e name remained on the screen for another 500 ms a#er 
the circle disappeared. 
!e head movement training consisted of 120 trials, of which 60 included a horizontally 
moving circle (shaking) and 60 a vertically moving circle (nodding). In the nod to Moroccan 
condition, participants received 40 trials with Moroccan names, and always made a nodding 
movement on trials with a Moroccan name. !ey also nodded 20 times and shook 60 times 
to other words (neutral words or Dutch names). A similar procedure was used for the shake 
to Moroccan condition, but now participants always shook their heads on the 40 trials with 
Moroccan names4. In total, there were 10 Moroccan names (the same as in the ST-IAT; e.g., 
Ahmed, Mohammed, Youssef), all of which were presented four times. Furthermore, there 
3 For each block, two pseudorandom orders were created, containing 50% task-switch and two-third response-switch 
trials, resulting in four IAT versions. !ese versions did not in%uence the ST-IAT scores on either the pre or post-
measure (all Fs < 1).
4  !e control category was counterbalanced across participants. One half of the participants in the nod to Moroccan 
condition shook their heads to Dutch names 40 times, and both nodded and shook 20 times to neutral words. !e 
other half of the participants shook their heads to neutral words 40 times, and both nodded and shook 20 times to 
Dutch names. A similar counterbalancing procedure was applied for the shake to Moroccan condition. Including this 
counterbalancing factor in the full model did not result in any signi$cant main or interaction e&ects with this factor.
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were 10 Dutch names (e.g., Arthur, Richard, Paul) and 10 neutral words (e.g., chair, %oor, 
market) that were all also presented four times.
Finally, participants again performed an ST-IAT, following the same procedure. 
Furthermore, we included some open questions at the end of the study to check for demand 
awareness. !ese questions tapped into participants’ ideas on the purpose of the study. 
Speci$cally, we asked participants what they thought was being investigated in the series of 
studies, and what they thought was being investigated in the task in which they had to follow 
the moving circle with the head. 
results
Incorrect trials on both ST-IATs were recorded as missing values (5.9% of the pretest data, 
and 5.8% of the posttest data), as well as reaction times faster than 300 milliseconds and 
slower than 3000 milliseconds (less than 0.1% of the pre- and posttest data). Subsequently, 
reaction times were log-transformed. Note that for clarity, we report the untransformed mean 
latencies. 
We calculated an ST-IAT score for both the pretest and the posttest by subtracting the mean 
log-transformed latencies in the congruent block from the mean log-transformed latencies in 
the incongruent block. !is way, higher ST-IAT scores as compared to lower ST-IAT scores 
re%ect more negative implicit attitudes toward people of Moroccan descent. As o#en found 
in Dutch student populations (cf., Dotsch & Wigboldus, 2008; Dotsch et al., 2008), the mean 
ST-IAT pretest score (M = 48.26, SD = 68.34) was signi$cantly higher than zero, t(137) = 8.41, 
p < .001, indicating that on average people’s implicit attitudes toward people of Moroccan 
descent were negative. No signi$cant di&erences in the pretest scores were observed between 
conditions, F < 1. 
In order to test whether our conditioning procedure changed implicit attitudes toward the 
out-group, we calculated an ST-IAT di&erence score for each participant by subtracting the 
ST-IAT pretest score from the ST-IAT posttest score. Negative di&erence scores thus re%ect 
a reduction in negativity of implicit attitudes on the posttest as compared to the pretest. 
First, we tested whether backward and forward conditioning resulted in di&erent e&ects on 
attitude change for the nodding and shaking movement condition. A 2 (movement condition: 
nod to Moroccan vs. shake to Moroccan) X 2 (conditioning order: backward vs. forward) 
Analysis of Variance revealed a signi$cant interaction e&ect between movement condition 
and conditioning procedure, F(1, 95) = 4.04, p = .047, ηp2 = .04. 
To investigate the direction of this interaction e&ect, we tested the simple e&ect of the nod 
versus shake condition within the two conditioning order procedures. !is analysis revealed 
a main e&ect of movement condition within the forward conditioning procedure, F(1, 95) = 
7.37, p = .008, but not within the backward conditioning procedure, F(1, 95) = 0.04, p = .832. 
When the movement followed the target stimulus, a signi$cant reduction of negativity was 
obtained for the nod to Moroccan condition (M = -39.37, SD = 75.30) as compared to the 
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shake to Moroccan condition (M = 8.15, SD = 67.31). No such di&erence was found between 
the nod to Moroccan (M = -8.21, SD = 43.24) and shake to Moroccan condition (M = -8.92, 
SD = 80.34) within the backward conditioning procedure. 
To further investigate these e&ects, we conducted simple contrast analyses including the 
control condition. !ese contrast tests showed that the change in attitudes within the nod 
to Moroccan condition for forward conditioning di&ered signi$cantly (p = .036) from the 
control condition (M = -1.86, SD = 91.71), whereas all other conditions did not di&er from 
the control condition (all ps > .492). In addition, the nod to Moroccan forward conditioning 
group was the only group for whom the attitudes changed from the pre to the posttest, as 
revealed by testing the ST-IAT di&erence score against zero, t(25) = -2.59, p = .016 (for 
the other conditions, ts < 1.08 and ps > .289). Figure 5.1 displays the means for change of 
evaluation in the di&erent movement conditions, for the two conditioning order procedures 
separately, as well as the control condition. 
figure 5.1. The mean change (and standard error) in implicit evaluations of the out-group 
as a function of conditioning with nodding or shaking. A negative difference score reflects a 
reduction of negativity, a positive difference score an increase of negativity, and scores around 
zero stable evaluations from the pre to the posttest. The left side of the graph shows results for 
forward conditioning (the movement follows the name), and the right side results for backward 
conditioning (the movement precedes the name). The straight line reflects the results for the no 
movement control condition.
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Finally, we checked for the in%uence of demand awareness by analyzing participants’ 
answers to our spontaneous measure on their ideas about the purpose of the study. Four 
participants revealed high awareness of our research purpose; that is, they reported that they 
noticed to have been nodding or shaking the head in combination with Moroccan names 
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and thought we were looking for e&ects of this coupling on the implicit attitude measure 
a#erwards. In addition to these four highly aware participants, another 17 participants showed 
some indication of contingency awareness (i.e., they reported noticing that Moroccan names 
were consistently coupled with a certain movement). !us, in sum, 21 participants indicated 
some awareness of coupling of Moroccan names with a speci$c head movement. Excluding 
these 21 participants did not a&ect the pattern of signi$cant and non-signi$cant results.
Discussion
In the present research, two possible processes by which head movements can alter 
attitudes were pitted against each other. On the one hand, a mere proximity explanation 
implies that head movements a&ect attitudes when they are presented in close proximity to 
the conditioned stimulus. On the other hand, a temporal contiguity explanation suggests 
that head movements alter attitude valence only when the movement is presented a#er the 
stimulus has been encountered. !e present data support the latter explanation. Our results 
show that embodied evaluative conditioning e&ects of head nodding are obtained only 
when the stimulus (e.g., the name Ahmed) precedes the participant’s positive embodied 
evaluative reaction (i.e., the head nodding movement) and not when the same stimulus 
and movement occur in the reverse order. As we argued in the Introduction, this particular 
stimulus-movement order matches the natural sequence of events in which embodied signs of 
agreement with a stimulus are typically expressed a#er the stimulus is perceived. 
!eoretically, the observed e&ect of temporal order suggests that causal misattribution 
underlies the obtained embodied evaluative conditioning e&ect. !e most parsimonious 
explanation for the $nding that target stimuli evaluations were enhanced a#er repeated 
exposure to target stimuli followed by head nodding, is that participants attributed their 
head nodding movements (as an expression of approval) to the preceding stimulus instead 
of correctly attributing them to the instruction to follow the moving circle on the screen. 
!e $nding that this misattribution of the source of the nodding takes place only when the 
stimulus precedes the movement is in line with principles of causal inference. Speci$cally, a 
cause must precede the e&ect in order to be perceived as cause (Michotte, 1946/1963). 
Recently, Jones, Fazio and Olson (2009) proposed a misattribution account to explain 
evaluative conditioning e&ects. In their argument, the causal misattribution originates from 
confusion about whether the unconditioned stimulus (US) or the conditioned stimulus (CS) 
is the source of an evaluative reaction. To illustrate, when a CS (e.g., a Chinese character) 
and a US (e.g., a %ower) are presented in close temporal and spatial proximity, the positive 
evaluative reaction evoked by the %ower may be mistakenly attributed to the Chinese character. 
Note that our misattribution explanation di&ers from the misattribution account presented by 
Jones et al. (2009). In our case, the misattribution is not a consequence of confusion between 
the CS (e.g., Ahmed) and the US (i.e., head nodding) as the source of the evaluation. Instead, 
the confusion is about what causes participants to nod their heads. !at is, a misattribution is 
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made to the CS being the cause of the US, instead of to our instruction to follow the moving 
circle. In a way, this speci$c misattribution process resembles the misattribution proposed 
in the self-perception literature, in which it is argued that people may infer their attitudes 
from their behavior (cf. Bem, 1972). In our case, participants seem to have (spontaneously) 
inferred their positive evaluation of the stimulus (i.e., their attitude) from their head nodding 
movements upon perceiving the stimulus (i.e., their behavior).
In a recent meta-analysis on evaluative conditioning (Hofmann et al., 2010), temporal 
order was not identi$ed as a moderating factor in the production of evaluative conditioning 
e&ects. However, in the paradigms reviewed in this meta-analysis the USs were all external 
stimuli while in our study evaluative bodily reactions of the participants constituted the US. 
It may be tentatively suggested that the involvement of one’s own evaluative response (US) to 
an outside event (CS) may have contributed to the critical role of temporal order. Subjectively, 
our evaluative response clearly pertains to the preceding stimulus, and not to a stimulus that 
appears immediately a#er our response. In contrast, when passively observing two external 
stimuli in close proximity, their temporal order may be less crucial in distinguishing which 
of the stimuli exactly caused the positive or negative a&ect experienced by the observer. !is 
would explain why in most evaluative conditioning studies the temporal order of CS and US 
does not seem to play a role, while it clearly does in the present paradigm.
Aside from accounts based on misattribution, several other processes for conditioning 
e&ects have been proposed, ranging from signal learning accounts or Pavlovian conditioning 
(e.g., Rescorla, 1988) to explanations involving propositions about the relation between the 
CS and the US (e.g., De Houwer, 2009). First, from a propositional perspective our e&ects 
should be explained by means of explicit evaluations involving propositions about the 
relation between the CS and the US. !is explanation requires participants’ awareness of the 
experimentally manipulated relationship between the nodding movement and Moroccan 
names. On the basis of our spontaneous reports of awareness, it seems unlikely that awareness 
of contingencies plays a crucial role in our e&ects. !at is, excluding participants spontaneously 
reporting awareness of contingencies between the movements and Moroccan names did not 
alter our e&ects. 
Although our present results do not provide direct evidence for a propositional account, 
we should be careful in drawing strong conclusions concerning the role of contingency 
awareness, because we did not include sensitive measures or manipulations of awareness in 
our study (see Field, 2000). It may thus be conceivable that propositional cognitions such as 
“I nodded upon seeing Ahmed” or simply “I like Ahmed” have played a mediating role in the 
production of our e&ects. Future studies should shed more light on this issue by measuring 
contingency awareness more directly, or by obscuring awareness, for example by subliminal 
presentation of the names or by including more trials in which people nod or shake for 
other words, as well as trials with Moroccan names in which people do not make a certain 
movement. 
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Our method and $ndings for the forward conditioning procedure resemble a Pavlovian 
form of conditioning (Rescorla, 1988). !at is, the Moroccan names are always coupled 
with one type of movement (100% statistical contingency), and the names may therefore 
be perceived as a signal for the movement to occur. However, the type of US we use in 
our procedure (head movements) is quite di&erent from the hedonic states that are used 
in Pavlovian forms of conditioning. !e ‘hedonic’ state in our case is caused by one’s own 
movement rather than brought about by a pleasant outside event (e.g., food). Future research 
should test whether the 100% statistical contingency is a prerequisite for the present e&ect to 
occur, or whether the e&ects would also be obtained if the Moroccan names were sometimes 
presented without the nodding movement following it. 
In the present research we have studied how embodied expressions of agreement and 
disagreement a&ect evaluations. !us, the term ‘embodied’ evaluative conditioning here 
refers to our evaluative conditioning procedure using embodied unconditioned stimuli. !e 
question may arise how these embodied expressions di&er from coupling out-group names 
with the verbal expressions of agreement and disagreement; i.e., the words “yes” and “no”. 
From the perspective of temporally scripted events, one might predict evaluative conditioning 
e&ects to be similarly constrained by order e&ects when using verbal evaluative reactions of 
participants instead of bodily movements. It may, however, be more di'cult to conceal the 
meaning of these verbal reactions than in the case of movements, which may give rise to 
enhanced demand e&ects. Future research should shed more light on whether the explicit 
expression of agreement has similar e&ects on evaluations as the more subtle expression of 
moving the head in a vertical way. Moreover, it would be interesting to test the role of order 
information in these more explicit expressions of positivity and negativity. 
!e goal of the present chapter was to shed more light on the process underlying 
embodied evaluative conditioning e&ects. Our $nding that evaluative conditioning e&ects 
occur only when the movement follows the stimulus does not imply that the opposite order 
does not yield any e&ects. From the literature on bodily-induced mindsets, we know that the 
performance of approach and avoidance movements can a&ect cognitive control on a trial 
that follows the movement (Koch, Holland, Hengstler, & Van Knippenberg, 2009). Here, the 
movements function as a general signal that the environment is safe or that caution is needed. 
Head nodding and shaking have also been found to a&ect attitudes in other ways than 
through evaluative conditioning. First, nodding and shaking can guide evaluations about 
persuasive messages by functioning as internal cues to either have con$dence or doubt in one’s 
own thoughts (Briñol & Petty, 2003; 2009). In these studies, either nodding or shaking head 
movements are made while listening to a message. Participants display more con$dence in 
their thoughts that are evoked by the message when they have been nodding their heads while 
listening to it as compared to shaking. Such a deliberate cognitive process is less applicable 
to our present paradigm, in which there was not much room for elaboration. Second, head 
shaking can make negative things more negative, and head nodding can make positive things 
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more positive (Förster, 2004). Here, participants made extended and very slow up and down 
or sideways movements while watching an extremely positive or negative product. !eir 
attitude toward the negative product became more negative a#er the sideways movements, 
whereas their attitude toward the positive product became more positive a#er the up and 
down movements. !ese up and down and sideways movements may respectively have had 
a positive and a negative connotation, but also may represent natural nodding or shaking 
to a lesser extent than in our paradigm, which is characterized by repeated and faster head 
movements. All in all, the self-validation paradigm and the compatibility study may have 
brought about di&erent dynamics than our evaluative conditioning paradigm, resulting in 
di&erent processes by which head movements can alter attitudes. 
By studying attitudes toward a social out-group, the present study also enhances our 
insights concerning embodiment e&ects in the area of prejudice. Our results extend recent 
$ndings that approach arm movements can lead to lower levels of prejudice than avoidance 
and control movements (Kawakami et al., 2007). Speci$cally, we show that head nodding can 
serve as a positive signal in a conditioning paradigm to alter out-group evaluations. Note 
that we used the same out-group names in the ST-IATs as in the conditioning procedure. 
Although the category in an IAT o#en overrides the in%uence of individual features of 
presented exemplars (e.g., De Houwer, 2001; Mitchell, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003), we cannot 
exclude the possibility that we changed attitudes to these speci$c exemplars only, and not to 
the out-group in general. 
In line with the absence of negative e&ects of avoidance training on prejudice, we also 
did not $nd e&ects of head shaking on out-group attitudes, possibly because the attitude 
was already predominantly negative (cf., Kawakami et al., 2007). For social attitudes that 
are predominantly positive, evaluative conditioning e&ects of head shaking should occur. 
Additionally, it would be interesting to see whether temporal order also moderates the 
in%uence of approach and avoidance arm movements on attitude change, because these 
movements are used in the same scripted manner as head movements.   
To conclude, the present results show that temporal contiguity plays an important role 
in embodied evaluative conditioning of social attitudes, in that these e&ects are bounded to 
the natural sequence in which head movements occur in daily life. !us, in order for head 
nodding to in%uence attitudes by means of evaluative conditioning, we should “$rst see, then 
nod”. 


Chapter 6
When you give the nod, half the time is not 
enough: !e role of statistical contingency 
in embodied evaluative conditioning
Abstract
!e goal of this chapter was to investigate the potential processes 
underlying e&ects of conditioning with head nodding movements. 
Speci$cally, we aimed to shed more light on the role of statistical 
covariation, contingency awareness, and demand awareness. In short, 
this study showed that when a Moroccan name was always followed 
by a nodding movement, a reduction of prejudice occurred, thereby 
replicating previous e&ects (Chapter 5, Wennekers, Holland, Wigboldus, 
& Van Knippenberg, 2012). However, when Moroccan names were half 
of the time followed by no movements, attitudes toward this group 
remained unaltered. !ese results are in line with a signal learning 
process. However, we also found indications that demand awareness 
disrupts the e&ect of head nodding on attitude change, which may be 
more in line with implicit misattribution processes. We discuss these 
$ndings in light of the idea that typical evaluative conditioning processes 
do not simply converge with processes underlying conditioning based 
on one’s own bodily responses.  
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Nodding the head repeatedly in response to out-group names has been found to result in 
more positive associations with this group on an indirect measure of prejudice (Wennekers, 
Holland, Wigboldus, & Van Knippenberg, 2012). Importantly, this e&ect has been found to 
be dependent on the temporal order of events within the conditioning procedure. !at is, 
nodding the head a&ected implicit prejudice only when the movement followed the out-
group name. When participants nodded before the name appeared, the measure of implicit 
prejudice was una&ected (Wennekers et al., 2012). !e goal of the present chapter is to 
shed more light on the process underlying this form of embodied evaluative conditioning. 
Speci$cally, we focus on the role of statistical contingency in the e&ect of head nodding on 
prejudice reduction. Should the out-group name be followed always by a nodding movement 
to a&ect implicit attitudes? 
Evaluative conditioning (EC) refers to “attitude formation (or change) due to an object’s 
pairing with positively or negatively valenced stimuli” (Jones, Olson, & Fazio, 2010, p.207). 
Many diverging results have been obtained in EC studies, and researchers have proposed that 
evaluative conditioning is an e&ect that could result from di&erent processes (e.g., De Houwer, 
2007; De Houwer, Baeyens, & Field, 2005; Jones et al., 2010). At a procedural level, di&erent 
forms of conditioning may be very much alike, such that most of these procedures consist 
of a conditioned stimulus (CS) of which the valence transfers to an unconditioned stimulus 
(US) a#er repeated couplings. Still, the processes driving this transfer of valence may di&er 
in important ways (for reviews see De Houwer, !omas, & Baeyens, 2001; Jones et al., 2010). 
Two fundamentally di&erent processes that have gained much attention in the area of 
evaluative conditioning are Pavlovian accounts of signal learning and implicit misattribution 
accounts. First, in Pavlovian conditioning, the CS signals the awaiting occurrence of 
the US, and this process is therefore also referred to as signal or expectancy learning (see 
Rescorla, 1988). Because of their signal value to the occurrence of positive or negative 
events, these stimuli acquire a corresponding evaluation. !at is, stimuli that are learned to 
predict a pleasant experience become viewed more positively, whereas stimuli that predict 
unpleasant experiences gain a less favorable evaluation. In contrast, according to the implicit 
misattribution model, an attitude evoked by the US is – without awareness – ascribed to 
the CS, thereby in%uencing the attitude toward the CS. !at is, due to confusion about the 
source, people’s positive or negative feelings that are actually caused by one stimulus become 
misattributed to the other stimulus (see Jones, Fazio, & Olson, 2009). 
!ere are several crucial di&erences between these two processes. Most importantly, they 
di&er regarding the role of statistical covariation between the CS and US, as well as the role 
of awareness about the CS-US couplings. For signal learning to occur, both the statistical 
covariation and awareness about the coupling of the CS and US are important boundary 
conditions. !at is, a US occurrence without the CS preceding it interferes with learning that 
the CS is a signal for a hedonically consequential event to occur. Furthermore, awareness 
about the coupling of the CS and US enhances the strength of the signal value (Jones et al., 
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2010). Conversely, for conditioning by means of implicit misattribution, people do not have 
to be aware of the coupling between the CS and the US. In fact, awareness may even hinder 
misattribution. Additionally, the consistency of CS-US covariation (i.e., signal value) is not a 
necessary condition for implicit misattribution. It is not the CS’s signal value in predicting the 
US that leads to attitude change of the US, but the mere co-occurrence with the US in time 
and space (Jones et al., 2010). 
As discussed in the previous chapter, both these accounts could potentially explain how 
nodding the head a#er seeing an out-group name reduces negative attitudes toward the out-
group. In line with Pavlovian learning, the out-group name always preceded the head nodding 
movement, and could therefore have become learned as a signal for the response of liking and 
agreement to occur. In line with implicit misattribution, people may have misinterpreted their 
head nodding response as having been caused by the out-group name, instead of being a 
consequence of following the movement of the circle on the screen. Even without being aware 
of the couplings between the out-group name and the movement, this could have resulted in 
positive feelings toward the out-group, which subsequently a&ected the indirect measure of 
prejudice. 
In the present study, we aimed to further investigate how nodding the head a#er out-group 
names could a&ect implicit prejudice. As a $rst follow-up test to the study of Wennekers and 
colleagues (2012), we conducted a study in which we varied the statistical contingency between 
the couplings of the movements with the out-group names. As explained above, if signal 
learning drives the e&ect, a disruption of the coupling between the name and the movement 
should be detrimental to the e&ect. !at is, if the out-group name is not always followed by a 
head nodding movement, it does not become learned as a signal for the movement to occur. 
Furthermore, we measured awareness of the couplings and goal awareness. A prerequisite 
for the signal learning process would be that people are aware of the covariation between the 
out-group name and the movement. For an implicit misattribution process, a non-perfect 
statistical covariation should not be harmful; because what then counts is simply that the 
CS and US have co-occured in time and space. !e same reasoning applies to an absence of 
awareness of statistical contingency. High levels of goal awareness could even stand in the way 
of the misattribution process (see Jones et al., 2010), but would not necessarily undermine 
signal learning. 
We conducted a study in which we manipulated whether the out-group name was always 
(100% contingency) or only half of the time (50% contingency) followed by a movement 
(head nodding or head shaking). We included a pre and post-measure of implicit prejudice 
to investigate the e&ect of our conditioning procedures on people’s attitudes toward the out-
group. It should be noted upfront that this test is primarily diagnostic for the signal learning 
account. If signal learning drives the e&ect of head nodding on implicit prejudice, we should 
$nd conditioning e&ects in the 100% contingency condition, but not in the 50% contingency 
condition. Most importantly, if we still $nd conditioning e&ects in the 50% contingency 
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condition, in which the name is no longer a signal of the movement (i.e., it is at chance level 
whether the movement occurs or not), it could be concluded that signal learning does not 
explain the e&ects.  
stuDy 1A
We used an adapted version of the Wennekers et al. (2012) procedure to gain more 
insight into the process by which evaluative conditioning with head nodding reduces implicit 
prejudice. We manipulated the movement (nodding or shaking) participants made a#er 
seeing a Moroccan name. Furthermore, we manipulated the statistical contingency of this 
coupling between the name and the movement to 100% or 50%. In the 100% contingency 
condition, the Moroccan name was always followed by a particular movement, whereas this 
was only the case in half of the trials in the 50% contingency condition. We conducted a 
Single-Target Implicit Association Test (ST-IAT) toward Moroccans before and a#er the 
head movement task, to be able to detect changes in implicit attitudes as a function of the 
conditioning procedure. 
method
Participants and design. One-hundred and forty students (24 males, 116 females, Mage 
= 21.17, SDage = 3.47, age range: 17-39 years) of Radboud University Nijmegen participated 
in this study with a 2 (movement condition: nod a#er Moroccan vs. shake a#er Moroccan) 
X 2 (statistical contingency: 100% vs. 50%) between-subjects design, with an additional no 
training control condition and a pre and post ST-IAT measure. 
Procedure. Participants subscribed to a series of computer tasks by di&erent researchers. 
!ey started with an ST-IAT to measure implicit associations with Moroccans. A#er some 
unrelated $ller tasks they performed the head movement task, which was supposedly recorded 
by a webcam attached to the computer screen. Directly a#er the head movement task they 
performed a second ST-IAT. 
!e procedures of the ST-IATs were exactly the same as those reported in the Wennekers et 
al. (2012) study. Participants performed three blocks, $rst a block to practice the categorizing 
of positive and negative words, then two experimental blocks containing both positive and 
negative words and Moroccan names. !e stimuli were presented in a pseudo-random order to 
make sure the blocks were of the same di'culty for all participants regarding switching trials. 
For further details of the ST-IAT procedures we refer to the method section of Wennekers et 
al. (2012; see Chapter 5). 
!e instructions for the head movement task were largely the same as in the procedure 
of Wennekers et al. (2012). We told participants we were interested in the in%uence of head 
movements on word pronunciation. !eir task was to pronounce words presented on the 
screen, a#er which a circle would appear that moved either horizontally or vertically on the 
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screen, or remained motionless in the center of the screen. Participants had to follow the 
movement of the circle with their entire head. !ey were instructed to place their chair close 
to the table, and sit straight. 
!e head movement training consisted of 200 trials, of which 40 included a horizontally 
moving circle (shaking), 40 a vertically moving circle (nodding), and 120 a motionless circle 
(no movement). For the presentation times of stimuli in the nodding and shaking trials we 
refer to the method of Wennekers et al. (2012). In the no movement trials, the circle remained 
motionless in the center of the screen for one second. In the nod a#er Moroccan condition, the 
nodding movement was always preceded by a Moroccan name, and the shaking movement 
by a Dutch name. In the shake a#er Moroccan condition, the shaking movement was 
always preceded by a Moroccan name and the nodding movement by a Dutch name.  In the 
100% statistical contingency condition, the 120 trials without movement were all preceded 
by neutral words. In the 50% contingency condition, 40 of these no movement trials were 
preceded by Moroccan names, 40 trials by Dutch names and 40 trials by neutral words. See 
Table 6.1 for an outline of the design. 
table 6.1. Outline of the 2 (statistical contingency: 100% versus 50%) X 2 (movement after 
Moroccan: nod versus shake) between-subjects design. 
Nod after Moroccan Shake after Moroccan
100% contingency 40 x nod Moroccan
40 x shake Dutch
120 x no movement neutral
40 x shake Moroccan
40 x nod Dutch
120 x no movement neutral
50% contingency 40 x nod Moroccan
40 x shake Dutch
40 x no movement neutral
40 x no movement Moroccan
40 x no movement Dutch
40 x shake Moroccan
40 x nod Dutch
40 x no movement neutral
40 x no movement Moroccan
40 x no movement Dutch
A#er the second ST-IAT, we included some measures to test for people’s awareness of the 
couplings between the stimuli and movements, as well as a question to test for demand or 
goal awareness. First, participants were asked for their ideas about the goal of this study with 
an open question. !ey could type their ideas into a text box on the computer. A#er this, 
participants were asked about their memory for the movements they had to make a#er certain 
stimuli. Participants were consecutively presented with 15 stimuli from the conditioning 
procedure (5 for each category), in random order. !ey were asked to indicate within 10 
seconds whether they made a nodding (vertical), shaking (horizontal), or no movement for 
this stimulus within the training. !ey could click more than one option per category.  
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results and Discussion
Incorrect trials on both ST-IATs were recorded as missing values (6.1% of the pretest data, 
and 6.6% of the posttest data), as well as reaction times faster than 300 milliseconds and 
slower than 3000 milliseconds (less than 0.2% of the pretest and posttest data). Subsequently, 
reaction times were log-transformed. Note that for clarity, we report the untransformed mean 
latencies.
To calculate the ST-IAT scores we subtracted the mean log-transformed latencies in the 
congruent block from the mean log-transformed latencies in the incongruent block. Higher 
ST-IAT scores as compared to lower ST-IAT scores thus re%ect more negative attitudes toward 
Moroccans. !e data of two participants were deleted from further analyses because their 
ST-IAT score(s) deviated more than 3 SD from the mean. !e data from a third participant 
were dropped from the analyses, because the ST-IAT posttest was missing due to a technical 
problem during the study.  
To test for e&ects of the conditioning procedure on implicit attitudes, we subtracted the 
ST-IAT pretest score from the ST-IAT posttest score. !is way, a negative score re%ects a 
reduction of negative associations, a positive score re%ects an increase of negative associations, 
and scores around zero re%ect stable associations. We subjected these di&erence scores to a 
2 (movement: nod a#er Moroccan vs. shake a#er Moroccan) X 2 (statistical contingency: 
100% vs. 50%) ANOVA. !is analysis revealed only a marginally signi$cant main e&ect of 
movement, F(1, 106) = 3.71, p = .057, ηp2 = .03, showing that head nodding on average resulted 
in more prejudice reduction (M = -28.97, SD = 80.13) than head shaking (M = -8.56, SD = 
80.09). Simple contrast analyses showed that the ST-IAT di&erence score in the head nodding 
condition di&ered from zero, t(54) = -2.88, p = .006, whereas these scores did not di&er from 
zero in both the head shaking and the control condition, ts < 1, n.s. Furthermore, the head 
nodding condition di&ered from the no training control condition (M = 10.10, SD = 90.61) p 
= .035, whereas the head shaking and control condition did not di&er, p = .530. 
!e interaction e&ect of movement X statistical contingency did not reach signi$cance, 
F(1, 106) = 1.53, p = .219, n.s. In combination with the main e&ect of movement, we could 
conclude that statistical contingency does not play a role in the e&ect of nodding on prejudice 
reduction. However, to draw that conclusion, we should obtain the e&ect of head nodding within 
both the 100% contingency condition and the 50% contingency condition. !us, despite the 
non-signi$cant interaction e&ect, we tested the simple e&ect of nodding versus shaking a#er 
Moroccan names within the two contingency procedures separately. !is analysis revealed a 
signi$cant main e&ect of movement condition within the 100% contingency procedure, F(1, 
106) = 4.91, p = .029, ηp2 = .04, but not within the 50% contingency procedure, F(1, 106) = 
0.24, p = .624, n.s. In the 100% statistical contingency procedure, a signi$cant reduction of 
negativity was obtained for the nodding condition (M = -41.61, SD = 72.58) as compared to 
the shaking condition (M = 1.14, SD = 72.08). No such di&erence was found between the nod 
a#er Moroccan (M = -16.79, SD = 86.34) and shake a#er Moroccan condition (M = -17.92, SD 
= 87.42) within the 50% statistical contingency procedure. 
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Furthermore, simple comparisons against zero show that the ST-IAT di&erence score in 
the 100% nod a#er Moroccan condition di&ered from zero, t(26) = -3.11, p = .004, whereas it 
did not in the 50% nod a#er Moroccan condition, t(27) = -1.11, p = .276, nor in both shaking 
conditions and the control condition, t < 1, n.s. See Figure 6.1 for an illustration of the results.
figure 6.1. The mean change (and standard error) in ST-IAT difference scores (posttest minus 
pretest) as a result of training with head nodding or shaking within the 100% and 50% statistical 
contingency conditions. A negative difference score reflects more positive associations with 
Moroccans on the posttest as compared to the pretest, whereas a positive difference score reflects 
more negative associations. A score around zero shows that the ST-IAT did not change from the 
pre to the posttest. The straight line reflects the results for the no movement control condition.
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To be able to draw stronger conclusions about the role of statistical contingency in evaluative 
conditioning with head movements, we decided to run extra participants for the 50% statistical 
contingency condition. Potentially, the e&ects in this condition are subtler than in the 100% 
contingency condition and need more statistical power. In Study 1b, we report the results of 
these extra participants, a#er which we combine them with the results of Study 1a.
stuDy 1b
method
Participants and design. Seventy-nine Dutch students from Radboud University Nijmegen 
(18 males, 61 females in the age range of 18-35, Mage = 21.48, SDage = 3.10) participated in this 
study, which had a 2 (movement condition: nod a#er Moroccan vs. shake a#er Moroccan) 
between-subjects design. All participants received the 50% statistical contingency condition 
of Study 1a. 
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Procedure. !e procedure of this study was identical to the 50% statistical contingency 
condition of Study 1a. 
results and Discussion
Incorrect trials on both ST-IATs were recorded as missing values (7.2% of both the pretest 
and the posttest data), as well as reaction times faster than 300 milliseconds and slower than 
3000 milliseconds (less than 0.3% of the pretest and posttest data). Subsequently, reaction 
times were log-transformed. Note that for clarity, we report the untransformed mean latencies. 
We calculated a di&erence score for the ST-IAT, subtracting the pretest score from the 
posttest score. !e data of three participants were excluded from further analyses, because 
they ST-IAT score(s) of more than 3 SD from the sample mean. !e data of the remaining 
76 participants were analyzed with a 2 (movement: nod a#er Moroccan versus shake a#er 
Moroccan) ANOVA. !is analysis did not reveal a main e&ect of movement, F < 1, n.s. !e 
reduction in implicit prejudice did not di&er for the nod a#er Moroccan condition (M = 
-9.44, SD = 87.74) versus the shake a#er Moroccan condition (M = -23.98, SD = 87.46). In 
both conditions, these di&erence scores did not di&er from zero, both ts < 1.59, ps > .120. 
Again, these results show that there is no e&ect of the nodding versus shaking conditioning 
procedure when using a 50% statistical contingency paradigm. !is further suggests that the 
100% coupling of the movement with the names may be of importance to the conditioning 
e&ect of head nodding. As a $nal test, we combined the data sets of Study 1b with the data set 
of Study 1a, and analyzed the combined results of these two experiments. 
stuDy 1A AnD 1b combineD
Participants
Combining the datasets of Study 1a and Study 1b resulted in a set consisting of data of 
219 participants (42 males, 177 females; with an age ranging from 17-39 years, Mage = 21.48, 
SDage = 3.1). 
results 
!e data of seven participants were excluded from the analyses because they had ST-IAT 
score(s) of more than 3 SD from the overall mean1. One participant was excluded because of 
the missing ST-IAT posttest data. We performed the same 2 (movement: nod a#er Moroccan 
versus shake a#er Moroccan) X 2 (statistical contingency: 100% versus 50%) between-subjects 
ANOVA as reported in Study 1a on the data of the remaining 211 participants. !is analysis 
showed that the reduction of prejudice a#er nodding (M = -20.75, SD = 83.52) was now only 
1 Note that the 2 participants that were already excluded in Study 1a and 3 participants that were excluded in Study 1b 
were also outliers in the combined study. When combining the studies, 1 extra participant from Study 1a and 1 extra 
from Study 1b came out as outliers using the 3 SD criterion. 
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marginally signi$cantly stronger than a#er shaking (M = -14.97, SD = 81.56), with a main 
e&ect of movement of F(1, 180) = 3.12, p = .079, ηp2= .017. However, this e&ect was quali$ed 
by a marginally signi$cant interaction between movement and contingency, F(1, 180) = 3.21, 
p = .075, ηp2= .018. Inspection of the contrast e&ects of movement within each contingency 
condition further strengthens the suggestion that nodding di&ers from shaking only within 
the 100% contingency procedure, F(1, 180) = 4.48, p = .036, ηp2 = .02, but not within the 50% 
contingency procedure, F(1, 180) = 0.01, p = .982, n.s.
Finally, if it is indeed only the nodding a#er Moroccan condition in the 100% contingency 
procedure that shows a reduction of prejudice from the pre to the posttest, a contrast analysis 
comparing this condition to the other 3 training conditions and the control condition should 
be signi$cant. To do so we computed a variable that was coded -4 for the 100% nodding 
condition, and 1 for all the other four conditions. !is variable indeed signi$cantly predicts 
the ST-IAT di&erence score, β = .14, t(209) = 2.02, p = .044. 
results of Awareness
In study 1a, we asked participants two types of awareness questions. First, participants 
answered a question to check for demand awareness. We included an open question asking 
about the goal of the head movement task. Second, we added a test of contingency awareness. 
Participants were asked to indicate for 15 stimuli (5 per category) which movement they had 
made for this stimulus (nodding, shaking or no movement). !ey could select more than one 
option, but had only 10 seconds to answer the question. In hindsight, this time limit may have 
been a restriction for the 50% contingency condition, because here the correct answer for 
most of the stimuli included clicking more than one option. Still, we will shortly present the 
results of Study 1a for these types of awareness and will explore how they may in%uence the 
e&ect of the head movement training on the ST-IAT.
Contingency awareness. Our indirect measure of prejudice was a single target measure, 
including only the Moroccan category. !erefore, we focus solely on awareness about the 
movements that were coupled to the Moroccan names. First, we checked whether participants 
correctly identi$ed the movement they had made a#er the Moroccan name. !at is, for both 
the 50% and 100% contingency conditions, participants either nodded or shook the head 
4 times for each of the Moroccan names. !us, for the 5 Moroccan names they were asked 
about in the contingency awareness measure, they should have indicated nodding or shaking 
(depending on movement condition). We $rst checked whether this was the case, by creating 
a variable ‘correct movement’ that received a score of 1 when participants from the nodding 
condition indicated for the 5 Moroccan names that they had nodded the head, and participants 
from the shaking condition that they had shaken the head for all these 5 Moroccan names. 
Any deviation from this perfect contingency resulted in a score of 0 on this variable. 
A Chi-square test indicated a signi$cant di&erence between the contingency conditions 
on correct coupling of the movements, X2 (1, N = 110) = 17.81, p < .001.  Within the 100% 
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contingency condition, only 3 out of 54 participants did not have a perfect answer to this 
movement contingency question, whereas 22 out of 56 participants from the 50% contingency 
condition did not reach the perfect answer.
Moreover, we aimed to test how contingency awareness may have a&ected the in%uence 
of the head movement condition on the ST-IAT di&erence score. To do so, we performed 
two separate analyses. First, for the 100% contingency condition, we performed the analyses 
excluding the 3 participants that did not give the perfect answer on the contingency awareness 
measure. Albeit weaker, we still $nd an e&ect of movement on the ST-IAT di&erence score, 
F(1, 49) = 4.00, p = .051, ηp2 = .02. Nodding the head resulted in prejudice reduction (M = 
-41.61, SD = 72.58) as compared to shaking the head (M = 1.14, SD = 72.08), and as indicated 
by a signi$cant test against zero, t(25) = -2.92, p = .007. Second, for the 50% contingency 
condition, we had 22 participants that did not indicate the correct movement for all the 
Moroccan names on contingency awareness measure. !erefore, we included this variable 
as a factor in the analyses. None of the variables (condition, contingency awareness), nor the 
interaction between the variables reached signi$cance, all Fs < 1.69, ps > .199.   
!us, although the 50% and 100% contingency condition di&er in their contingency 
awareness, we do not have any indication that contingency awareness may drive the e&ect of 
head nodding on prejudice reduction.
Demand awareness. To test for demand awareness, we checked people’s responses to the 
open question about the goal of the study. People who indicated to have no idea about the 
goal of the study, or whose ideas $tted within our cover story (i.e., that we were interested in 
their head movements) were coded as demand unaware. People who indicated a coupling 
between the head movement training and the IAT or who indicated otherwise they believed 
the training served as a prime of positive or negative associations were indicated as potentially 
aware. First, we compared demand awareness between the 50% and 100% condition by 
performing a Chi-square test on demand awareness (no versus potentially), X2 (1, N = 112) 
= 0.16, p = .693.  Within the 100% contingency condition, 21 out of 56 participants were 
potentially aware, which did not di&er statistically from the 19 out of 56 participants in the 
50% contingency condition. 
Subsequently, we performed analyses of the contingency condition and the movement 
condition on the ST-IAT di&erence score including the goal awareness measure. !e three-
way interaction between these variables did not reach signi$cance, F(1, 103) = 2.42, p = .123, 
ηp2 = .02. Still, inspecting simple contrasts of the e&ect of movement within the di&erent 
contingency X goal awareness conditions showed that the head nodding and head shaking 
condition di&ered only signi$cantly within the 100% contingency condition for people that 
were unaware of the goal of the study, F(1, 103) = 7.52, p = .007, ηp2 = .07, and not for people 
that were potentially aware, F < 1, n.s. Within the 50% contingency condition, movement did 
neither become signi$cant for the goal unaware people, nor for the goal aware people, Fs < 
1.13, ps > .290.
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!us, demand awareness may play a role in the 100% contingency condition. !e e&ect 
of head movement on the ST-IAT may be primarily present for people who are not aware of 
the goal of the study. In fact, we found a similar result for demand awareness in the forward 
conditioning procedure of the study reported in Chapter 5. We combined the forward 
conditioning condition from Chapter 5 with the 100% contingency condition of the present 
chapter, and performed an ANOVA of study (Chapter 5 versus 6), goal awareness (unaware 
versus potentially aware), and movement (nodding versus shaking) on the ST-IAT di&erence 
score. !e factor Study did not a&ect the result, but the interaction between movement and 
goal awareness was only marginally signi$cant, F(1, 99) = 2.71, p = .103, ηp2 = .03. Simple 
contrast tests again showed that movement had an e&ect only for people that were unaware 
of the goal of the study, F(1, 99) = 14.44, p < .001, ηp2 = .13, and not for people that were 
potentially aware, F < 1, n.s.
GenerAl Discussion
In the present study, participants were trained to repeatedly nod or shake the head a#er 
seeing an out-group name, and we tested the e&ect of this head movement training on an 
indirect measure of prejudice. An important $rst conclusion that can be drawn from this 
study is that we provide a replication of previous $ndings by Wennekers and colleagues (2012) 
that repeatedly nodding the head a#er seeing an out-group name reduces the negative scores 
on an ST-IAT. Speci$cally, the condition in which the out-group name was always followed 
by a nodding movement (i.e., the 100% contingency condition) was modeled closely a#er 
the Wennekers et al. (2012) procedure, and within this condition we $nd clear evidence for a 
reduction of prejudice from the pre to the post-measure of the ST-IAT. !us, this head nodding 
procedure seems to be robust in altering responses on an indirect measure of prejudice. 
Besides aiming to replicate previous $ndings of the e&ect of head nodding on prejudice, 
the main goal of the present study was to gain more knowledge about the process driving 
these e&ects of evaluative conditioning with head nodding movements. Speci$cally, within 
the literature on evaluative conditioning, two distinct processes have been identi$ed by which 
unconditioned stimuli can change the valence of a conditioned stimulus; that is, through 
signal learning or implicit misattribution. !ese processes make di&erent predictions about 
the role of statistical contingencies, contingency awareness and demand awareness in 
evaluative conditioning. In the present study, we manipulated statistical contingencies by 
varying whether the coupling between the movement and the out-group was made 100% or 
50% of the times, and measured awareness of the couplings and awareness about the goal of 
the study. 
First, the manipulation of statistical contingency clearly shows that the e&ect of head 
nodding on reduction of prejudice is only obtained within the 100% contingency condition. 
Within the 50% contingency condition, head nodding does not result in a change in negative 
associations with the out-group on the ST-IAT. It should be emphasized that the 50% and 
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100% contingency conditions do not di&er in terms of frequency of the couplings; in both 
conditions, the head movement was made 40 times in response to an out-group name. 
However, in the 50% contingency conditions, trials were added in which the Moroccan name 
was not followed by a nodding movement. !is disruption in the name being followed by a 
nodding movement thus intervened with the e&ect of head nodding on prejudice. !erefore, 
these results favor a signal learning account, and seem to be inconsistent with an implicit 
misattribution explanation. 
However, by comparing a 100% with a 50% contingency condition, we have chosen 
an extreme test of statistical contingency. In fact, in hindsight, the 50% contingency as 
operationalized in the present study may have precluded both signal learning and implicit 
misattribution. Possibly, the out-group names do not have to be perfect signals for the 
head nodding movement to occur, but the potential for the occurrence of the movement 
may have to be higher than chance level in order to elicit misattributions. Within a typical 
evaluative conditioning procedure in which positive pictures are coupled to a conditioned 
stimulus, adding the same number of neutral pictures to the conditioned stimulus may not 
be harmful when the e&ect is driven by implicit misattribution. Speci$cally, these pictures do 
not undermine the spill-over of the positive feelings evoked by the positive pictures. However, 
using responses of the own body as unconditioned stimuli may give rise to di&erent process. 
!at is, nodding the head only half of the times, and not making a movement the other half 
of the times may induce feelings of doubt in participants. 
Moreover, making no movement a#er Moroccan names may not be seen as a neutral event, 
but this ‘no-go’ response may in fact be interpreted as a negative signal (cf., Veling, Holland, 
& Van Knippenberg, 2008). !e positivity of head nodding may thus be diminished by the 
negativity of the no movement trials, which may lead to a neutral net result, in which attitudes 
remain unaltered. !us, future studies should test what happens in more subtle deviations 
from 100% couplings, for example by testing a 80% statistical contingency condition.  
Second, the measure of contingency awareness does not shed more light on the process 
driving e&ects of evaluative conditioning with head movements. Speci$cally, within the 100% 
contingency condition, the lack of variance in contingency awareness precludes assessing 
the e&ect of this variable. Within the 50% contingency condition, there is more variance in 
contingency awareness, but the results are not clear on the role of this type of awareness. 
In the present data, we do not have evidence that contingency awareness drives e&ects of 
head nodding in the 50% contingency condition. !us, based on our contingency awareness 
measure we cannot draw any conclusions about the role of this type of awareness in the e&ect 
of head nodding on prejudice reduction. As discussed in the previous chapter, it is hard to 
come to a good measure contingency awareness (see Field, 2000). Instead, future studies 
should manipulate contingency awareness, for example by presenting the out-group names 
subliminally in the head movement training. 
!ird, we included a measure of demand awareness by asking participants about the goal 
of the study. Interestingly, in the 100% contingency condition, demand awareness seems to 
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undermine the e&ect. !at is, e&ects seem to be stronger for people who did not report to be 
aware of the goal of the study. Moreover, this $nding seems to be consistent with the study 
of Chapter 5 (Wennekers et al., 2012). !e literature on implicit misattribution and signal 
learning is silent about the role of demand awareness, but it would seem to be most harmful to 
the implicit misattribution account. !at is, if you know that the researchers aim to alter your 
attitude of the CS by consistent coupling with the US, implicit misattribution can no longer 
occur. Future studies should shed more light on the role of this type of awareness in evaluative 
and embodied conditioning.
All in all, the $ndings for our manipulation of statistical contingency are in line with a 
signal learning account, but the implications of these $ndings for implicit misattribution are 
not clear. !e $nding for demand awareness seem to be in line the misattribution explanation, 
but the implications of these $ndings for signal learning are not clear. In balance, the present 
results are not conclusive about the role of these two evaluative conditioning processes in the 
e&ect of head nodding on attitudes toward an out-group.  
 A question that may rise is whether processes that have been found to underly e&ects of 
evaluative conditioning with external stimuli (e.g., coupling of pictures on the screen) are 
also applicable to e&ects of embodied evaluative conditioning. !e fact that people’s own 
responses function as conditioned stimuli may render other processes as more plausible 
explanations. Concretely, signal learning may play a role in this process, but it may be di&erent 
from Pavlovian forms of conditioning in which a stimulus becomes learned as a signal for 
a hedonic event to occur. !e moving of the own head is not a hedonic stimulus, but the 
fact that the own response is part of the conditioning procedure may activate processes of 
self-perception (Bem, 1972). Repeatedly making nodding movements a#er seeing Moroccan 
names may make people believe they agree with or like Moroccans.  
!us, instead of applying principles of evaluative conditioning to embodied evaluative 
conditioning, future studies should focus more on broader phenomena in explaining e&ects 
of head nodding on implicit prejudice. For example, the question should be answered how 
propositional or how associative processes underlie people’s interpretation of their own 
behavior in embodied evaluative conditioning. A way to test this would be by manipulating 
awareness of the couplings by presenting the out-group names subliminally in the head 
movement training
In the words of Jones et al. (2010), “the boundary conditions that characterize EC and 
the underlying mechanism(s) by which it is produced are poorly understood at this point in 
time” (p.210). !is may even apply more to embodied forms of evaluative conditioning. We 
acknowledge that a single study will not solve these issues, but we think that investigations 
like those reported in the previous and present chapter may increase the knowledge about 
the crucial conditions and processes that explain how bodily movements a&ect people’s out-
group attitudes.
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“!e scientist, by the very nature of his commitment, creates more and more questions, 
never fewer” - Gordon Allport (1955, p. 67)
!e goal of the present dissertation was to enhance the knowledge about the processes 
underlying and a&ecting people’s biased attitudes and behaviors toward members of ethnic 
out-groups. In Chapter 1 of this dissertation, I have proposed that an embodiment perspective 
could serve as a fruitful framework to the study of prejudice. In line with this perspective, the 
empirical chapters of the present dissertation focused on the role of a person’s environment 
and bodily states in the expression of biased attitudes. In Part 1, it was studied how the 
environment a&ects a person’s negative associations with the out-group, focusing on darkness 
and an out-group that typically evokes fear. In Part 2 and 3, insights have been gained into the 
role of bodily movements in the reduction of biased behavioral responses and associations 
toward the out-group. Speci$cally, Part 2 focused on approach and avoidance movements, 
and Part 3 on head nodding and head shaking movements. 
In this $nal chapter, I will discuss the broader theoretical implications of the present 
$ndings. !e discussion of the empirical contributions of the present dissertation is organized 
around three new thematic issues that run across the topics dealt with in the three empirical 
parts of this dissertation; the role of the environment and emotions in the expression of 
prejudice, the use of embodied evaluative conditioning procedures in the reduction of 
prejudice, and the role of gender in the embodiment of prejudice. Within each theme, I will 
highlight the insights gained by the present dissertation, as well as the limitations of the 
present research and the questions that remain yet unanswered. As illustrated by the quote 
from Gordon Allport at the top of this page, scienti$c research o#en evokes more questions 
than it can answer. I will conclude this chapter with a discussion of potential directions for 
future research that could be derived from the present dissertation. 
How environmentAlly situAteD emotions Affect PrejuDice
 In Part 1 we have studied how the environment a person $nds him or herself in may a&ect 
the biased attitudes of that person toward an out-group. In Chapter 3, we found that a dark 
environment enhanced people’s negative associations with an out-group that is stereotypically 
thought to be fear-evoking. !e results showed that people’s indirectly measured negative 
associations with a feared out-group (i.e., Moroccans in the Netherlands, see Chapter 2) were 
enhanced in a dark room, as compared to a normally lit room and a room with a negative cue 
that was unrelated to fear (i.e., bad smell). Moreover, people’s negative associations toward an 
out-group that does not evoke fear (i.e., obese people, see Chapter 2) were una&ected by the 
dark. !e results of three subsequent studies reported in Chapter 3 suggest that darkness in 
itself may not be a strong enough signal to a&ect negative associations with the feared out-
group. Instead, the results seem to indicate that the e&ect is contingent upon a procedure in 
which people $rst perform an Emotion Priming Task of repeatedly categorizing pictures as 
fearful, which are then used as negative stimuli in the Implicit Association Test. 
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!ese $ndings could be explained from an amodal cognition perspective. According to 
such amodal models, people have di&erent cognitive and associative schemas in their minds 
for di&erent subcategories of an out-group (e.g., dangerous and criminal Moroccans versus 
family-minded Moroccans). Which of these subcategories becomes accessible is a&ected by 
relevant cues, such as whether the out-group person is depicted in the context of a gang or 
a family barbecue (cf., Barden, Maddox, Petty, & Brewer, 2004; Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 
2001). In our studies of Chapter 3, the priming task with Moroccans in the context of fearful 
pictures could have made the subcategory of threatening Moroccans accessible. !e darkness 
then strengthened the accessibility of the concept of fear in people’s minds, which reinforced 
the activation of the subcategory of threatening Moroccans. As a result, people may have 
performed the IAT with that schema in mind, which facilitated responding to Moroccan 
names and negative words as compared to Moroccan names and positive words (cf., Dasgupta, 
DeSteno, Williams, & Hunsinger, 2009).   
In contrast, the results of Chapter 3 could also be explained from an embodiment 
perspective, which di&ers from an amodal explanation in crucial ways. According to an 
embodied cognition model, the representation of Moroccans should comprise partial 
reenactments of experiences in di&erent modalities. For example, when encountering a 
(picture or name of a) Moroccan person, people may feel anxious; their heart starts to beat 
faster, their hands become sweaty, and their motor system prepares for escape. In fact, in 
the studies of Chapter 3 such fear simulations may have been (partially) activated during 
the Evaluative Priming Task in which pictures of Moroccans were followed by pictures of 
frightening scenes. Subsequently, the darkness may have further enhanced feelings of fear. As 
a result of these overlapping feelings of fear as caused by Moroccans and the dark, people’s 
responses on the indirect measure of prejudice in the dark may have been facilitated when 
Moroccans and negative pictures had to be categorized using the same response key. 
One of the main di&erences between the amodal and embodied cognition process is the 
role that fear plays in these explanations. In the amodal cognition explanation, the concept 
of fear becomes accessible, but this does not imply that participants experienced enhanced 
feelings of fear. In contrast, in the embodied cognition explanation, enhanced feelings of 
fear are suggested to drive the e&ect. !us, in the amodal model, the e&ect of darkness on 
implicit prejudice should be mediated by an enhanced accessibility of fear-related words (e.g., 
as measured by a Lexical Decision Task or word completion task), but not by physiological 
indications of fear. In the case of embodiment, physiological indications of fear should 
mediate the e&ect of darkness on implicit prejudice. 
Based on the studies presented in this dissertation, we cannot draw strong conclusions 
about which of these two models – the amodal or the embodiment approach – best explains 
the e&ect of a dark environment on the expression of biased attitudes. However, the 
embodiment approach may provide the more $tting explanation considering the nature of 
our manipulation. Earlier studies on context-sensitivity of implicit prejudice have focused 
primarily on the context in which a target is presented (e.g., Blair, 2002; Wittenbrink et al., 
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2001). In line with amodal models, such manipulations may activate di&erent preexisting 
schemas of the out-group. Instead of providing pictures of di&erent types of out-group 
exemplars, we focused in our studies on the context of the perceiver. Such a manipulation $ts 
with the idea that people’s mental and physical experiences are a&ected by the environment 
people $nd themselves in (see Smith & Semin, 2004; Semin & Smith, 2008). When thinking 
about an out-group, these concurrently environment-induced experiences may feed into the 
partial re-enactment concerning this out-group.  
To be able to draw stronger conclusions about the nature of the e&ect of darkness on implicit 
prejudice, future research should directly investigate the role of the body in this process. If the 
embodiment perspective applies to the $ndings of Chapter 3, e&ects of darkness on biased 
attitudes should be mediated by physiological indications of fear, such as increased heart 
rate or heightened skin conductance levels. In the present studies, we did not include online 
physiological measures of arousal. Conducting such physiological measures in future studies 
should help to shed more light on the process by which darkness a&ects implicit prejudice. 
It may be the case that the IAT is less sensitive to pick up on subtle temporary 
environmental conditions compared to for instance the APT. Recent $ndings have shown 
that the IAT measure is not particularly responsive to people’s bodily reactions to individual 
stimuli (Foroni & Semin, 2012), and it is argued that the IAT is an “amodal representational 
index that is not a&ectively grounded” (p. 425; see also Niedenthal, 2007). In comparison, 
the evaluative priming task was found to heavily depend on bodily input about a&ective 
states (Foroni & Semin, 2012). !is $nding may (partially) explain why our e&ect of darkness 
on implicit prejudice was contingent upon speci$c procedural con$gurations. Possibly, the 
IAT measure was not sensitive enough to pick up subtle changes in people’s a&ective state in 
the dark environment. From this perspective, a priming measure of prejudice (such as the 
A&ective Priming Task) may be more sensitive for testing our processes and we look forward 
to test whether this measure results in more straightforward di&erences in implicit prejudice 
between a dark and light environment. 
emboDieD conDitioninG of biAseD AttituDes
In Part 2 and 3 we have studied the role of bodily movements in the expression of biased 
attitudes. !e focus was on two types of movements; approach and avoidance movements 
in Chapter 4 and head nodding and shaking movements in Chapter 5 and 6. Speci$cally, by 
combining conditioning principles with embodiment insights, we have found that repeatedly 
coupling positive bodily responses to out-group symbols may result in a reduction of 
prejudiced behavior and biased attitudes. What are the similarities and di&erences in how 
these movements a&ect implicit bias? Does this form of conditioning di&er from other forms 
of evaluative conditioning? 
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How approach movements reduce implicit bias
In Chapter 4, we found that people’s biased attitudes toward Moroccans predicted their 
tendency to make avoidance arm movements in response to this out-group. In a subsequent 
study we gave people a training in which they had to repeatedly make approach arm 
movements or avoidance arm movements in response to pictures of Moroccan males. People 
with a relatively strong bias toward Moroccans who had repeatedly approached pictures of 
this out-group subsequently showed less avoidance of a Moroccan male in a waiting room 
setting as compared to people who had repeatedly avoided Moroccans. In conclusion, this 
chapter shows that people’s bias toward a feared out-group may result in a tendency to avoid 
the out-group, but repeatedly approaching the out-group may help to overcome this automatic 
avoidance tendency. 
We were not the $rst to study e&ects of an approach training on out-group bias. In a series 
of studies, Kawakami, Phills, Steele, and Dovidio (2007) showed that White participants who 
repeatedly made approach arm movements in response to Black males subsequently showed 
less bias toward Black people on an indirect measure of prejudice and more openness in their 
behavior toward a Black confederate. Although these researchers clearly use embodiment 
principles in their training, they mostly rely on amodal cognitive models in explaining their 
$ndings. In a follow-up paper, Phills,  Kawakami, Tabi, Nadolny, and Inzlicht (2011) found 
that approach training resulted in stronger associations between the self and the out-group 
using an Implicit Association Test, and preliminary indications that this may mediate the 
e&ect of approach training on the reduction of negative associations with the out-group. To 
explain these $ndings, they state that an approach training is designed to “systematically 
build strong associations between the self and Blacks and thereby in%uence the working self-
concept” (Phills et al., 2011; p. 198). In other words, their argument is based on the idea that 
the self is a complex cognitive representation that consists of di&erent kinds of information, 
including associative links with social categories (cf., Greenwald et al., 2002). According to 
this line of reasoning, approach behaviors strengthen the associative links between the self 
and the out-group, and this increased identi$cation with the out-group results in reduced 
bias. 
In the present dissertation, we propose an embodiment explanation for the e&ect of 
approach movements on implicit bias, which is based on fundamental behavioral processes. 
Speci$cally, we argue that feelings of fear toward Moroccans underlie people’s automatic 
avoidance tendencies toward this group. Repeatedly making approach movements in 
response to Moroccans may – in the absence of aversive events – reduce these feelings of 
fear and the resulting tendency to avoid the out-group. !is reasoning is in line with clinical 
treatment of phobias through exposure training (see e.g., Öst, 1996). Irrational feelings of fear 
are addressed at basic levels of behavior and in doing so, approach training is expected to tap 
into the activation of older structures in the brain that play a role in automatic physiological 
regulation of behavior. Indeed, research on fear extinction suggests that such procedures 
temporarily render lower activation in the amygdala as a response to the feared stimulus 
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(Myers & Davis, 2007). !us, physiological indications of amygdala activation – such as 
galvanic skin response measures – should be a&ected by approach training. 
Although the studies of Chapter 4 provide interesting $rst evidence in line with such an 
embodiment approach, future studies should focus more directly on the reduction of fear by 
means of approach training. In line with what we have proposed in the previous section, online 
physiological indications of fear should be measured to test the proposed mediating role of 
(the reduction) of fear experiences in the e&ect of approach movements on the reduction of 
implicit bias. 
How head nodding reduces implicit bias
In Chapter 5 and 6, we investigated the e&ect of a di&erent movement on biased attitudes. 
In the studies reported in these chapters, people were trained to make head nodding or 
shaking movements in proximity to out-group names. We varied whether the movement 
always preceded or always followed the name and found that associations with Moroccans 
were a&ected only when the movement followed the name. Speci$cally, repeatedly making 
head nodding movements a#er seeing a Moroccan name resulted in less bias on an indirect 
measure of prejudice, whereas making these movements before the name appeared le# 
the responses on the indirect measure una&ected. In conclusion, coupling head nodding 
movements to out-group names results in a reduction of bias when the movement is made in 
a way that $ts people’s lifelong experiences in using these movements to express approval or 
liking. !at is, we $rst see, then nod. 
!e question may rise whether this speci$c ordering of events is also of crucial importance 
for the training with approach arm movements. !e meaning of both approach arm movements 
and head nodding movements is captured in their use as responses or expressions of one’s 
attitude to objects or people. We nod our head to express our agreement with something or 
someone, and we approach something or someone because we want to get closer. !us, these 
movements are responses to stimuli in the environment. 
Because of our frequent use of these approach and head nodding movements as positive 
expressions, training people to make these movements as responses to the out-group may 
make them part of their behavioral repertoire vis-a-vis this out-group and result in more 
positive (or less negative) feelings about the out-group. Within our approach training, and in 
other studies that have used an approach movement conditioning procedure (e.g., Kawakami 
et al., 2007; Phills et al., 2011; Wiers, Rinck, Kordts, Houben, & Strack, 2010), the movement 
always followed the conditioned stimulus. !us, no empirical evidence has yet been obtained 
for the hypothesis that e&ects of an approach training are bound by the same temporal order 
e&ect as the head nodding training. Future research should establish whether the temporal 
order principle also applies to a conditioning procedure with approach movements. !at is, 
should we $rst see, then approach?  
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Different movements, same process?
!e present dissertation provides empirical evidence that both approach arm movements 
and head nodding movements can successfully be used in a conditioning procedure to reduce 
implicit bias. Furthermore, we have suggested that the same temporal order e&ect applies to 
the use of both types of movements. However, do these movements a&ect implicit bias in the 
same way? In this section, I will argue that the underlying process by which approach arm 
movements and head nodding movements a&ect prejudice are most likely to be inherently 
di&erent. 
As I have discussed in the section about e&ects of approach movements, it is expected that 
these movements speci$cally tap into people’s feelings of fear toward the out-group. !is $ts 
with de$nitions of emotions as adaptive processes (e.g., Ekman, 1992) that are functionally 
related to fundamental response patterns such as approach and avoidance (LeDoux, 1995, 
see also Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999). Feelings of fear and disgust typically result in avoidance 
tendencies, whereas happiness and anger evoke approach tendencies. Presumably, these 
adaptive behavioral tendencies have an evolutionary old origin. It is therefore expected that 
approach training a&ects implicit bias by means of a low-level cognition process. Repeatedly 
approaching an out-group without aversive consequences may evoke the experience of safety, 
thereby reducing the original automatic fear responses. As a result, out-group members may 
no longer (or to a lesser extent) activate the evolutionary self-protection system (Neuberg, 
Kenrick, & Schaller, 2011). 
In contrast, we propose that head nodding movements a&ect implicit bias by means of a more 
high-level cognition process. Head nodding movements are not part of our basic evolutionary 
system of behaviors, but are movements that have acquired their meaning as expression of 
agreement as a result of culture and communication processes. In our conditioning procedure, 
the head nodding movement becomes attributed to the out-group name, which results in a 
reduction of negative associations toward this group. As we have discussed in Chapter 5 and 6, 
it seems likely that self-perception processes play a role here. People perceive that they nod a#er 
Moroccan names and may interpret this as a signal of their own liking or acceptance of this 
group. !e extent to which these perceptions and interpretations of the own behavior require 
conscious awareness remains to be investigated. Is this a deliberate propositional process or 
a result of more automatic associations? Future research is needed to be able to draw $rm 
conclusions on this issue. In Part 3, we provide $rst indications that demand awareness may 
actually hinder e&ects of head nodding on indirect measures of prejudice. However, awareness 
should be studied more systematically, or be manipulated experimentally to clarify the role of 
this process (e.g., Field, 2000).   
!us, approach movements and head nodding movements may a&ect indirect measures 
of prejudice through di&erent processes. Do they also have di&erent consequences for people’s 
behaviors toward members of the out-group? We have shown that approach training a&ects 
basic behaviors that are fueled by feelings of fear, such as maintaining interpersonal distance. 
It remains to be investigated whether a head nodding training would also a&ect the distance 
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people keep from an out-group member. It is possible that a head nodding training leaves 
people’s avoidance responses una&ected, because this training is not expected to tap directly 
into people’s feelings of fear. Conversely, it could be hypothesized that a head nodding training 
a&ects behaviors that are in line with the meaning that is associated with this movement, that is 
acceptance and agreement. For example, do people agree more with or are they more accepting 
of the out-group a#er a head nodding training? More research is needed to study and compare 
the e&ects that approach movements and head nodding movements may have on di&erent 
aspects of prejudice.   
Does embodied conditioning differ from evaluative conditioning?
I have now discussed how bodily movements can be used in a conditioning procedure 
to a&ect implicit bias toward an out-group. !e question may rise whether and how such 
embodied conditioning di&ers from other forms of evaluative conditioning. In typical evaluative 
conditioning procedures, the conditioned stimulus is repeatedly presented in proximity to a 
positive or negative stimulus, such as pictures of respectively pleasant and unpleasant pictures 
or words. For example, in a study by Olson and Fazio (2006), participants were presented with 
pairs of pictures of Black faces with positive stimuli and pairs of White faces with negative 
stimuli. Compared to a control condition, these pairings resulted in less bias toward Blacks on 
a subsequent priming measure, even up to two days later. 
A major di&erence between these forms of evaluative conditioning and the procedures 
presented in this dissertation is that the latter procedures involve the participants’ own body. 
At $rst sight, these bodily movements may be interpreted as mere examples of positive stimuli. 
However, it could be that the use of the own body results in processes that are inherently di&erent 
from evaluative conditioning with external stimuli. Conditioning with external stimuli is a 
relatively passive task; the person perceives the stimuli, and this visual input is the only type of 
information that is processed. In embodied conditioning procedures, the person is an active 
agent in the self-performed conditioning task. Because more modalities play a role here (i.e., the 
visual and motor system) and the participant is actively involved in the task, stronger encoding 
may occur. In fact, a large number of cognitive and neuroscienti$c studies have shown that 
self-performed physical actions during encoding of information enhance cognitive processes 
such as memory as compared to passive tasks (e.g., Cohen, 1989; Engelkamp & Zimmer, 1997; 
James et al., 2002; Matsumoto et al., 2006). Importantly, such bene$cial performance e&ects of 
active learning have also been found for multisensory associative information (Butler, James, 
& Harman James, 2011). !us, because of its active motor involvement embodied conditioning 
may potentially evoke stronger e&ects than evaluative conditioning with external stimuli.     
tHe role of GenDer in tHe emboDiment of PrejuDice
As outlined in the General Introduction of this dissertation, recent perspectives on 
prejudice view bias as a gendered phenomenon, from the side of the target as well as of the 
perceiver (Navarrete, McDonald, Molina, & Sidanius, 2010). First, it has been found that ethnic 
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out-group bias is primarily targeted at males from the out-group (Haley, Sidanius, Lowery, 
& Malamuth, 2004; Navarrete et al., 2009; Navarrete et al., 2010). Second, it is argued that 
bias toward out-group males is primarily driven by fear-related avoidance in females and by 
aggression-related approach in males. In line with most studies on ethnic prejudice, we have 
focused solely on prejudice toward out-group males in the present dissertation. On the side of 
the perceiver, the present dissertation provides partial and indirect evidence for the idea that 
out-group bias may be based on di&erent processes for males and females. In this section, I 
will shortly review the relevant $ndings and suggest how future studies could shed more light 
on the role of gender of the perceiver in the embodiment of prejudice.   
 In Part 1 and 2 of this dissertation, we propose that the e&ects of darkness and approach 
movements are driven by processes of fear. Speci$cally, we suggest that darkness increases 
implicit bias because it enhances feelings of fear that are already activated by the out-group, 
whereas we suggest that approach movements diminish feelings of fear toward the out-group. 
From the perspective of Navarrete and colleagues (2010), these processes should be particularly 
applicable to female perceivers. Unfortunately, we did not have enough male participants in 
our samples to draw strong conclusions about the role of gender of the perceiver. However, 
there are some preliminary indications in our data sets that are in line with the idea that fear 
may primarily be relevant for female perceivers’ prejudice.
In Chapter 3, a few males participated in the $rst study on the e&ect of darkness on bias 
toward Moroccans. When comparing the e&ect of darkness on prejudice for male versus 
female participants, we found a signi$cant e&ect of participant gender. Females had much 
higher prejudice scores in the dark than males, whereas these scores did not di&er in the 
light room. In the following studies, we invited only female participants, and in Study 4 we 
found more support for an e&ect of darkness on prejudice of females toward Moroccan males. 
Future research should shed more light on the role that gender of the perceiver plays in the 
in%uence of the environment on prejudice. By focusing on a fear-evoking environment, we 
may have le# prejudice of males una&ected. Situations in which feelings of anger or aggression 
are evoked are expected to result in heightened prejudice for males.   
In Chapter 4, we also ran several explorative analyses to study the role of participant 
gender. In the $rst study, we found an interaction between the indirect measure of prejudice 
and gender on avoidance responses. !e $nding that prejudice predicts avoidance was found 
particularly for female participants, in line with the idea that their prejudice is based on 
feelings of fear. In the second study, the interaction between training, prejudice and gender 
seems to indicate that the approach training is speci$cally applicable to reducing female 
participants’ avoidance behavior. However, because of the low number of males in the sample, 
this e&ect should be interpreted with caution. Directly studying the in%uence of gender on 
approach and avoidance responses and investigating whether or how gender a&ects the impact 
of approach training on the reduction of prejudiced behavior are interesting lines for future 
research. Based on the perspective proposed by Navarrete and colleagues (2010), it could be 
expected that prejudice in males predicts anger-based approach toward the out-group. In line 
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with this $nding, an approach training may only exacerbate prejudiced responses for males. 
In that case, an avoidance training may be better suited to reduce prejudice and prejudiced 
responses of males. 
Interestingly, recent studies by Kuppens and colleagues (2012) have tested whether 
di&erent emotions have diverging e&ects on indirect measures of ethnic prejudice for men 
and women. British participants were asked to recall an event in which they felt angry or 
afraid (cf., Dasgupta et al., 2009) and then performed an IAT comparing positive and negative 
associations with the in-group (British names) versus a non-familiar out-group (Surinamese 
names). !ey found that anger resulted in more negative associations with the out-group, 
but only for male participants. No e&ects were found for fear. !is $nding may result in yet 
another interesting hypothesis for the role of gender of the perceiver in prejudice. Possibly, 
anger increases prejudice of males toward all ethnic out-groups, whereas fear only increases 
prejudice of females toward groups that they already $nd threatening. 
Finally, it may be of interest to focus on relevant individual di&erences in the role of gender 
of the perceiver in prejudice. !at is, males’ prejudice may generally be driven by anger and 
aggression, and females’ prejudice by fear, but there may important moderating variables in 
these e&ects. For example, Navarrete and colleagues (2010) have shown that the role of these 
emotions are primarily present for males that are socially dominant and females that feel 
sexually vulnerable. !us, anger may speci$cally drive bias for males who are generally more 
aggressive, and fear may speci$cally drive bias for females who believe they could be harmed 
easily. Future research on the role of gender of the perceiver in out-group bias should also take 
into account measures of relevant individual di&erences.
tHe future of An emboDiment APProAcH to PrejuDice
I have now discussed the main $ndings of the present dissertation, explained how 
these $ndings $t within an embodied cognition approach to prejudice, and indicated some 
limitations of the present studies and questions that remain to be answered by future research. 
In this section, I would like to emphasize a few $nal directions for future research that may be 
inspired by the embodied cognition approach to prejudice. 
Giving more body to the embodiment of prejudice 
As has become clear from di&erent discussion sections within this $nal chapter, the body 
is suggested to play a crucial role in the in%uence of the environment on the expression of 
prejudice and bodily movements in the expression or reduction of prejudice. Concretely, 
I have argued that enhanced feelings of fear drive the e&ects of strengthened prejudice in 
the dark, and that the reduction of feelings of fear by means of approach training underlies 
the prejudice-reducing e&ect of this procedure. !e next step in fully implementing the 
embodiment approach is to include online measures of physiological states in the study on 
the embodiment of prejudice. Many measures are available to the psychophysiological study 
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of prejudice (see for a review Guglielmi, 1999; see also Amodio, 2008) that could help to shed 
more light on the proposed mediating role of the body in the in%uence of the environment 
and bodily movements on prejudice. 
Besides testing more directly the mediating role of the body, the embodiment approach to 
prejudice could bene$t from a wider and more ecologically valid selection of movements in 
studying prejudice reduction. Most concretely, in the research line on approach training, we 
(and other researchers, i.e., Kawakami et al., 2007; Phills et al, 2011) have now only studied 
approach training e&ects using approach arm movements. Expanding this line of research 
by testing an approach training in which participants repeatedly have to walk toward an out-
group person may shed more light on the e&ects and boundaries of this type of training. 
Importantly, not only does this procedure di&er in type of movement, but also in symbolic 
meaning. In the approach arm movement training, the participant moves the joystick towards 
the self and as a result the picture of the out-group male moves closer. In a walking procedure, 
it is not the out-group person that is being moved closer by the participant, but the participant 
him or herself has to move toward the out-group person. Possibly, such a full body approach 
in which the participant makes the move may at $rst be more aversive, but eventually could 
result in a stronger change in the underlying feelings of fear and subsequent reduction of 
prejudice. 
With the present dissertation, I have made a start in systematically studying e&ects of the 
environment and bodily movements on prejudice and prejudice reduction. I look forward 
to studies that will expand this line of research by investigating e&ects of di&erent types of 
environmental factors and di&erent bodily movements. !e growing literature on embodiment 
e&ects in social psychology provides many interesting options that could be applied to 
the research area of prejudice. Outside darkness, a potentially interesting variable in the 
environment could be temperature. Previous studies have shown that warmth may enhance 
positive feelings toward other people (e.g., Williams & Bargh, 2008; IJzerman & Semin, 
2009). Would this also apply to people belonging to other ethnic groups? Besides approach 
and head nodding movements, other bodily movements could potentially reduce negative 
associations with an out-group. For example, activation of facial muscles involved in smiling, 
and synchronizing movements with the out-group (i.e., imitation, see for a $rst demonstration 
Inzlicht, Gutsell, & Legault, 2012) may be interesting directions for future research.    
Practical applications and long-term effects
A question that remains unanswered by the present dissertation is how long-lasting the 
e&ects of a training with bodily movements are on the reduction of negative feelings toward 
the out-group. In all our studies, we have measured prejudice or prejudiced behavior directly 
a#er the bodily movements training. !us, we can only speculate about more long-term 
e&ects of the training. Without further repetition of the training, it is likely that the e&ects 
will not last very long (cf., Rowe & Craske, 1998 for clinical practice work). As a comparison, 
exposure therapy e&ects have been found to show strong e&ects, but also high levels of 
General discussion 131
Chapter 
7
relapse in the long run (for a review see Bouton, 2002). Interestingly, it has been suggested 
that extinction of fear by means of exposure therapy does not result in unlearning of fear, 
but in “context-dependent new learning” (Bouton, 2002; p. 982). For clinical practice, it thus 
has been suggested to conduct the treatment in the context in which the disorder is most 
problematic, or in a way that makes it generalizable to new contexts. Drawing this comparison 
may thus evoke the interesting suggestion to test the interaction between context and bodily 
movements in the reduction of negative associations with an out-group.   
Finally, the question may rise whether the $ndings of our controlled environmental 
studies are applicable to real-world situations. Could the $ndings be implemented to alter 
negative associations between groups in society? Although the aim of this dissertation was 
not to design an intervention to alter prejudice in society, the fundamental insights gained by 
these studies may prove to be relevant to the public domain. !at is, by enhancing knowledge 
about the role of the environment in prejudice, it could be studied how public spaces may be 
optimized to decrease potentially fear-enhancing e&ects, for example by optimizing lightning 
conditions at night. Additionally, the role of television in transmitting implicit bias may 
be taken under consideration. A study by Weisbuch, Pauker, and Ambady (2009) showed 
that nonverbal negative behaviors displayed by White characters toward Black characters 
on popular television shows in the US a&ected viewers‘ implicit bias toward Blacks. !us, 
through vicarious learning, implicit prejudice was enhanced. Combining this insight with 
knowledge from the present dissertation may evoke potentially interesting options for 
reduction of prejudice through channels like television. !at is, it should be studied whether 
people’s bias could also be reduced by seeing other people approaching, nodding, or making 
other positive nonverbal signals toward an out-group member. If so, this may open directions 
for the practical application of the way in which the body may a&ect prejudice. 
concluDinG remArks
Research on prejudice has a long and strong history in the $eld of social psychology. !e 
richness of this research $eld is not only re%ected in the relatively large number of studies that 
are published in this area, but also in the use and application of important perspectives from 
di&erent areas of psychology. !e goal of the present dissertation was to apply insights from 
embodied cognition to the study of prejudice. In doing so, I have aimed to show how this 
framework may be combined with other recent approaches to prejudice, such as emphases on 
implicit forms of bias, the role of emotions, and gender. 
!e most important take-home message of this dissertation is that biased attitudes and 
behaviors do not develop in a vacuum free from bodily and environmental in%uences. More 
speci$cally, the body and the environment are at the core of these prejudiced attitudes. 
Systematically studying how the environment and bodily states a&ect people’s attitudes toward 
people from other groups may enhance knowledge about this problematic form of intergroup 
bias. In this dissertation, I have made a start in approaching prejudice from an embodied 
cognition perspective. I hope that the research and suggestions in this dissertation inspire 
future investigations into the embodiment of prejudice. 
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Mensen delen de wereld om zich heen in in categorieën; objecten die we tegenkomen 
krijgen automatisch een label opgeplakt. We zitten op een stoel, we eten aan een tafel, we 
reizen met een trein en we wonen in Nederland. We hebben deze categorieën nodig om de 
enorme hoeveelheid informatie te kunnen verwerken die dagelijks op ons a"omt. Hetzelfde 
doen we ook bij personen. Zonder veel nadenken delen we mensen in in groepen (ook wel 
sociale categorieën genoemd); bijvoorbeeld op basis van geslacht, etniciteit, seksuele voorkeur, 
woonplaats of clublidmaatschap (Allport, 1954). Dit groeperen van mensen is een natuurlijk 
psychologisch proces dat een functionele rol speelt in ons dagelijks leven (Van Knippenberg 
& Dijksterhuis, 2000).
Echter, het indelen van mensen in groepen brengt ook problemen met zich mee, omdat 
dit “hokjesdenken” de basis legt voor stereotypering, vooroordelen en discriminatie (Brown, 
1995). Hoe vergaand de consequenties van “wij” versus “zij” denken kunnen zijn, blijkt uit 
talloze hedendaagse voorbeelden en uit gebeurtenissen in de menselijke geschiedenis. Met 
name de verschrikkingen van de Tweede Wereldoorlog riepen vragen op over het ontstaan van 
vooroordelen en discriminatie, wat resulteerde in de ontwikkeling van de sociale psychologie 
als onderzoeksgebied (Cartwright, 1979).  
Onderzoek naar stereotypen, vooroordelen en discriminatie blij# toenemen in omvang 
(Dovidio, Hewstone, Glick, & Esses, 2010). Naast de groei in aantal studies vindt er in de 
laatste jaren ook een verbreding plaats van theoretische inzichten die worden gebruikt in deze 
studies. Een benadering die recent veel aandacht hee# gekregen in de sociale psychologie 
is de ‘belichaamde cognitie’ (embodied cognition; Barsalou, Niedenthal, Barbey, & Ruppert, 
2003; Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2005; Smith & Semin, 2007). 
Deze benadering hee# belangrijke inzichten geleverd voor het onderzoek naar emoties, 
sociale waarneming en attitudes; processen die een belangrijke rol spelen bij (het ontstaan 
van) vooroordelen. Onder vooroordelen verstaan we de negatieve gevoelens of attitudes 
die mensen kunnen hebben tegenover mensen van andere groepen. Verrassend genoeg is 
slechts een klein aantal studies naar vooroordelen gebaseerd op theorieën van belichaamde 
cognitie. Het doel van dit proefschri# is om de kennis over het ontstaan en de werking van 
vooroordelen te verhogen door het toepassen en onderzoeken van ideeën uit de belichaamde 
cognitie.  
De kern van de belichaamde cognitie benadering is dat ons lichaam een centrale rol speelt 
bij psychologische processen. Het heersende idee in de psychologie was lange tijd dat complexe 
cognitieve processen, zoals het trekken van conclusies en categoriseren van dingen en mensen, 
los van het lichaam plaatsvinden (Fodor, 1975; Newel, 1980). Informatie komt volgens deze 
opvatting wel binnen via verschillende zintuigen (bijvoorbeeld zien, ruiken, horen), maar 
wordt vervolgens in ons geheugen opgeslagen in de vorm van abstracte symbolen die geen 
relatie meer hebben met de neurale systemen die betrokken waren bij de oorspronkelijke 
ervaring (gebieden in het brein die bij de speci$eke sensorische systemen horen; bijvoorbeeld 
de visuele, olfactorische of motor cortex). Vanuit het belichaamde cognitie perspectief 
vormen lichamelijke processen echter de kern bij het verwerken van informatie. Volgens 
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deze benadering wordt kennis opgeslagen in dezelfde (sensorische) gebieden die betrokken 
waren bij de oorspronkelijke ervaring. Bijvoorbeeld, als je een persoon tegenkomt worden 
neuronen actief in je visuele cortex bij wat je ziet, in de auditieve cortex bij wat je hoort, en 
in de motor cortex bij hoe je beweegt. Deze informatie wordt niet vertaald naar een abstract 
symbool, maar wordt in oorspronkelijke vorm in deze gebieden opgeslagen. Wanneer je later 
terugdenkt aan de gebeurtenis, dan wordt een deel van deze oorspronkelijke informatie weer 
actief. Dus, kennis is de gedeeltelijke simulatie van de oorspronkelijke gebeurtenis (Barsalou, 
1999) en het gebruiken van kennis is als het herbeleven van een ervaring in (delen) van de 
hersengebieden die betrokken waren bij de oorspronkelijke gebeurtenis (Niedenthal, 2007). 
Uit het perspectief van belichaamde cognitie volgt een aantal voorspellingen over 
de relatie tussen lichamelijke en psychologische processen. Ik zal kort aangeven wat deze 
voorspellingen zijn, welk bewijs er voor gevonden is en wat de relatie met onderzoek naar 
vooroordelen is. De eerste voorspelling is dat iemands gevoelens of attitudes via lichamelijke 
uitingen tot expressie komen. Voor deze voorspelling is veel bewijs gevonden in onderzoek 
naar attitudes en emoties. Mensen hebben bijvoorbeeld de neiging om positieve dingen te 
benaderen en negatieve dingen te vermijden (Chen & Bargh, 1999). In een sociale context 
is verder gevonden dat het lezen over een aardig persoon automatisch resulteert in positieve 
gezichtsexpressies en het lezen over een onaardig persoon in negatieve expressies (Andersen, 
Reznik, & Manzella, 1996). In het onderzoeksgebied van vooroordelen is er ook vaak gevonden 
dat negatieve attitudes ten opzichte van een andere groep tot uiting komen in gedrag richting 
mensen van die groep, bijvoorbeeld het houden van afstand en het vermijden van oogcontact 
(Amodio & Devine, 2006; Dotsch & Wigboldus, 2008; Dovidio et al., 1997).
Ten tweede voorspelt de benadering van belichaamde cognitie dat lichaamsuitingen, 
omgekeerd, ook iemands attitudes kunnen beïnvloeden. Zo is er gevonden dat het maken 
van positieve bewegingen (zoals toenadering en hoofdknikken) resulteert in meer positieve 
attitudes en het maken van negatieve bewegingen (zoals vermijding en hoofdschudden) in 
meer negatieve attitudes (Cacioppo, Priester, & Berntson, 1993; Tom, Pettersen, Lau, Burton, 
& Cook, 1991). Bij vooroordelen is hier verrassend genoeg nog weinig onderzoek naar gedaan. 
Vooroordelen resulteren in negatieve gedragsuitingen en volgens de belichaamde cognitie 
moet je juist deze lichamelijke processen aanpakken om uiteindelijk vooroordelen te kunnen 
verminderen. In het huidige proefschri# heb ik daarom bestudeerd hoe je lichamelijke 
processen kunt gebruiken om negatieve attitudes of gedragingen ten opzichte van mensen 
van een andere groep te veranderen. 
Tot slot voorspelt de benadering van belichaamde cognitie dat ook de omgeving een 
belangrijke rol speelt bij psychologische processen. Bij het onderzoek naar vooroordelen 
wordt de omgeving vaak buiten beschouwing gelaten. Echter, volgens de belichaamde cognitie 
benadering zou de omgeving waarin een persoon zich bevindt zijn of haar psychologische 
en emotionele staten beïnvloeden, die vervolgens de perceptie van dingen of mensen in de 
omgeving zou moeten kleuren. In het huidige proefschri# is onderzocht hoe een donkere 
omgeving iemands vooroordelen kan beïnvloeden. 
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overzicHt vAn Het ProefscHrift
In dit proefschri# heb ik een begin gemaakt met het bestuderen van vooroordelen vanuit 
het perspectief van de belichaamde cognitie, door 1) de rol van de omgeving te bestuderen bij 
de uiting van vooroordelen, en 2) te onderzoeken hoe lichamelijke bewegingen vooroordelen 
kunnen beïnvloeden. We bestudeerden hierbij de vooroordelen van Nederlanders over een 
andere etnische groep (mensen van Marokkaanse a"omst). 
 Vooroordelen kunnen bijvoorbeeld gemeten worden door mensen direct te vragen 
naar hun mening over verschillende groepen. Onderzoek hee# echter laten zien dat deze 
expliciete attitudes niet altijd goede voorspellers zijn voor subtiele uitingen van vooroordelen 
en daarom is er een reeks indirecte technieken ontwikkeld om vooroordelen te meten. Eén 
van de meest gebruikte technieken is de Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, 
& Schwartz, 1998). Dit is een methode die gebaseerd is op reactietijden. De variant die wij 
in het proefschri# hebben gebruikt (Wigboldus, Holland, & Van Knippenberg, 2004) kijkt 
hoe snel mensen zijn om negatieve versus positieve concepten te associëren met de categorie 
“Marokkanen”. Hoe sneller mensen zijn in het combineren van negatieve concepten met 
Marokkanen, in vergelijking tot het combineren van positieve concepten met Marokkanen, 
hoe sterker de mate van bevooroordeeldheid. 
Deel 1: Duisternis versterkt vooroordelen
In het eerste deel van dit proefschri# onderzochten we de invloed van een donkere 
omgeving op vooroordelen. Duisternis kan angst oproepen vanwege de mogelijke gevaren die 
in het donker kunnen schuilen (Grillon, Pellowski, Merikangas, & Davis, 1997; Mühlberger, 
Wieser, & Pauli, 2008). We verwachtten dat vooroordelen sterker tot uiting zouden komen in 
het donker, maar alleen met betrekking tot een groep die over het algemeen angst oproept. 
Deze hypothese sluit aan bij onderzoek dat laat zien dat groepen verschillende emoties in 
mensen kunnen oproepen (Smith, 1993), zoals angst, walging of boosheid (e.g., Cottrell & 
Neuberg, 2005; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; Mackie & Smith, 2002). Het ervaren van deze 
emoties buiten een groepscontext kan invloed hebben op vooroordelen (Dasgupta, DeSteno, 
Williams, & Hunsinger, 2009). Bijvoorbeeld, in dit eerdere onderzoek werd getoond dat het 
terugdenken aan het ervaren van walging de negatieve associaties versterkte met een groep 
die met walging geassocieerd is (homoseksuelen), maar niet met een groep die met boosheid 
geassocieerd is (Arabieren). Terugdenken aan een boosheid ervaring had het omgekeerde 
e&ect, namelijk versterkte negatieve associaties met Arabieren, maar niet met homoseksuelen. 
Alvorens de invloed van duisternis op vooroordelen te onderzoeken deden we eerst 
een aantal studies om te bestuderen welke speci$eke emoties over het algemeen worden 
opgeroepen door verschillende groepen in de Nederlandse context. Hierbij maakten we 
een onderscheid tussen walging en angst, twee negatieve basis emoties die geassocieerd zijn 
met vermijding (Ekman, 1992; 1999). We verwachtten dat vooral mensen van Marokkaanse 
a"omst bij Nederlanders gevoelens van angst zouden oproepen, omdat uit eerder onderzoek 
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is gebleken dat deze groep tot de meest negatief geëvalueerde etnische groepen in Nederland 
behoort (Verkuyten & Zaremba, 2005) en geassocieerd wordt met criminaliteit en agressie 
(Dotsch, Wigboldus, Langner, & Van Knippenberg, 2008). In Hoofdstuk 2 rapporteren we drie 
studies waarin we vonden dat Marokkanen in Nederland inderdaad vooral angst oproepen. 
We vonden dit zowel wanneer we deelnemers direct vroegen naar de mate van angst die ze 
ervaren bij Marokkanen, maar ook wanneer we op meer indirecte wijze de angst maten die 
door Marokkanen werd opgeroepen.  
In Hoofdstuk 3 bestudeerden we de invloed van een donkere omgeving op vooroordelen. In 
de eerste studie van Hoofdstuk 3 maten we impliciete vooroordelen in een onderzoeksruimte 
die of nagenoeg donker was of normaal verlicht. Deelnemers begonnen allemaal in een lichte 
onderzoeksruimte, waar ze een taak deden om de associaties tussen Marokkanen en angst 
te meten. Hierna werden ze naar de ruimte met de omgevingsmanipulatie gebracht voor de 
meting van impliciete vooroordelen. We voegden in deze studie ook een aantal controles 
toe. Ten eerste hadden we een derde omgevingsfactor, die ook negatief was, maar niet met 
angst geassocieerd (een ruimte met een vieze lucht). Verder maten we in de drie ruimtes ook 
impliciete vooroordelen over mensen met obesitas. We verwachtten dat negatieve associaties 
met Marokkanen sterker zouden worden in het donker dan in het licht of de ruimte met 
de vieze geur. Voor de negatieve associaties met mensen met obesitas verwachtten we geen 
verschillen tussen het donker en licht. Voor deze groep zou de vieze geur tot versterkte 
vooroordelen kunnen leiden, omdat we in Hoofdstuk 2 hadden gevonden dat obesitas met 
walging geassocieerd is.  
De resultaten van de eerste studie lieten een e&ect zien van de omgevingsmanipulatie op de 
impliciete vooroordelen over Marokkanen. In alle condities vonden we dat deelnemers over 
het algemeen negatieve associaties met Marokkanen hadden. Echter, deze associaties waren 
negatiever in het donker dan in het licht en in de stank. De impliciete vooroordelen over 
mensen met obesitas werden niet beïnvloed door de omgevingsmanipulatie, mogelijk omdat 
de vieze lucht die we hadden gebruikt (visachtige geur) niet toepasbaar is op deze groep. 
We hebben een tweede studie uitgevoerd om de e&ecten te repliceren van duisternis op de 
impliciete vooroordelen over Marokkanen. De procedure van deze studie was verder gelijk aan 
die van Studie 1 en we vonden wederom een e&ect van omgeving op impliciete vooroordelen. 
In beide condities waren deelnemers over het algemeen negatief over Marokkanen, maar deze 
negatieve associaties waren sterker in de donkere kamer dan in de lichte kamer. 
We vonden in deze studies ook aanwijzingen dat de e&ecten van het donker alleen 
optreden voor vrouwelijke deelnemers. Deze bevindingen zijn in lijn met recente ideeën 
dat vooroordelen sterk beïnvloed worden door geslacht (Navarrete et al., 2010). Vanuit een 
evolutionair perspectief wordt gesuggereerd dat vooroordelen van vrouwen ten opzichte van 
mannen van een andere groep voornamelijk gebaseerd zijn op angst en vermijding, terwijl 
vooroordelen van mannen ten opzichte van mannen van een andere groep voornamelijk 
gebaseerd zijn op boosheid en agressie. We hadden in onze studies niet genoeg mannelijke 
deelnemers om te bestuderen wat er bij hun precies gebeurde, maar door onze focus op 
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duisternis en angst hebben we ons verder gericht op de vrouwelijke deelnemers. 
Belangrijk om te vermelden is dat twee andere studies uit dit hoofdstuk laten zien dat de 
e&ecten van duisternis op vooroordelen subtiel zijn en a-ankelijk van een procedure waarin 
we eerst de associaties tussen Marokkanen en angst activeren in de normale onderzoeksruimte 
en een maat van impliciete vooroordelen gebruiken die ook angst-gerelateerde plaatjes bevat. 
Dit kan te maken hebben met het feit dat duisternis in een gecontroleerde lab-omgeving niet 
erg veel angst oproept of omdat onze meting van impliciete vooroordelen wellicht niet de 
meest geschikte maat is om subtiele angst signalen bloot te leggen. Vervolgonderzoek is nodig 
om meer inzicht te verkrijgen in e&ecten van duisternis op vooroordelen en om de rol van het 
lichaam hier meer direct in te bestuderen, door bijvoorbeeld fysiologische metingen te doen 
van angst-reacties bij verschillende groepen in het donker. 
Deel 2: toenadering vermindert bevooroordeeld gedrag
In het tweede deel van het proefschri# hebben we gekeken naar de relatie tussen 
vooroordelen en bewegingen van toenadering en vermijding. Uit eerder onderzoek was 
gebleken dat de mate van impliciete vooroordelen een voorspeller is voor de afstand die 
mensen houden van leden van een andere etnische groep (Amodio & Devine, 2006; Dotsch 
& Wigboldus, 2008). Bij het bestuderen van vooroordelen over groepen die angst oproepen 
kan de speci$eke hypothese worden opgesteld dat vooroordelen met name de mate van 
vermijding van deze groepen voorspellen.
Deze hypothese toetsten we in de eerste studie van Hoofdstuk 4. We maten eerst bij 
deelnemers de impliciete vooroordelen over Marokkanen en na een aantal ongerelateerde 
taken werd aan hen gevraagd een taak van toenadering en vermijding uit te voeren. 
We maten hierbij hoe snel mensen waren in het naar zich toe trekken van een hendel 
(toenaderingsbeweging) of het van zich duwen van een hendel (vermijdingsbeweging) bij 
Marokkaanse versus Nederlandse namen. We vonden dat naarmate mensen meer impliciete 
vooroordelen hadden over Marokkanen, ze sneller waren in het vermijden van Marokkaanse 
namen dan het vermijden van Nederlandse namen. Snelheid van toenadering was niet 
a-ankelijk van impliciete vooroordelen. 
Er is een interessante parallel te trekken tussen deze op angst gebaseerde vooroordelen en 
fobieën. In de klinische literatuur over het a%eren van angst en vermijding speelt toenadering 
een grote rol. Via zogenaamde exposure training wordt mensen met een fobie aangeleerd 
om het door hun gevreesde object te benaderen. Herhaaldelijk benaderen zonder negatieve 
consequenties kan vervolgens leiden tot een vermindering van angst en vermijding (Öst, 
1996). 
In lijn met deze ideeën wilden wij in Hoofdstuk 4 testen of de automatische neiging tot 
vermijding bij bevooroordeelde mensen afgeleerd zou kunnen worden via het herhaaldelijk 
maken van toenaderingsbewegingen. De hypothese hierbij was dat een toenaderingstraining 
zou leiden tot verminderde vermijding bij mensen met een relatief hoge mate van vooroordelen. 
We maten dus eerst bij alle deelnemers impliciete vooroordelen over Marokkanen en na een 
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aantal ongerelateerde taken ontvingen de deelnemers een training. In deze training verschenen 
plaatjes van Marokkaanse mannen op het scherm, die de ene hel# van de proefpersonen met 
een hendel naar zich toe moest trekken (toenadering) en de andere hel# van de proefpersonen 
met een hendel van zich af moest duwen (vermijding). Direct na a%oop van deze training 
meldden de deelnemers zich bij de proe%eider, die hun vroeg even plaats te nemen in een 
wachtruimte. In deze wachtruimte stonden een aantal stoelen langs de muur opgesteld en op 
de eerste stoel lagen een jas en een rugzak. De proe%eider liet deelnemers op subtiele wijze 
geloven dat deze bezittingen van een Marokkaanse jongen waren, die zo terug zou keren naar 
de wachtruimte. De proe%eider observeerde vervolgens hoe ver de proefpersonen van deze 
stoel af gingen zitten. 
De resultaten van deze studie waren in lijn met de verwachtingen. Voor de deelnemers 
die met de hendel plaatjes van Marokkaanse mannen hadden vermeden vonden we dezelfde 
relatie als in de eerste studie: namelijk dat hoe meer impliciete vooroordelen ze hadden over 
Marokkanen, hoe verder weg de deelnemers gingen zitten van de stoel van de Marokkaanse 
jongen in de wachtruimte. Echter, wanneer deelnemers een toenaderingstraining hadden 
ontvangen verdween deze relatie tussen impliciete vooroordelen en vermijding. Mensen met 
relatief veel vooroordelen gingen dichterbij de stoel van de Marokkaanse jongen zitten, even 
dichtbij als de mensen met relatief weinig vooroordelen. 
Net als in Hoofdstuk 2 vonden we in beide studies van Hoofdstuk 4 aanwijzingen dat de 
e&ecten met name optreden voor vrouwelijke deelnemers. Dit is wederom in lijn met het 
idee dat vooroordelen voor vrouwen gebaseerd zijn op angst en vermijding. Toekomstig 
onderzoek is nodig om meer inzicht te krijgen in de processen van vermijding en toenadering 
die bij mannen een rol spelen. 
Deel 3: knikken met het hoofd vermindert vooroordelen
In het laatste deel van dit proefschri# bestudeerden we de e&ecten van andere 
lichaamsbewegingen op impliciete vooroordelen; namelijk het knikken en schudden met 
het hoofd. Knikken met het hoofd hee# in de meeste westerse culturen de betekenis van 
instemming of goedkeuring, terwijl schudden met het hoofd een signaal van afwijzing of 
a"euring is. In Hoofdstuk 5 stelden we ons de vraag of het herhaaldelijk knikken van het 
hoofd bij het zien van een Marokkaanse naam zou leiden tot een vermindering van impliciete 
vooroordelen. We onderzochten hierbij ook of de volgorde waarin deze hoofdbeweging werd 
gemaakt – namelijk vóór of na het zien van de Marokkaanse naam – een invloed zou hebben 
op deze e&ecten. Wanneer het puur de positieve betekenis van het knikken is die overslaat 
op stimuli die in de nabijheid van het knikken worden aangeboden, dan zou het niet moeten 
uitmaken of de beweging al voor aanbieding van de naam of net daarna wordt ingezet. Echter, 
we hebben het knikken van het hoofd aangeleerd als een reactie op dingen in onze omgeving 
en we knikken dan ook vaak nadat we iets hebben gehoord of gezien dat ons aanspreekt. Als 
de betekenis van hoofdknikken dus vastligt in dit temporele patroon van gebeurtenissen, dan 
zou het hoofdknikken alleen positieve e&ecten moeten hebben als het volgt op het zien van 
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de Marokkaanse naam. 
We voerden een experiment uit om meer inzicht te krijgen in de e&ecten van 
hoofdbewegingen op impliciete vooroordelen. Deelnemers begonnen met een meting van 
impliciete vooroordelen en na een aantal ongerelateerde taken ontvingen ze een training 
waarin ze ofwel systematisch met het hoofd knikten of systematisch met het hoofd schudden 
voor of na het zien van een Marokkaanse naam. De taak was om woorden en namen die op het 
beeldscherm verschenen rustig uit te spreken en om een balletje te volgen dat op het scherm 
zou bewegen. Het balletje bewoog ofwel verticaal (knikken), ofwel horizontaal (schudden). 
Direct na deze taak maten we weer de impliciete vooroordelen over Marokkanen en deze 
meting vergeleken we met de meting van voor de training met de hoofdbewegingen. 
De resultaten lieten zien dat het knikken met het hoofd bij een Marokkaanse naam leidde 
tot een vermindering van vooroordelen. Echter, we vonden dit e&ect alleen wanneer de 
hoofdbeweging in de training na de naam volgde. Als mensen hadden geknikt vóórdat ze 
een Marokkaanse naam zagen, dan was er geen verandering van impliciete vooroordelen. 
In Hoofdstuk 6 repliceerden we het e&ect dat vooroordelen verminderen wanneer mensen 
herhaaldelijk hadden geknikt na het zien van een Marokkaanse naam. In deze studie vonden 
we ook dat er geen verandering van vooroordelen plaatsvindt wanneer de naam slechts de 
hel# van de tijd werd gevolgd door het knikken, en de andere hel# van de tijd niet werd 
gevolgd door een beweging. Meer onderzoek is nodig om heldere conclusies over die laatste 
bevinding te trekken, maar het zou er op kunnen wijzen dat het bij een ‘belichaamde’ manier 
van conditioneren belangrijk is dat er een eenduidig signaal optreedt. Wanneer mensen 
slechts de hel# van de tijd knikken zouden ze dit kunnen ervaren als twijfel. 
conclusie
Sociaal psychologisch onderzoek naar vooroordelen kent een lange en rijke geschiedenis, 
niet alleen wat betre# de hoeveelheid studies naar dit fenomeen, maar ook gezien de toepassing 
van belangrijke theoretische benaderingen uit verschillende takken van de psychologie. Het 
doel van dit proefschri# was om inzichten vanuit een belichaamde cognitie benadering toe 
te passen op het onderzoek naar vooroordelen. Ik heb hierbij gepoogd te laten zien hoe dit 
raamwerk gecombineerd kan worden met andere recente inzichten, zoals de nadruk op 
impliciete vooroordelen, de rol van speci$eke emoties en de invloed van geslacht. 
De belangrijkste boodschap van dit proefschri# is dat vooroordelen en bevooroordeeld 
gedrag zich niet ontwikkelen in een vacuüm, maar dat ons lichaam en onze omgeving 
mede aan de basis van bevooroordeelde attitudes staan. Het systematisch bestuderen van 
de manieren waarop de omgeving en lichamelijke processen vooroordelen beïnvloeden 
is van groot belang voor een beter begrip van dit fenomeen. In dit proefschri# heb ik een 
begin gemaakt met het benaderen van vooroordelen vanuit het perspectief van belichaamde 
cognitie. Ik hoop dat het onderzoek en de suggesties uit dit proefschri# een inspiratie kunnen 
zijn voor vervolgonderzoek naar de rol van het lichaam en de omgeving bij vooroordelen. 

